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ABSTRACT
This dissertation research seeks to examine the role o f organizational insiders’ 
psychological capital (PsyCap) on the performance of protection motivated behaviors 
(PMBs). The dissertation examines the role o f PsyCap through three studies which were 
conducted for this research. Using structural equation modeling (SEM), the responses 
from four distinct samples were analyzed. The results largely support the significant role 
o f PsyCap in information security. The first study takes an expectancy theory (Vroom, 
1964) approach and found that PsyCap was a significant consequence o f insiders’ 
security-related expectancy dimensions. Additionally, expectancy theory was found to be 
an appropriate frame-work for promoting PMBs.
The expectancy dimensions were found to be trainable through security, 
education, training, and awareness (SETA) programs, and were significantly related to 
the performance of PMBs. The second study draws upon the broaden-and-build theory 
(Fredrickson, 2004) to examine the role of PsyCap within an emotional security 
framework. The second study found that the broaden-and-build theory explained the 
performance of PMBs through a direct relationship between emotion and behavior as 
well as through an indirect relationship between emotions and an insider’s PsyCap.
Finally, the dissertation examines the role o f PsyCap in information security from 
a framework of behavioral complexity (Wu et al., 2010) in the third study. The results of 
the third study indicate that PsyCap is a significant contributor to a model o f security
behavioral complexity which is shown to effectively influence insiders’ performance of 
PMBs. Implications o f the results on both practice and research are discussed along with 
limitations to the current studies. The overall contributions of the dissertation are 
highlighted and areas o f future research evidenced by the findings are raised.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In today’s knowledge economy, organizational success is increasingly reliant 
upon the effective utilization of organizational information systems (IS). In order to 
leverage the capabilities enabled by new technology, organizations often provide 
employees with access to information and information systems on an ongoing basis. This 
increased access provided by enterprise-wide systems and ubiquitous computing exposes 
the organization’s systems to risks beyond the proximate control o f the IT staff (Vroom et 
al., 2004). Given this complexity, it is not an understatement to say that the 
organization’s resources and systems are largely at the mercy o f the actions o f all insiders 
with access to the IS (Boss, Kirsch, Angermeier, Shingler, & Boss, 2009; D'Arcy & 
Hovav, 2007; Moore, Cappelli, & Trzeciak, 2008). In fact, According to a recent survey 
o f security practitioners, the complexity o f the security environment, not a lack of 
resources was the most widely reported cause o f information security concerns 
(Richardson, 2010/2011).
The reliance upon the behavior of employees for organizational information 
security led to the genesis o f a branch of information security research deemed behavioral 
information security, behavioral information security is defined as the study of “the 
human actions that influence the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of information 
systems” (Stanton et al., 2006b, p. 263). To date, most research into behavioral
1
information security has been in line with the perspective that users are generally bad 
actors, and any increase in user computing ability can be associated with an increased 
threat to the organization (Straub et al., 1990; Zafar et al., 2009). Recently, however, it 
has become known that many organizational insiders have requisite knowledge and 
ability to affect organizational security positively through their use of and interactions 
with technology and information systems in the workplace (Posey et al., 2013). 
Organizational insiders are all individuals (e.g., full- and part-time employees, temporary 
workers, board members) who have access to organizationally relevant information while 
fulfilling their duties (Posey et al., 2013; Shaw et al., 1998). The volitional behaviors 
organizational insiders can enact to protect (1) organizationally relevant information 
within their firms and (2) the computer-based IS in which that information is stored, 
collected, disseminated, and/or manipulated from information-security threats are 
protection-motivated behaviors (PMBs) (Posey et al., 2013).
The shift of behavioral information security to consider the security abilities of 
the average employee has mirrored a similar shift in psychology brought about by the 
positive psychology movement (Seligman et al., 2000). Positive psychology is “the study 
o f the conditions and processes that contribute to the flourishing or optimal functioning 
o f people, groups, and institutions” (Gable et al., 2005). Drawing on positive psychology, 
this dissertation extends the body of knowledge in behavioral information security by 
considering the impact of employees’ psychological capital (PsyCap) on the security- 
related outcomes of an organization. PsyCap is a higher order construct made up of core 
tenets of positive psychology conceptualized as hope, self-efficacy, resilience, and 
optimism (Luthans et al., 2007a).
3Psychological Capital
As a higher-order construct, PsyCap is composed of distinct yet related core 
tenets o f positive psychology o f hope, resilience, optimism, and self-efficacy. Positive 
psychology is interested in “optimal functioning” or what is referred to in its literature as 
“flourishing” (Seligman et al., 2000). A key characteristic o f positive psychology that 
makes it an ideal candidate for consideration in behavioral information security—  
especially dealing with the security behaviors of insiders— is that it is a branch of 
traditional psychology that has the “average person” as its subject (Sheldon et al., 2001). 
Therefore, positive psychology is fertile ground for the cultivation of appropriate security 
behaviors of ordinary organizational insiders, and PsyCap provides a succinct and well- 
established construct for investigating the role o f positive psychology in information 
security. The four subconstructs o f PsyCap are described next and are summarized in 
Table 1.1.
PsyCap hope is a “positive motivational state that is based on an interactively 
derived sense o f successful (a) agency (goal directed energy) and (b) pathways (planning 
to meet goals)” (Snyder et al., 1991, p. 287; Luthans et al., 2007a). PsyCap resilience “is 
characterized by positive coping and adaptation in the face o f significant risk or 
adversity” (Luthans et al., 2007a, p. 546; Masten, 2001; Masten et al., 2002). Resilience 
can also be thought of simply as “the positive psychological capacity to rebound, to 
‘bounce back’ from adversity, uncertainty, conflict, failure, or even positive change, 
progress and increased responsibility” (Luthans, 2002, p. 702; Luthans et al., 2007a). 
PsyCap optimism is the characteristic o f individuals who “expect things to go their way, 
and generally believe that good rather than bad things will happen to them” (Scheier et
4al., 1985). PsyCap self-efficacy is a role-breadth self-efficacy and is defined as “the 
employee’s conviction or confidence about his or her abilities to mobilize the motivation, 
cognitive resources or courses o f action needed to successfully execute a specific task 
within a given context” (Stajkovic et al., 1998, p. 66; Luthans et al., 2007a).
Table 1.1
Summary o f  PsyCap Characteristics
PsyCap
Compone
nt
Definition Micro-Development
PsyCap
Self-
Efficacy
“[T]he employee’s conviction or 
confidence about his or her abilities to 
mobilize the motivation, cognitive 
resources or courses o f action needed to 
successfully execute a specific task 
within a given context” (Stajkovic et al., 
1998, p. 66)
• Mastery experiences
• Modeling and vicarious 
learning
• Social persuasion
• Physiological and psychological 
arousal
PsyCap
Hope
“[Pjositive motivational state that is 
based on an interactively derived sense 
o f successful (a) agency (goal directed 
energy) and (b) pathways (planning to 
meet goals)” (Snyder et al., 1991, p. 
287).
• Goal-setting
• Participation
• Contingency planning for 
alternative pathways to attain 
goals
PsyCap
Optimism
Characterizes individuals who “expect 
things to go their way, and generally 
believe that good rather than bad things 
will happen to them.” (Scheier et al., 
1985).
• Leniency for the past
•  Appreciation for the present
•  Opportunity-seeking for the 
future
PsyCap
Resilience
“[T]he positive psychological capacity to 
rebound, to ‘bounce back’ from 
adversity, uncertainty, conflict, failure, or 
even positive change, progress and 
increased responsibility” (Luthans, 2002, 
p. 702)
• Asset-focused strategies such as 
enhancing employability
• Risk-focused strategies such as 
proactive avoidance of 
adversity
• Process-focused strategies to 
influence the interpretation of 
adverse events
Adapted from descriptions in Psychological capital: Developing the human competitive edge, Luthans, Youssef, et 
al. (2007b).
Though a relatively new construct, PsyCap, has already been widely accepted and 
used extensively in the field o f organizational behavior and beyond (Avey et al., 2009;
5Walumbwa et al., 2011; Avey et al., 2010; Peterson et al., 2011; Abbas et al., 2012; 
Wang et al., 2012). One reason that PsyCap has been so widely used is that it has been 
shown to be composed of characteristics that are state-like rather than trait-like. Though 
research has often relied on context to inform the true distinction between state and trait 
(Allen et al., 1981), an important distinction can be made between trait-like and state-like 
dispositions (Zuckerman, 1983; Fugate et al., 2012). This differentiation is especially 
critical in a security context because PsyCap, a construct composed o f state-like 
characteristic, has been shown to be developable (Luthans et al., 2007a; Luthans et al., 
2006a; Peterson et al., 2011). Therefore, any benefits to firm security that can be shown 
to be attributable to PsyCap can be influenced by an organization through what could be 
thought o f as an investment in employees’ PsyCap.
Additionally, malleability is an important criterion for inclusion into behavioral 
information security. To fully recognize the potential benefits of considering PsyCap in 
behavioral information security, the methods for developing PsyCap should also be 
considered. As PsyCap is a latent construct composed of four underlying characteristics, 
it can be developed at the facet level by developing each o f the individual characteristics 
(Luthans et al., 2006b; Luthans et al., 2006a). A thorough treatment o f PsyCap “micro­
intervention” can be found in Luthans et al. (2007b), and is summarized in Table 1.1. 
PsyCap is a higher-order reflective construct, which means that the facets o f PsyCap vary 
together (Jarvis et al., 2003; Bagozzi, 2011). Building PsyCap at the facet level should 
take advantage o f the reported synergistic relationship among the indicators and lead to 
an increase in the overall PsyCap construct (Luthans et al., 2007b).
As the name implies, PsyCap can be thought of quite literally as a factor of 
psychological production. In parallel to the traditional factors o f economic production, 
land (or natural resources), labor, and capital (Beer, 1980; Huettner et al., 1982), PsyCap 
meets the criteria o f a psychological resource (Avey et al., 2009). PsyCap can therefore 
be viewed through the lens o f resource theory (Luthans et al., 2007b; Hobfoll, 1989; 
Hobfoll, 2002). Hobfoll’s (1989) describes the role o f resources, stipulating that 
individuals require resources for functioning, and they will seek to gain available 
resources and when possible conserve unnecessarily expended resources. Thus, the 
conservation o f resources has two components: the building of resources and the 
conservation of resources. PsyCap as a resource can be built by either micro-intervention 
(see Table 1.1) or by macro-intervention such as a supportive climate (Luthans et al., 
2008). In reference to conservation, resources are either “centrally valued in their own 
right” or “as a means to obtain centrally valued ends” (Hobfoll, 2002). PsyCap can be 
viewed as adaptive in that not only does PsyCap embody a positive psychological state, 
as a psychological construct it serves meaningful ends. For instance, PsyCap has been 
shown to provide a necessary psychological resource for psychological well-being 
(Culbertson et al., 2010).
Theoretical Foundation of Dissertation
This dissertation includes three studies which each examine a novel and unique 
approach to behavioral information security. As implied in the name of the tome, 
common to the studies is an examination of the role o f insider’s PsyCap. The first study 
is grounded in expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) and simultaneously assesses the 
responsiveness o f expectancy dimensions to training and the impact o f expectancy
7dimensions on motivation to and withdrawal from protective security behaviors. The 
second study examines the impact o f emotion in information security and is grounded in 
the broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 2004). The final study develops and examines 
a model o f security behavioral complexity (Wu et al., 2010), consisting o f security 
behavioral repertoire, security differentiation, and PsyCap. The succeeding sections 
provide a brief articulation of the theoretical foundation of each of the three security 
studies including PsyCap.
Study 1: A Multi-Dimensional Assessment o f  Organizational 
Insiders ’ Performance o f  Protection-Motivated Behaviors:
An Expectancy Theory Approach
Originally developed by Vroom (1964), expectancy theory has been used in 
numerous studies involving motivation in the workplace (Van Eerde et al., 1996). 
Expectancy theory enables a multidimensional diagnostic approach to motivation 
(Sanchez et al., 2000; Ilgen et al., 1981; Courtney et al., 1983; DeSanctis, 1983). 
Expectancy theory— also referred to as VIE theory— offers a set of three motivational 
antecedents consisting o f (1) valence, (2) instrumentality, and (3) expectancy (Ellingson 
et al., 2011). Valence is the preference of one outcome over another (or all others) 
(Vroom, 1964). Instrumentality is an individual’s perception that successfully enacting a 
behavior will lead to an ultimate outcome (Vroom, 1964). Expectancy is an “action- 
outcome association” and is defined as is a perception that an individual’s efforts will 
lead to the intended behavior (Vroom, 1964).
This study explores the impact o f expectancy measures on insiders’ motivation to 
and withdrawal from performance o f PMBs. In addition to the direct effect o f expectancy 
measures, it also explores antecedents and consequences o f expectancies. First the impact
8of security education, training and awareness (SETA) on expectancy dimensions is 
assessed. SETA programs are the mechanism by which organizations inform users o f 
security threats, establish the responsibilities of the employees, and detail the 
consequences o f failing to comply (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Straub et al., 1998). Finally, the 
impact o f expectancies on insiders’ PsyCap in addition to the role o f PsyCap in the 
motivation to and withdrawal from PMBs is assessed. The research model for the 
expectancy theory study is shown in Figure 1.1.
Security
Expectancy
Security
Velence
PMBePeyCapSETA
H3
Security
Withdrawal
Firat Order Formative
First Order Reflective 
1 Second Order Reflective
Figure. 1.1 Chapter 1 Research Model
Study 2: The Adaptive Role o f  Emotion in Information Security:
Broadening the Theoretical Repertoire
As in the broader organizational literature (Fredrickson, 1998), where the IS
security literature has considered emotions at all, it has most often considered the role of
negative emotions such as fear (e.g. Johnston et al., 2010). However, emotional stimuli
often elicit multiple emotions o f varying intensities simultaneously (Lazarus et al., 1984;
Lazarus, 1991; Beaudry et al., 2010). The broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 1998;
Fredrickson, 2001) provides a multi-dimensional framework of emotions which includes
9the often neglected positive emotions. The broaden-and-build theory posits that positive 
emotions “broaden the scope of attention and thought-action repertoires,” (Fredrickson et 
al., 2005) while simultaneously building lasting psychological resources (Fredrickson, 
1998; Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson et al., 2005). An individual’s thought-action 
repertoire is the collection of the thoughts and behaviors which are cognitively available 
in the moment o f action (Fredrickson et al., 2005).
Organizations often play on the emotions o f employees to elicit security behaviors 
by employing appeals to emotion, such as fear (Johnston et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 
2010; Herath et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2009). Yet, as the role o f emotion becomes 
increasingly important in IS (Beaudry et al., 2010), even the established role of fear has 
been called into question (Crossler et al., 2012). The broaden-and-build theory explains 
that certain emotional responses to security threats (i.e. emotions such as fear and 
anxiety) may have a confounding effect on proactive security behaviors such as PMBs 
(Fredrickson, 2001). The goal o f this study is to integrate a framework o f emotions 
(Beaudry et al., 2010) with the broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 1998, 2001) in 
order to examine the adaptive role o f emotions in information security. The research 
model for the Chapter 2 is shown in Figure 1.2.
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Challenge Emotions
Hope Positive Affect
Interest
Achievement Emotions
Happiness
Pride
PsyCap PMBs
Loss Emotions
Sad
Anger
r  Avoidance Emotions
Anxiety
Negative Affect
Fear
Figure 1.2 Chapter 2 Research Model
Study 3: Security Behavioral Complexity and Psychological Capital:
An Empirical Examination
The protective roles (e.g. PMBs) which insiders may enact in order to protect the 
Firm’s information and IS may be unrelated to or even in direct contrast with an insider’s 
formal job description. In this way, PMBs are enacted alongside the various 
organizational roles held by all insiders with access to informational resources, creating 
behavioral complexity for insiders (Posey et al., 2013). Behavioral complexity refers to 
“the ability to act and play multiple roles that call for diverse and even competing 
behaviors” (Wu et al., 2010, p. 818). Hooijberg (1996) established that behavioral 
complexity is comprised of two distinct components: (1) behavioral repertoire and (2) 
behavioral differentiation. Behavioral repertoire is the portfolio of roles an individual
performs and his or her ability to perform multiple roles, and behavioral differentiation is 
the ability to “switch from role to role at appropriate times to handle paradoxes and 
contradictions mandated by one’s job” (Wu et al., 2010, p. 818).
Insiders’ PMB complexity has recently been espoused as an antecedent to the 
performance o f PMBs (Posey et al., 2013), but has yet to be empirically examined. 
Complementary to behavioral complexity are personal resources such as PsyCap which 
equip an individual to deal with the tensions o f divergent demands (Smith et al., 2011). 
This study reports an empirical examination o f a model of behavioral security 
complexity, which considers the impact of PMB complexity and PsyCap simultaneously. 
The research model for the Chapter 3 study is shown in Figure 1.3.
Repertoire of PMBs
Security Behavioral 
Differentiation
Protection Motivated 
Behaviors
BEHAVIORAL COMPLEXITY
Psychological Capital
First-Order Reflective 
"1 Second-Order Reflectivert
First-Order Formative
Figure 1.3 Chapter 3 Research Model
The remainder o f the work is dedicated to the development and empirical 
examination of the three studies outlined in this chapter. Each study is self-contained 
within its own chapter (chapters two, three, and four, respectively). The final chapter of 
the dissertation, chapter five, concludes the work with a summary o f the findings.
CHAPTER 2
A MULTI DIMENSIONAL ASSESSMENT OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL INSIDERS’ PERFORMANCE 
OF PROTECTION-MOTIVATED BEHAVIORS:
AN EXPECTANCY THEORY APPROACH
Introduction
In today’s technology-driven economic environment, many employees have 
unprecedented access to their organizations' information and information system (IS), 
(Dhillon et al., 2001; Zafar et al., 2009; Stanton et al., 2006b; Stanton et al., 2006a). This 
increased access provided by enterprise-wide systems and ubiquitous computing often 
exposes the organization’s systems to risks beyond the proximate control o f the IT staff 
(Vroom et al., 2004). It is increasingly difficult for organizations to maintain information 
security, as 54% of firms report an inability to determine if off-site employees are using 
technology and informational resources within corporate and regulatory requirements 
(Ponemon, 2013). These realities have led many practitioners and academicians to 
recognize that organizational information security is at the mercy o f the actions o f those 
with access to the firm’s information and IS (Moore et al., 2008; Boss et al., 2009; 
D'Arcy et al., 2007).
The study of “the human actions that influence the availability, confidentiality, 
and integrity o f information systems” is behavioral information security (Stanton et al.,
12
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2006b, p. 263). Behavioral information security research examines the impact of 
organizational insiders’ behavior on information security— often in order to assess or 
deter the diminution o f security brought on by insider behavior (e.g. Shaw et al., 1998; 
Boss et al., 2009; Vroom et al., 2004; Willison et al., 2009; Greitzer et al., 2008; Zafar et 
al., 2009; Straub et al., 1990; Sasse et al., 2001). Organizational insiders are individuals 
(e.g., full- and part-time employees, temporary workers, board members) who have 
access to organizationally relevant information while fulfilling their duties (Posey et al., 
2013; Shaw et al., 1998). However, just as insiders may jeopardize information security 
by behaving maliciously (e.g. Straub et al., 1990; Posey et al., 2011; Whitman, 2003) or 
carelessly (e.g. Johnson, 2008; Workman et al., 2008; Im et al., 2005), insiders who 
actively and conscientiously work toward the protection o f the firm are able to increase 
information security (Posey et al., 2013; Albrechtsen et al., 2009; Stanton et al., 2005).
Posey et al. (2013) comprehensively identified many o f the security-enhancing 
behaviors an insider can perform by developing a taxonomy of protection-motivated 
behaviors (PMBs) . PMBs are the volitional behaviors organizational insiders can enact 
to protect (1) organizationally relevant information within their firms and (2) the 
computer-based IS in which that information is stored, collected, disseminated, and/or 
manipulated from information-security threats (Posey et al., 2013). PMBs include a broad 
swath of protective behaviors ranging from maintaining general security etiquette to 
identifying and reporting suspicious co-worker behavior (Posey et al., 2013). Therefore, 
in addition to deterring the harmful behavior of some corrupted and/or heedless 
employees, effective security requires that organizations motivate insiders to reach their 
protective potential through the performance o f PMBs.
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To examine insiders’ motivation to perform PMBs, I employ a multi-dimensional 
model of motivation grounded in expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964). Expectancy theory is 
a behavioral process theory (Brouer et al., 2011), which explains motivation as a product 
o f both individual preferences and perceptions o f outcome probabilities (Vroom, 1964). 
This essay evaluates the impact o f expectancy measures on insiders’ motivation to and 
withdrawal from performance o f PMBs. In addition, to more fully explicate the role of 
expectancy theory in eliciting protective behaviors, this research includes key antecedents 
and consequences to the expectancy measures as well. First, the role o f security 
education, training and awareness (SETA) is examined as an antecedent to expectancy 
theory. SETA programs are the mechanism by which organizations inform users of 
security threats, establish the responsibilities o f employees, and detail the consequences 
o f failing to comply (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Straub et al., 1998). Second, the role of 
expectancy theory in building insiders’ psychological capital (PsyCap) is analyzed. 
PsyCap is a higher order construct conceptualized as hope, self-efficacy, resilience, and 
optimism (Luthans et al., 2007a) that has emerged out o f the positive psychology 
movement (e.g. Seligman et al., 2000).
Background
Driving the importance o f information security is a realization that protection of 
information resources is paramount for organizational success and should be a primary 
goal o f the organization (Siponen et al., 2010; Herath et al., 2009; Dhillon et al., 2006). 
Information security has most often placed primary focus on technical methods and 
managerial approaches to safeguard against security-threatening behavior (Zafar et al., 
2009; Choobineh et al., 2007). PMBs, however, imply a broadened view o f the insider
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from merely a threat to a potential protector o f information security (Posey et al., 2013; 
Albrechtsen et al., 2009; Stanton et al., 2005).
Organizations seeking to motivate employees to protect the organization tend to 
focus on employees’ compliance with formalized security policies (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; 
D'Arcy et al., 2009; Herath et al., 2009; Vroom et al., 2004). Security policy compliance 
is an important goal for any organization, without which the policy itself is meaningless 
(Siponen, 2000). Yet security policy compliance represents only one subset of the 
protective behaviors in which an insider can engage (Posey et al., 2013; Albrechtsen et 
al., 2009). Additionally, policies are often constructed with a negative frame, such that 
they generally focus on telling employees what not to do to deter unwanted behavior such 
as computer abuse rather than telling employees what to do to protect the organization 
(Lee et al., 2002). Security research has also investigated individuals’ intentions to adopt 
software solutions such as anti-malware software (Lee et al., 2009) or anti-spyware 
software (Johnston et al., 2010). These software solutions are important safeguards; 
however, they are most often adopted by the IT department and represent an 
organization’s investment in IT security rather than the motivation of insiders’ to protect 
the organization (Kumar et al., 2008; August et al., 2006).
Expectancy Theory
Expectancy theory has been used in numerous studies involving motivation in the 
workplace (Van Eerde et al., 1996). Expectancy theory has strong empirical support 
(Burton et al., 1992), is straightforward and easily understood by both practitioners and 
researchers (Fudge et al., 1999), and is applicable to practice (Sanchez et al., 2000). 
Further, expectancy theory enables a multidimensional diagnostic approach to motivation
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(Sanchez et al., 2000; Ilgen et al., 1981; Courtney et al., 1983; DeSanctis, 1983). 
Expectancy theory explains motivation as a result o f a multi-level assessment (Galbraith 
et al., 1967) including “perceptions o f the environment and expectations based on these 
perceptions” (Brouer et al., 2011, p. 870). Expectancy theory shares the higher-order vs. 
lower-order outcome orientation espoused by many behavioral theorists (e.g. Carver et 
al., 1982; Wiener, 1948). First-order outcomes are the behaviors resulting from effort, 
while second-order outcomes are the ultimate outcomes resulting from the behavior 
(Sanchez et al., 2000). Specifically, expectancy theory— also referred to as VIE theory—  
offers a set o f three motivational antecedents consisting o f ( 1 ) valence, (2 ) 
instrumentality, and (3) expectancy (Ellingson et al., 2011).
Valence
Valence is the preference of one outcome over another (or all others) (Vroom, 
1964). Valence is not the true satisfaction o f an outcome, but rather the anticipated 
satisfaction (Vroom, 1964). This is an important distinction as valence serves as a 
motivator toward future action in expectancy theory. Actual satisfaction contributes to 
valence formulation only to the extent that past satisfaction influences future preferences 
(Ellingson et al., 2011). Valence can also be described as an assessment o f the 
attractiveness o f success (Feather, 1969).
In expectancy theory, valence is oriented toward higher-order outcomes (Sanchez 
et al., 2000; Ellingson et al., 2011). For the purposes of this study, security valence is 
defined as an insider’s affinity for the protection o f his or her firm from information 
security risks. The outcome referent o f security valence (i.e., the security o f the firm) 
distinguishes it from behavioral attitudes (Taylor et al., 1995; Anderson et al., 2010;
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Ajzen, 1991). Security valence is associated with the attractiveness o f protecting the firm 
(e.g. valence o f the higher-order goal) and not the attitude toward the protective behavior 
itself (e.g. attitude about PMBs).Therefore, according to expectancy theory, it is the 
security-related outcome and not the attractiveness o f the protective behavior itself which 
motivates performance of PMBs. In addition to valence perceptions, behavioral 
motivation is also reliant upon assessments o f instrumentality and expectancy.
Instrumentality and Expectancy 
Concomitant with valence, expectancy theory posits a dual-level model of 
motivation consisting of instrumentality and expectancy. Like valence, instrumentality is 
oriented toward higher-order outcomes. Instrumentality is an individual’s perception that 
successfully enacting a behavior will lead to an ultimate (i.e. second-order) outcome 
(Vroom, 1964). Vroom (1964) describes instrumentality an “outcome-outcome 
association.” Conversely, expectancy is an “action-outcome association” and is defined as 
a perception that an individual’s efforts will lead to the intended behavior (Vroom, 1964). 
Therefore, expectancy theory provides a distinction between first- and second-order 
probabilities: ( 1 ) a first-order probability (e.g. expectancy) is the likelihood that given 
appropriate effort, an action can be taken, and (2 ) a second-order probability (e.g. 
instrumentality) is the likelihood that successfully taking an action will lead to a desired 
ultimate outcome.
The distinction between instrumentality and expectancy is important and has 
received considerable treatment in the behavioral literature. Bandura (1977) describes the 
distinction.
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People can give up trying because they lack a sense o f efficacy in 
achieving the required behavior, or they may be assured of their 
capabilities but give up trying because they expect their behavior to have 
no effect on an unresponsive environment or to be consistently punished.
These two separable expectancy sources o f futility have quite different 
antecedents and remedial implications. To alter efficacy-based futility 
requires development of competencies and expectations of personal 
effectiveness. By contrast, to change outcome-based futility necessitates 
changes in prevailing environmental contingencies that restore the 
instrumental value of the competencies that people already possess (pp. 
204-205).
Expectancy theory explains that expectancy and instrumentality have unique 
antecedents and consequences. The diagnostic nature o f expectancy theory (Sanchez et 
al., 2000; Ilgen et al., 1981) makes it an attractive approach for establishing the 
antecedents of PMBs. In this study, I define security instrumentality as the perception 
that securing one’s work-related information will protect the organization from security 
threats, and security expectancy as the perception that with ample effort one can protect 
his or her work-related information. Security instrumentality and expectancy, combined 
with valence, influence insiders’ motivation to and withdrawal from the performance of 
PMBs.
Motivation and Withdrawal 
Expectancy theory is often examined in terms of positive motivation (i.e. 
motivation toward an outcome) (Sanchez et al., 2000; DeSanctis, 1983; Fudge et al., 
1999). However, facets o f expectancy theory can be linked to positive, negative, or 
neutral perceptions (Vroom, 1964). Lack of instrumentality, for example, is linked to 
perceptions of helplessness (Dweck, 1975), wherein the helpless individual has no 
expectation of behavioral contingency (Diener et al., 1980; Abramson et al., 1978). In
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other words, individuals who perceive themselves to be helpless expect that their 
actions—no matter how well performed— will not lead to the desired ultimate outcome 
(Diener et al., 1980; Maier et al., 1976).
Perceptions o f expectancy provide task-related (i.e. first-order) motivation 
(Ellingson et al., 2011). Individuals lacking expectancy may see themselves as unskilled 
(Brouer et al., 2011), while those lacking instrumentality feel helpless due to some 
insurmountable personal or environmental circumstances (Diener et al., 1980; Maier et 
al., 1976). Therefore, expectancy is associated with motivation to attempt the task 
motivated at the task-level (Vroom, 1964; Brouer et al., 2011). Individuals lacking 
instrumentality, however, often feel helpless and psychologically distance themselves 
from the uncontrollable situation through a process of psychological withdrawal (Dweck, 
1975).
Psychological withdrawal is the psychological equivalent of physical withdrawal, 
which can be either organizational-level psychological withdrawal or simply the 
withdrawal “from participation in a prescribed role” (Hulin et al., 1985, p. 233). 
Withdrawal can be the result of a preference (Horn et al., 2012), a mechanism for 
avoiding stress (Keaveney et al., 1993), or the result o f unfavorable expectancies (Carver 
et al., 1982). For the purpose of this research, security withdrawal is defined as the 
psychological withdrawal from participation in security roles (e.g. PMBs). The role of 
security withdrawal has received considerably less attention in the security literature than 
other antecedents to security behaviors. The general schema o f learned helplessness and 
expectancy theory is depicted in Figure 2.1.
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Security Valence 
'The Outcome is Good'
Motivation
(Withdrawal)
Security Instrumentality 
'Behavior Leads to Outcome'
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"Effort Leads to Behavior1
Figure 2.1 Expectancy Theory Schema -  VIE Model o f  Security Motivation/Withdrawal
Security, Education, Training, and Awareness 
Each component o f the VIE model o f security motivation/withdrawal provides 
unique insight into insiders’ behavior. To the extent that valence, instrumentality, and 
expectancies can be influenced by organizations, behavioral outcomes are likewise 
influenced. As it relates to security, SETA programs are the mechanism by which 
organizations inform users of security threats, establish the responsibilities o f the 
employees, and detail the consequences of failing to comply (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Straub 
et al., 1998). It follows that SETA programs should relate directly to the expectancy 
measures. In this way, expectancy theory provides a diagnostic framework for the 
positive impact o f SETA programs.
Prior research has largely described the role of SETA programs in deterring 
inappropriate behaviors within an organization (Lee et al., 2002). Serving this purpose, 
organizations often employ SETA programs to provide individuals with a prescribed 
response to a given security threat (Zafar et al., 2009; Siponen et al., 2010), as well as to
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persuade the user that a failure to comply is amply detrimental so as to deter security 
lapses (Straub et al., 1998). Recently the relationship between SETA and deterrence has 
been supported empirically (D'Arcy et al., 2009). However, a well-developed program 
should not only provide training related to security policy compliance, but should also 
maintain a program of keeping users aware o f evolving security threats (Whitman, 2003). 
Further, to the extent that SETA programs influence the expectancy dimensions (i.e., 
valence, instrumentality, expectancy), SETA may be shown to be an effective tool in 
motivating insiders to protect their organizations’ information and information systems 
by the performance o f PMBs. The role of SETA on the expectancy dimensions is 
examined in this research to evaluate the potential motivational efficacy of SETA 
programs.
Psychological Capital
In addition to the direct impact o f expectancy dimensions on motivation and 
withdrawal, expectancy theory is also related to malleable personal characteristics 
(Luthans et al., 2010) which have been shown to be an important consideration for 
security-related behavior (e.g. Myyry et al., 2009; Workman et al., 2008; Leach, 2003) . 
One such conceptualization of personal characteristics, PsyCap, has emerged out of the 
positive psychology movement (Luthans et al., 2007a). Positive psychology is “the study 
of the conditions and processes that contribute to the flourishing or optimal functioning 
o f people, groups, and institutions” (Gable et al., 2005), and PsyCap is a construct of 
positive “psychological resource capabilities” which are open to development (Luthans et
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al., 2009). PsyCap is a higher-order construct composed o f distinct yet related core tenets 
of positive psychology of hope, resilience, optimism, and self-efficacy (Luthans et al., 
2007b).
As a component of positive psychology, PsyCap is uniquely applicable to the 
present study because positive psychology has the optimal functioning of the average 
person as its subject (Seligman et al., 2000; Sheldon et al., 2001). PsyCap has also 
received broad acceptance in business research and beyond (Avey et al., 2009; 
Walumbwa et al., 2011; Avey et al., 2010; Peterson et al., 2011). PsyCap has been linked 
to a number o f positive personal and organizational outcomes such as job performance 
and satisfaction (Luthans et al., 2007a), low absenteeism (Avey et al., 2006), low 
turnover and stress (Avey et al., 2009), as well as increased citizenship and decreased 
deviance (Avey et al., 2011). Finally, PsyCap has been shown to mediate important 
relationships between perceptions o f organizational and behavioral environment and 
actual behavior (Luthans et al., 2008).
PsyCap Hope can be defined as a “positive motivational state that is based on an 
interactively derived sense o f successful (a) agency (goal directed energy) and (b) 
pathways (planning to meet goals)” (Snyder et al., 1991, p. 287; Luthans et al., 2007a). 
PsyCap Resilience “is characterized by positive coping and adaptation in the face of 
significant risk or adversity” (Luthans et al., 2007a, p. 546; Masten, 2001; Masten et al., 
2002). Resilience can also be thought o f simply as “the positive psychological capacity to 
rebound, to ‘bounce back’ from adversity, uncertainty, conflict, failure, or even positive 
change, progress and increased responsibility” (Luthans, 2002, p. 702; Luthans et al., 
2007a). PsyCap Optimism is defined as that characteristic that is held by individuals who
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“expect things to go their way, and generally believe that good rather than bad things will 
happen to them.” (Scheier et al., 1985). PsyCap Self-Efficacy is role-breadth self-efficacy 
and is defined as “the employee’s conviction or confidence about his or her abilities to 
mobilize the motivation, cognitive resources or courses of action needed to successfully 
execute a specific task within a given context” (Stajkovic et al., 1998, p. 6 6 ; Luthans et 
al., 2007a).
PsyCap can be viewed through a resource lens (Luthans et al., 2007b; Hobfoll, 
1989; Hobfoll, 2002). Hobfoll (1989) stipulates that individuals require resources to 
function and will seek to gain available resources and when possible conserve 
unnecessarily expended resources. Thus, the conservation of resources entails two 
components: the building up o f resources and the conservation o f resources. PsyCap as a 
resource can be built at the facet level by micro-intervention or at the construct level by 
macro-intervention such as a supportive climate (Luthans et al., 2008). Resources are 
either “centrally valued in their own right” or “as a means to obtain centrally valued 
ends” (Hobfoll, 2002). PsyCap can also be viewed as adaptive in that not only does 
PsyCap embody a positive psychological state, as a psychological construct it serves 
meaningful ends. For instance, PsyCap has been shown to provide a necessary 
psychological resource for psychological well-being (Culbertson et al., 2010).
Lastly, a distinguishing quality of PsyCap-and perhaps one reason that it has been 
so widely considered— is that it has been shown to be composed of characteristics that 
are state-like rather than trait-like. This distinction between state- and trait-like 
characteristics is important as it differentiates those characteristics which are innate and 
inflexible from those which are malleable and developable (Zuckerman, 1983; Fugate et
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al., 2012). Trainable characteristics are especially critical in a security context as they can 
be developed within an organization to enhance organizational security. PsyCap has been 
shown to be developable (Luthans et al., 2007a; Luthans et al., 2006a; Peterson et al., 
2 0 1 1 ); therefore, any benefits to firm security which can be shown to be attributable to 
PsyCap can be influenced by an organization through an investment in employees’ 
PsyCap. This ductile quality of PsyCap distinguishes it from other, more stable, traits like 
“The Big Five” personality traits (Goldberg, 1990) and the higher order “Core Self- 
Evaluation” (Judge et al., 2001; Luthans et al., 2007a). Peterson (2012) notes:
“People’s locus of control and self-esteem are things a manager probably 
can’t change significantly within a few weeks. Psychological capital is 
more malleable. We’re not bom hopeful, resilient, optimistic, efficacious 
people. We leam these things.”
The facets o f  PsyCap and established facet-level developm ent strategies 
are sum m arized in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1
Summary o f  PsyCap Characteristics
PsyCap
Component
Definition M icro-Development
PsyCap
Self-
Efficacy
“[T]he em ployee’s conviction or confidence 
about his or her abilities to mobilize the 
motivation, cognitive resources or courses o f  
action needed to successfully execute a 
specific task within a given context” 
(Stajkovic et al., 1998, p. 66)
•  Mastery experiences
•  Modeling and vicarious learning
•  Social persuasion
•  Physiological and psychological 
arousal
PsyCap
Hope
“[PJositive motivational state that is based on 
an interactively derived sense o f  successful 
(a) agency (goal directed energy) and (b) 
pathways (planning to meet goals)” (Snyder 
et al., 1991, p. 287).
•  Goal-setting
• Participation
• Contingency planning for alternative 
pathways to attain goals
PsyCap
Optimism
Characterizes individuals who “expect things 
to go their way, and generally believe that 
good rather than bad things will happen to 
them.” (Scheier et al., 1985).
•  Leniency for the past
•  Appreciation for the present
•  Opportunity-seeking for the future
PsyCap
Resilience
“[T]he positive psychological capacity to 
rebound, to ‘bounce back’ from adversity, 
uncertainty, conflict, failure, or even positive 
change, progress and increased 
responsibility” (Luthans, 2002, p. 702)
•  Asset-focused strategies such as 
enhancing employability
•  Risk-focused strategies such as 
proactive avoidance o f  adversity
•  Process-focused strategies to 
influence the interpretation o f  
adverse events
Adapted from descriptions in Psychological capital: Developing the human competitive edge, Luthans, Youssef, et 
al. (2007b).
Protection-M otivated Behaviors
PMBs are the volitional behaviors organizational insiders can enact to protect (1) 
organizationally relevant information within their firms and (2) the computer-based IS in 
which that information is stored, collected, disseminated, and/or manipulated from 
information-security threats (Posey et al., 2013). PMBs are in-role and extra-role 
behaviors that an insider may undertake which protect the firm’s information and 
information systems (Posey et al., 2013). Posey et al.(2013) categorized PMBs into a 
systematic-based taxonomy made up of fourteen categories (see Table 2.2) for summary, 
and Posey et al. (2013) for full discussion).
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Table 2.2 
PMB Roles
Identified Cluster Number and Name
4. Appropriate data entry and management______________________________________
3. Policy-driven awareness and action__________________________________________
8 . Wireless installation_______________________________________________________
2 . Protection against unauthorized exposure_____________________________________
7. Verbal and electronic sensitive-information protection__________________________
9 . Widely applicable security etiquette__________________________________________
12. Account protection________________________________________________________
11. Co-worker reliance___________________ ____________________
13. Immediate reporting o f suspicious behavior__________________________________
1. Legitimate e-mail handling__________________________________________________
6. Secure software, e-mail, and Internet use______________________________________
5. Document conversion______________________________________________________
10. Distinctive security etiquette_______________________________________________
14. Equipment location and storage_____________________________________________
Table 2.2 from Posey, Roberts, Lowry, Bennett. & Courtney, 2013___________________________________
As a general class o f behaviors, PMBs are robust to the varying security policies 
that are inevitably found across organizations. For example, compliance with an explicit 
security policy is clearly an in-role behavior, but the specific behaviors required for that 
compliance vary across firms (Bulgurcu et al., 2010).
Research M odel and H ypotheses
SETA programs are often employed in order to inform employees about the 
various threats to the organization’s security as well as to train employees to recognize 
threats and enact various security roles (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Straub et al., 1998; Lee et 
al., 2002). Education, training, and awareness each relate to the motivational dimensions 
espoused in expectancy theory. SETA is expected to increase an insider’s perception of 
behavioral expectancy, outcome instrumentality, and outcome valence. That is, SETA is 
expected to ( 1) enhance the perception that insider’s efforts will lead to successful
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performance of the desired security behavior (security expectancy), (2 ) increase an 
insider’s perception that the behavior will lead ultimately to the security o f the firm 
(security instrumentality), and (3) influence insiders’ perceptions that protecting the firm 
is good (security valence).
HI: SETA will be positively related to users ’ security valence.
H2: SETA will be positively related to users ’ security instrumentality.
H3: SETA will be positively related to users ’ security expectancy.
Security expectancies are first-order perceptions (Vroom, 1964; Galbraith et al., 
1967) and are hypothesized to be positively related to motivation to protect the firm, 
deemed protection motivation. As explained in expectancy theory, the perception that 
effort will lead to performance of a behavior is directly linked to behavioral motivation. 
On the other hand, instrumentality (or lack thereof) is a second-order perception and 
relates to ultimate outcomes. Security instrumentality is an insider’s perception that their 
protective behaviors will ultimately protect the firm. A lack of instrumentality is linked to 
helplessness and withdrawal from behavioral attempts (Dweck, 1975; Carver et al., 
1982). Therefore, perceptions o f expectancy and instrumentality each have a unique 
impact on PMBs through increased protection motivation and decreased security 
withdrawal.
Expectancy theory further explains that favorability of an outcome or valence 
provides a motivational stimulus as well. Therefore, positive security valence (i.e. 
favorable perception o f protecting the firm from security threats) is expected to be 
positively related to protection motivation. Conversely, security valence is expected to be 
negatively related to security withdrawal. Vroom (1964, p. 15) notes, “[a] positive (or
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approach) motive signifies that outcomes which are members o f the class have positive 
valence, and a negative (or avoidance) motive signifies that outcomes in the class have 
negative valence.”
H4: Security expectancy will be positively related to users ’protection motivation.
H5: Security instrumentality will be negatively related to security withdrawal.
H6: Security valence will be positively related to users’ protection motivation.
H7: Security valence will be negatively related to security withdrawal.
PsyCap is composed of psychological resource capabilities (Luthans et al., 2007b; 
Luthans et al., 2009) and is directly related to individual’s perceptions o f expectancy and 
instrumentality. Security expectancy and instrumentality are hypothesized to be 
positively related to each of the PsyCap characteristics in related, yet distinct ways. First, 
expectancy is expected to have a positive impact on PsyCap self-efficacy, which is role- 
breadth self-efficacy (Parker, 1998; Luthans et al., 2007b), by virtue o f the increased 
confidence of an insider that he or she can successfully enact instrumental security 
behaviors. In a similar way, PsyCap hope and PsyCap optimism are expected to be 
increased by expectancies and instrumentalities, as those with perceptions of expectancy 
and instrumentality will feel able to enact pathways instrumental to reaching goals 
(PsyCap hope) and will be more likely to believe that positive security outcomes can be 
achieved (PsyCap optimism). Finally, employees’ perceived expectancy and 
instrumentality are hypothesized to be related to PsyCap resilience, as individuals who 
see themselves as able to enact instrumental security behaviors will be more equipped to 
adapt in the face of security challenges and bounce back after failed attempts to enact 
PMBs.
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H8: Security expectancy will be positively related to users ’ PsyCap.
H9: Security instrumentality will be positively related to users ’ PsyCap.
Whether viewing PsyCap as a psychological resource or simply a positive 
psychological state, the previously established links between PsyCap and organizational 
outcomes provide a basis for the relationship between PsyCap and protection motivation. 
For example, PsyCap has been positively linked to an increase in both job performance 
and satisfaction (Luthans et al., 2007a) as well as increased organizational commitment 
and citizenship (Avey et al., 2011). As security continues to be adapted into 
organizational strategy through security policy and otherwise, an increase in job 
performance, which includes security policy compliance, will lead to an increase in 
organizational security (Siponen et al., 2006; Herath et al., 2009; Bulgurcu et al., 2010). 
The positive impact of job satisfaction, commitment, and citizenship are closely linked 
and are supported by findings that individuals who are satisfied with their jobs are better 
organizational citizens and can be expected to perform both in-role and extra-role 
behaviors to support the organization (Bateman et al., 1983; Williams et al., 1991). The 
performance o f protective behaviors is the focus o f this research and as such, it is 
expected that PsyCap will increase protection motivation in part by virtue o f the 
established relationships with increased job performance, satisfaction, commitment, and 
citizenship.
II10: PsyCap will be positively related to protection motivation.
PsyCap, has also been shown to reduce unfavorable outcomes such as 
absenteeism (Avey et al., 2006), turnover and stress (Avey et al., 2009), and cynicism and 
deviance (Avey et al., 2011). Therefore, PsyCap’s reduction of withdrawal-related
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outcomes is hypothesized to reduce the security-vulnerability created by security 
omission through the reduction o f security withdrawal.
H I 1: PsyCap will be negatively related to security withdrawal.
In line with the theories o f planned behavior (TPB) and reasoned action (TRA) 
(Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen et al., 1972) which contend that intentions often mediate important 
relationships with behavior, protection motivation is conceptualized as the intention to 
protect the organization. Therefore, protection motivation is hypothesized to lead to 
PMBs. Finally, security withdrawal is the withdrawal from security roles, and is 
hypothesized to lead to an omission of PMBs (see Figure 2.2).
HI 2: Protection Motivation will be positively related to PMBs.
HI 3: Security withdrawal will be negatively related to PMBs.
PMBsSETA
H3
Security
W ithdrawal
H5
First O rdsr Form ativs
F irst O rdsr Raflactiva 
"! S sco n d  O rdsr R aflactiva
Figure 2.2 Research Model
Measurement Models 
As shown in Figure 2.2, the research model utilizes three distinct latent model 
structures: first-order reflective constructs, a first-order formative construct, and a 
second-order reflective construct. Construct specification is a topic o f considerable
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interest in IS research, as the field seeks to employ second generation techniques with 
both theoretical and statistical validity (Bagozzi, 2011; Gefen et al., 2000; Gefen et al., 
2011; Straub et al., 2004; Jarvis et al., 2003). The ultimate goal o f all model specification 
is to appropriately model theoretical relationships; therefore, the on-going discussion 
regarding the theoretical justification and statistical validity is an important one (Aguirre- 
Urreta et al., 2012; Jarvis et al., 2012).
The various forms of model specification are “derived from the fact that (a) a 
first-order construct can have either formative or reflective indicators, and (b) those first- 
order constructs can, themselves, be either formative or reflective indicators of an 
underlying second-order construct” (Jarvis et al., 2003). Constructs defined as first- and 
second-order reflective appear most often in business research (Jarvis et al., 2003), and 
specify that the indicators at each level “reflect” the latent variable (Straub et al., 2004; 
Jarvis et al., 2012). All o f the constructs in this study were adapted from prior research 
and retained the specification of the published measures.
R esearch M ethodology
The multi-dimensional research model was tested empirically using survey 
research methodology. The instrumentation for the survey was developed based on a 
thorough literature review. Where possible, the items were adapted from prior research. 
All the items included in the final survey were subjected to subject matter expert review 
and were pilot tested before executing the final survey.
Study Measures
SETA was measured using five items in this study. SETA measures an individual’s 
perception that the organization provides training to educate employees about
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information security issues and security responsibilities. As in previous research, SETA 
was measured with a formative construct consisting of five items (D'Arcy et al., 2009).
Security valence, instrumentality, and expectancy (VIE) measures were adapted 
from existing scales of the expectancy dimensions (Sanchez et al., 2000). The original 
items measured VIE in a test-taking situation. In order to adapt the measures into a 
security context, the measures were altered to capture the perception o f security-related 
valence, instrumentality, and expectancy. The items adapted to measure security valence, 
ascertain the extent to which the respondent perceives keeping the organization safe from 
security threats is attractive or good. The items for security instrumentality were adapted 
to reflect the perception that security their work-related information would secure the 
organization from information security threats. Finally, security expectancy items were 
adapted to measure the perception that with adequate effort the respondent could secure 
his or her information at work. An example of an item used to measure security valence 
is “It would be good to protect my organization from security threats.” An example of an 
item used to measure security instrumentality is “If I protect my information and 
computer at work, my organization has a good chance o f being protected from security 
threats.” An example of an item used to measure security expectancy is “I can protect my 
information and computer at work if I put some effort into it.”
PsyCap was measured using the questionnaire developed by Luthans, Youssef et 
al. (2007b). The PsyCap Questionnaire includes twenty-four items (six for each o f the 
four characteristics). The PsyCap items were all developed from prior literature and have 
consistently exhibited validity and test/retest reliability throughout the business literature. 
(Luthans et al., 2007a; Luthans et al., 2007b).
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PsyCap hope measures state-hope and is “responsive to events in the lives o f 
people” (Snyder et al., 1996, p. 321). PsyCap hope captures both the agency and pathway 
components o f hope, and an example of an item measuring PsyCap Hope is “I can think 
of many ways to reach my current work goals”(Luthans et al., 2007b). PsyCap Resilience 
measures an individual’s ability to bounce back or to take stressful things at work in 
stride (Wagnild et al., 1993). An example o f an item measuring resilience is “I usually 
take stressful things at work in stride” (Luthans et al., 2007b). PsyCap optimism measures 
an individual’s state-belief that “good rather than bad things will happen to them” 
(Scheier et al., 1985, p. 219). An example of an item measuring PsyCap optimism is “I 
approach this job as if  ‘every cloud has a silver lining’”(Luthans et al., 2007b). Lastly, 
PsyCap self-efficacy measures the state-like role-breadth self-efficacy and is based on 
Parker’s (1998) self-efficacy scale. An example o f an item measuring PsyCap self- 
efficacy is “I feel confident analyzing a long-term problem to find a solution” (Luthans et 
al., 2007b).
Protection motivation was measured as an intention to perform protective 
behaviors. The scale was developed in accordance with the view o f Ajzen and Fishbein 
(1972) that intention mediates important antecedents o f behavior. As such, protection 
motivation is modeled as a behavioral intention in the way o f the theory of planned 
behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Posey (2010) developed a four item scale which was used to 
assess an individual’s protection motivation. A sample item measuring protection 
motivation is “I intend to protect my organization from its information security threats.”
Security withdrawal is a state o f psychological withdrawal in which individuals’ 
experience withdrawal-like symptoms such as denying, ignoring, or refusing to respond
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to security threats (Keaveney et al., 1993). The items used to measure security 
withdrawal were adapted to reflect a psychological withdrawal from security from 
established measures of psychological distancing (Beaudry et al., 2010). Psychological 
distancing is “the effort one expends to direct one’s attention away from the situation and 
detach oneself from it” (Beaudry et al., 2010, p. 699). In order to assess security 
withdrawal, insiders were asked to indicate the extent to which they engaged in 
psychological distancing when dealing with a security threat. An example o f an item 
measuring security withdrawal is “When confronted with a security threat... I told 
myself that there was nothing I could do about the threat to my organization’s 
information security.”
PMBs were measured with a five-item scale developed based on a taxonomy of 
protection-motivated behaviors (Posey et al., 2013). The taxonomy identifies fourteen 
categories o f behaviors and reflective items measuring a general class o f PMBs were 
developed using a MIMIC model (see Posey, in press for full explanation of item 
development). An item assessing the performance o f PMBs is “I tried to safeguard my 
organization’s information and information systems from their information security 
threats.”
A nalysis and Results
The research model was analyzed in a two-step procedure as recommended by 
methodologists (Gerbing et al., 1988). The analysis utilized covariance-based structural 
equation modeling (SEM) platform Mplus (Muthen et al., 1998-2010). In the first step, a 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was run in Mplus in order to establish the validity of 
the measures to be included in the subsequent structural model. Upon confirmation of the
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validity o f the research model, the hypothesized research model was assessed using SEM 
in Mplus. Prior to the collection of the data for the final analysis, the instrument was pilot 
tested to confirm the validity of the measures.
Pilot Study
Critical to any study is the validity and reliability of the measures employed 
(Straub, 1989; Gefen et al., 2011). As recommended, whenever possible the scales 
included in this study were employed as previously published (Straub et al., 2004). The 
instrument was pilot tested with a sample o f 42 MBA students from a large public 
university in the Southeastern United States. All the students used for the pilot were 
either currently employed or had previous work experience. The descriptive statistics of 
the pilot sample are summarized in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3
Descriptive Statistics o f  Pilot Sample
Average Age 24.26
Average Organizational Tenure 1.66
Gender Female 31%
Male 69%
IT Position 4.8%
Management 12.2%
The data from the pilot test was used to examine the validity o f the reflective 
measures to be used in the study. The pilot test construct statistics were ascertained using 
partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) in SmartPLS (Ringle et al., 
2005). Overall, the results of the pilot test provide evidence of the initial validity o f the
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measures to be used in the full study. The construct loadings from the pilot test are 
summarized in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4
Pilot Study Construct Loadings
Security
Expectancy
Security
Instrumentality
Security
Valence
Security
Withdrawal
Protection
Motivation PMBs PsyCap
SE1 0.932
SE2 0.934
SE3 0.865
SI1 0.931
SI2 0.856
SI3 0.904
SI4 0.922
SV1 0.936
SV2 0.931
SV3 0.975
SW1 0.634
SW2 0.915
SW3 0.875
PM1 0.931
PM2 0.915
PM3 0.916
PM4 0.892
PMB1 0.949
PMB2 0.926
PMB3 0.946
PMB4 0.874
PMB5 0.941
PCO 0.808
PCSE 0.896
PCH 0.914
PCR 0.925
In addition to viewing the standardized loadings, I also examined the convergent 
and divergent validity o f the constructs by calculating the latent variable correlations, the
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Cronbach’s alpha, and the average variance extracted (AVE) for each o f the constructs. 
The convergent and divergent statistics are summarized in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5
Pilot Study Construct Correlations
Security
Expectancy
(SE)
Security
Instrumentality
(SI)
Security
Valence
(SV)
Security
Withdrawal
(SW )
Protection
Motivation
(PM) PMB PsyCap
Cronbach’s
a
SE 0.83* 0.8971
SI 0.6017 0.82 0.9247
SV 0.3122 0.4366 0.90 0.9429
SW -0.4662 -0.6665 -0.4345 0.67 0.7557
PM 0.7789 0.6611 0.5314 -0.6334 0.83 0.9337
PM
B
0.4279
0.4837
0.6104 -0.4493 0.6104 0.86 0.9593
Psy
Cap
0.4578
0.434
0.4595 -0.1913 0.4595 0.3871 0.79 0.9189
*AVE’s bolded along diagonal
Primary Study
After analyzing the results o f the pilot test and confirming the initial validity of 
the instrumentation, responses were collected from a sample o f 414 organizational 
insiders. On-line panels are especially appropriate for gathering security data as they 
offer full anonymity, not simply confidentiality. Given the sensitive nature of security 
responses, anonymity is required to encourage candid responses, and panels provide 
increased anonymity in multiple ways. First, the researchers never know the identity of 
the respondents, and the privacy o f respondents is guaranteed and governed by the data 
provider. Second, respondents’ real and perceived anonymity is enhanced by having 
access to the survey outside of their organization’s network and computers. Providing 
anonymous, off-site access to self-report surveys has been shown to be adequate and 
appropriate for the elicitation o f self-reported incidences of sensitive and even socially
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undesirable behaviors such as protection-motivated behaviors (Posey et al., 2013) and 
organizational deviance (Bennett et al., 2000; Bennett et al., 2003). The descriptive 
statistics of the primary sample are summarized in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6
Descriptive Statistics o f  Primary Sample
Average Age 45.59
Average Organizational Tenure 10.58
Gender Female 53.1%
Male 46.9%
Education Some high school 0.2%
High school diploma 11.4%
Some college 25.6%
Undergraduate degree 41.5%
Master’s degree 16.4%
Doctorate/Professional degree 4.8%
IT Position 15.2%
Management 33.8%
Construct Validity
For the reflective measures included in the structural model, the standardized 
factor loadings from a CFA analysis were considered along with the Cronbach’s alphas. 
Also, the convergent and discriminant validity of measures in the structural model were 
assessed with average variance extracted (AVE) and the Fomell-Larker criterion 
(comparison of squared correlations with AVEs) as recommended (Hair et al., 2006; Hair 
et al., 2014). This study also employed one construct which was specified as formative in 
prior research, SETA (D'Arcy et al., 2009). The validity o f formative measures is 
assessed differently than that of reflective measures (Hair et al., 2014). In order to assess 
the validity of SETA, first, the content validly was examined for the present study.
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Second, the collinearity o f the formative items was assessed by calculating the indicator 
correlation matrix and the variance inflation factor (VIF) o f each indicator. Finally, the 
statistical and practical significance o f each formative indicator was assessed through the 
significance and magnitude of the coefficient (see Table 2.7).
Table 2.7
Full Measures in Study & Validity Statistics
CFA of F .eflective Item s: Chi-Squared = 1758.36 d.f. = 794; CFI: 0.9^1; RM SEA: 0.054
Items Measures Scale1 Spec." Mean STD Load.
Security
Valence
(SV)
Adapted from Sanchez et al. (2000) 
Instructions: “Please indicate your level of 
agreement with the following statements about 
information-security threats to your 
organization.” Scale Spec. Mean STD Load.
SV-1
I would like to protect my organization from 
information security threats. a R 5.89 1.230 0.970
SV-2
It would be good to protect my organization 
from information security threats. a R 6.02 1.191 0.894
SV-3
I want to protect my organization from 
information security threats. a R 5.94 1.202 0.945
Security
Expectancy
(SE)
Adapted from Sanchez et al. (2000) 
Instructions: “Please indicate your level of 
agreement with the following statements about 
information-security threats to your 
organization.” Scale Spec. Mean STD Load.
SE-1
If 1 try my best to perform security tasks, I can 
successfully protect my work-related 
information. a R 5.44 1.225 0.908
SE-2
If I concentrate and try hard then I can secure 
my work-related information. a R 5.32 1.208 0.887
SE-3
I can protect my work-related information if I 
put some effort into it. a R 5.49 1.210 0.911
Security
In stru ­
m entality
(SI)
Adapted from Sanchez et al. (2000) 
Instructions: “Please indicate your level of 
agreement with the following statements about 
information-security threats to your 
organization.” Scale Spec. Mean STD Load.
SI-1
If I protect my work-related information, my 
organization has a good chance o f being 
protected from security threats. a R 5.30 1.361 0.941
40
Table 2.7 (Continued)
SI-2
I think my organization will be protected from 
security threats if I can secure my work-related 
information. a R 5.24 1.389 0.912
SI-3
How well I protect my work-related 
information will affect whether my 
organization is protected from security threats. a R 5.24 1.509 0.911
SI-4
The better I am at securing my work-related 
information, the more likely my organization 
will be protected from security threats. a R 5.18 1.355 0.897
Security
Withdrawa
1(SW)
Adapted from Beaudry et al. (2010) 
Instructions: “ Indicate how often you reacted in 
the following ways when confronted with a 
threat to your organization’s information 
security.” Scale Spec. Mean STD Load.
“Indicate how often you reacted in the 
following ways when confronted with a threat 
to your organization's information security.” b R
SW-I
I told myself that time would take care o f the 
threat to my organization's information 
security. b R 2.95 1.673 0.715
SW-2
1 told myself that there was nothing I could do 
about the threat to my organization's 
information security. b R 3.08 1.638 0.856
SW-3
I tried not to worry about the threat to my 
organization's information security. b R 3.87 1.637 0.652
Protection
Motivation
(PM)
Posey (2010)
Instructions: “Please indicate your level of 
agreement with the following statements about 
information-security threats to your 
organization.” Scale Spec. Mean STD Load.
PM-1
I intend to protect my organization from its 
information security threats. a R 5.48 1.314 0.931
PM-2
My intentions to prevent my organization's 
information security threats from being 
successful are high. a R 5.36 1.355 0.892
It is likely that I will engage in activities that 
protect my organization's information and 
PM-3 information systems from security threats. a R 5.28 1.424 0.863
PM-4
1 intend to expend effort to protect my 
organization from its information security 
threats. a R 5.23 1.369 0.864
PsyCap
Hope
(PCH)
(Luthans et al., 2007b)
Instructions: “Please indicate your level of 
agreement with the following statements." Scale Spec. Mean STD Load.
PCH-1
If I should find myself in a jam at work, I could 
think of many ways to get out of it. a R 5.34 1.057 0.721
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PCH-2
At the present time, I am energetically pursuing 
my work goals. a R 5.14 1.334 0.675
PCH-4
Right now I see myself as being pretty 
successful at work. a R 5.41 1.054 0.764
PCH-5
1 can think o f many ways to reach my current 
work goals. a R 5.29 1.246 0.794
PCH-6
At this time, 1 am meeting the work goals that I 
set for myself. a R 5.45 1.118 0.763
PsyCap
Resilience
(PCR)
(Luthans et al., 2007b)
Instructions: "'Please indicate your level of 
agreement with the following statements." Scale Spec. Mean STD Load.
PCR-2
I usually manage difficulties one way or 
another at work. a R 5.64 .989 0.814
PCR-3
I can be “on my own,” so to speak, at work if I 
have to. a R 6.01 1.069 0.714
PCR-4 I usually take stressful things at work in stride. a R 5.18 1.202 0.668
PCR-5
I can get through difficult times at work 
because I’ve experienced difficulty before. a R 5.61 1.069 0.850
PCR-6
I feel 1 can handle many things at a time at this 
job. a R 5.65 1.111 0.786
PsyCap
Optimism
(PCO)
(Luthans et al., 2007b)
Instructions: "Please indicate your level of 
agreement with the following statements." Scale Spec. Mean STD Load.
PCO-1
When things are uncertain for me at work, I 
usually expect the best. a R 4.81 1.263 0.773
PCO-3
I always look on the bright side o f things 
regarding my job. a R 5.03 1.521 0.845
PCO-4
I’m optimistic about what will happen to me in 
the future as it pertains to work. a R 5.09 1.277 0.765
PCO-6
I approach this job as if “every cloud has a 
silver lining.” a R 4.96 1.421 0.762
PsyCap
Self-
Efficacy
(PCSE)
(Luthans et al., 2007b)
Instructions: "Please indicate your level of 
agreement with the following statements." Scale Spec. Mean STD Load.
PCSE-1
I feel confident analyzing a long-term problem 
to find a solution. a R 5.43 1.143 0.786
PCSE-2
I feel confident in representing my work area in 
meetings with management. a R 5.45 1.274 0.782
PCSE-3
I feel confident contributing to discussions 
about the company’s strategy. a R 5.05 1.375 0.752
PCSE-4
I feel confident helping to set targets/goals in 
my work area. a R 5.543 1.250 0.742
PCSE-5
I feel confident contacting people outside the 
company (e.g., suppliers, customers) to discuss 
problems. a R 5.17 1.482 0.625
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PCSE-6
I feel confident presenting information to a 
group o f colleagues. a R 5.32 1.347 0.755
Protection
M otivated
Behaviors
(PMB)
(Posey, 2010)
Instructions: “Given the following statements, 
on what basis did you engage in the stated 
behaviors in the last year?” Scale Spec. Mean STD Load.
PMB-1
I actively attempted to protect my 
organization’s information and computerized 
information systems b R 4.87 1.900 0.944
PMB-2
I tried to safeguard my organization’s 
information and information systems from their 
information security threats b R 4.94 1.877 0.906
PMB-3
I took committed action to prevent information 
security threats to my firm’s information and 
computer systems from being successful b R 4.52 1.983 0.863
PMB-4
I purposefully defended my organization from 
information security threats to its information 
and computerized information systems b R 4.36 1.994 0.813
PMB-5
I earnestly attempted to keep my organization’s 
information and computer systems from harm 
produced by information security threats b R 4.90 1.886 0.924
Security
Education
Training
Awareness
(SETA)
D’Arcy et al. (2009)
Instructions: “Please indicate your level of 
agreement with the following statements about 
your organization.”
Scale Spec. Mean STD Load.
SETA-1
My organization provides training to help 
employees improve their awareness of 
computer and information security issues. a F 4.51 1.846 0.081
SETA-3
In my organization, employees are briefed on 
the consequences of modifying computerized 
data in an unauthorized way. a F 4.50 1.870 0.112
SETA-4
My organization educates employees on their 
computer security responsibilities. a F 4.82 1.795 0.529
SETA-5
In my organization, employees are briefed on 
the consequences of accessing computer 
systems that they are not authorized to use. a F 4.59 1.854 0.349
(R) = reverse scored item
'Scale: a) Strongly Disagree -  Strongly Agree; b) N ev e r- Always 
"Specification: R) reflective F) formative
As shown in Table 2.7, most o f the standardized loadings o f the reflective items 
were above a conservative 0.70 cutoff criterion. A loading of 0.70 indicates that the
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associated latent variable accounts for 50% of the variance in the indicator (Hair et al., 
2006; Hair et al., 2014). The Cronbach’s alpha of each construct was within the 
recommendations of prior research (Nunnally, 1978) (see Table 2.8). Finally, the 
constructs exhibit convergence and discriminance as indicated by the ratio of Fomell- 
Larker statistic and latent variable correlations o f < 1.
Table 2.8
Primary Study Reflective Construct Correlations
Security
Expectancy
(SE)
Security
Instrumentality
(SI)
Security
Valence
(SV)
Security
Withdrawal
(SW)
Protection
Motivation
(PM) PMB
PsyCa
P
Cronbach’s
a
SE 0.81* 0.93
SI 0.78 0.84 0.95
SV 0.69 0.64 0.88 0.96
SW -0.19 -0.17 -0.25 0.56 0.78
PM 0.79 0.79 0.75 -0.18 0.79 0.94
PM
B
0.59
0 . 6 6
0.56 -0.04 0.75 0.79 0.96
Psy
Cap
0.63
0.53
0.56 -0.15 0.46 0.39 0.71 0.95
*AVE’s bolded a ong diagonal
The validity o f SETA was assessed according to the recommendations for 
formatively specified constructs (Hair et al., 2014). First, the content validity of the 
SETA measure was established. Formative measures are modeled to include no measure 
error (Bagozzi, 2011); therefore, the formative items are said to fully explain the latent 
variable. An error in content validity is manifest in the absence o f an item which should 
be included in order to fully represent the construct domain. The formative item 
measuring SETA was taken directly from prior research (D'Arcy et al., 2009). In its prior 
use, SETA was validated in a similar context (security) and to a similar population
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(organizational insiders). Based on the previous establishment o f SETA and an 
assessment of the items forming SETA, the construct was determined to be content valid. 
Second, the collinearity o f the items was assessed by assessing the correlations among 
items and running regressions o f each item on the others in order to ascertain the VIF 
level o f each item. Items with a VIF of greater than ten are said to suffer from 
multicollinearity, while those with a VIF of five or less are conservatively assessed to 
have no multicollinearity (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Hair et al., 2014; Hair et al., 2006). The 
range o f VIFs was 3.0 to 4.3 with the average for each SETA item reported in Table 2.9.
Table 2.9
SETA Item Correlations & VIFs
SETA 1 SETA 3 SETA  4 SETA  5
SETA 1 3.7
SETA 3 .786*** 3.4
SETA 4 7 9 4 *** 76i*** 3.7
SETA 5 793*** 3 3 9 *** .801*** 3.2
*** p=0 .0 C)1; avg. VIF. bolded along diagonal
Structural Model
Finally, the hypothesized relationships in the research model were tested using 
SEM. The Chi-Squared statistic and degrees o f freedom (X2=2552.8 and d.f.=967; X2 to 
d.f. ratio = 2.6) along with a goodness of fit index (CFI =0.90) and a badness o f fit index 
(RMSEA=.06) all indicate that the final structural model has good fit overall (Hu et al., 
1999; Kline, 2010). Moreover, nine of thirteen hypothesized relationships were 
significant and in the predicted direction. ( see Table 2.10)
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Table 2.10
Structural Model Results
Chi-Squared = 2552.8; d.f.= 967 
CFI=0.91; RMSEA=0.06
Hyp.
Hypothesis
(direction)
Path
Coefficient p-value
Significance
(two-tailed)
HI SETA-> Security expectancy (+) 0.520 <0.001 ***
H2 SETA-> Security valence (+) 0.403 <0.001 k k k
H3 SETA-^ Security instrumentality (+) 0.514 <0.001 k k k
H4 Security expectancy Protection motivation (+) 0.572 <0.001 k k k
H5 Security instrumentality -> Security withdrawal (-) -0.002 0.983 n/s
H6 Security valence -> Protection motivation (+) 0.453 <0.001 ■kick
H7 Security valence Security withdrawal (-) -0.242 0.001 k k k
H8 Security expectancy -> PsyCap (+) 0.572 <0.001 k k k
H9 Security instrumentality -> PsyCap (+) 0.139 0.044 k
HI
0
PsyCap -> Protection motivation (+) 0.020 0.668 n/s
HI
1
PsyCap Security withdrawal (-) -0.015 0.827 n/s
HI
2
Protection motivation PMBs (+) 0.734 <0.001 k k k
HI
3
Security withdrawal -> PMBs (-) 0.11 0.009 k k
Bold = supported; *p=0.05; **p=0.01; ***p=0.001; n/s^not significant
Controls and Rival Explanations 
To substantiate the findings of the structural model, the analysis was performed 
again including several controls. As can be seen in Table 2.11, controls for age, tenure, 
gender, and whether the individual had a managerial or an IT position had no significant 
impact on the performance of PMBs. Additionally, potential rival explanations of PMBs 
were tested in order to isolate the impact o f the expectancy model. Security locus of 
control, managerial support for security, and social desirability were all included as 
potential rival explanations of the performance of PMBs. Again, as can be seen in Table 
2.11, none of the controls were statistically related to the performance o f PMBs. Further, 
the expectancy model was fully robust to the inclusion of the controls and the substantive
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variables in the study suffered no appreciable loss o f impact or significance when tested 
in concert with a plethora o f controls. The research model is shown in Figure 2.3.
Table 2.11
Structural Model Results Including Controls
Chi-Squared = 4104.921; d.f.= 1660 
CFI=0.87; RMSEA=0.06
Hyp Hypothesis Path Significance
. (direction) Coefficient p-value (two-tailed)
HI SETA-> Security expectancy (+) 0.520 <0.001 ***
H2 SETA-^ Security valence (+) 0.403 <0.001 ftftft
H3 SETA-^ Security instrumentality (+) 0.514 <0.001 ***
H4 Security expectancy Protection motivation (+) 0.573 <0.001 ftftft
H5 Security instrumentality Security withdrawal (-) -0.003 0.964 n/s
H6 Security valence Protection motivation (+) 0.454 <0.001 AAA
H7 Security valence 4  Security withdrawal (-) -0.240 0.001 ftftft
H8 Security expectancy -> PsyCap (+) 0.553 <0.001 & & ft
H9 Security instrumentality PsyCap (+) 0.139 0.045 ft
H10 PsyCap -> Protection motivation (+) 0.017 0.718 n/s
HI 1 PsyCap Security withdrawal (-) -0.016 0.816 n/s
H12 Protection motivation PMBs (+) 0.722 <0.001 ftftft
H13 Security withdrawal PMBs (-) 0.097 0.031 ft
Controls
Age 0.004 0.457 n/s
Tenure -0.005 0.513 n/s
Manager 0.227 0.101 n/s
IT Position 0.147 0.422 n/s
Gender -0.061 0.635 n/s
Security Locus o f Control 0.046 0.425 n/s
Managerial Support for Security -0.083 0.141 n/s
Social Desirability 0.071 0.196 n/s
Bold = supported; *p=0.05; **p=0.01; ***p=0.001; n/s=not significant
47
0.67
Protection
Motivation
— I; 040 PMBsPayCapSETA
Controla:
Aga 
Tenure 
Manager 
IT Position 
Sex
Security Locue of Control 
Managerial Support for Security 
Social Desirability
First Order Reflective 
-► Significant Patti 
*► insignificant Path
Figure 2.3 Research Model
Discussion
The expectancy-based security model provides a robust, multidimensional 
framework of PMB motivation. The role of insiders as protectors of the firm’s security is 
an evolving role that is based on the realization that insiders are uniquely able to protect 
their firm’s information and information systems (Posey et al., 2013). The results o f this 
study elucidate the impact of expectancy dimensions on the motivation to and withdrawal 
from performance of security behaviors. As predicted, security expectancy is positively 
related to the motivation to protect the firm’s information and IS. Additionally, security 
valence is positively related to protection motivation and negatively related to security 
withdrawal.
In addition to finding support for relationships espoused in Vroom’s (1964) 
expectancy theory, I also found support for the role o f SETA in influencing insiders’ 
security-related valence, instrumentality, and expectancies. The positive impact of 
training was shown through the relationship between SETA and all three expectancy
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measures. Second, as hypothesized, expectancy and instrumentality build insiders’ 
psychological resource capabilities manifested in their positive relationship with PsyCap. 
Finally, as predicted protection motivation is positively related to PMBs. Therefore, the 
intention to protect the firm from security threats significantly impacts whether or not an 
insider proactively attempts to protect their firm’s information and information system.
The direct role o f PsyCap on security motivation was not supported in the 
research model. PsyCap was not significantly related to either motivation or withdrawal. 
However, the findings support a relationship between security and PsyCap. Specifically, 
the expectancy theory measures were shown to increase the PsyCap o f individuals. One 
potential explanation of the insignificant relationship between PsyCap and protection 
motivation is the substantial explanatory power o f the security expectancy measures, 
which leave little variance in protection motivation for PsyCap to explain.
I found one significant relationship which was in the opposite direction of the 
hypothesis, the relationship between security withdrawal and PMBs. This finding is 
seemingly counter-intuitive at first given the concept of security withdrawal. However, 
security withdrawal as measured in self-report requires that the individual actively 
identify potential security threats and then cope with the threat by psychologically 
distancing him or herself from the performance of security behaviors. This identification 
o f security threats may be confounding the impact of security withdrawal by implicitly 
including an identification of potential security threats. The significant negative 
relationship between security valence and withdrawal supports this assertion by 
indicating that individuals who believe it is good to protect their firm from security 
threats are less likely to withdraw psychologically from security behaviors. In this way,
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the nuance o f psychological withdrawal is made evident as psychological withdrawal 
does not necessarily negatively relate to intention to protect the firm. Ergo, an individual 
may not be convinced that protecting the firm is good, and may withdraw psychologically 
from security behaviors yet refrain from malicious intent or maintain an— albeit 
weaker— intention to protect the firm.
Implications and Contributions 
This research makes several important contributions to the behavioral information 
security literature. First, the expectancy theory-based research model establishes evidence 
o f SETA’s positive relationship with insiders’ expectancies. The positive relationship 
between SETA and each of the expectancy dimensions provides an important framework 
for the influence of SETA on insiders’ motivation to and withdrawal from protective 
behaviors. The diagnostic nature of expectancy theory makes it uniquely suited for 
establishing training roles, and the significance of SETA on expectancy, instrumentality, 
and valance support a multi-dimensional framework for SETA development. 
Organizations seeking to increase security can effectively develop insiders’ behavioral 
expectancies, outcome instrumentalities, and outcome valences via SETA programs.
Complementary to the recently established deterring effect o f SETA (D'Arcy et 
al., 2009), this research also provides support for a broad and positive impact o f SETA 
programs. In addition to the direct relationship between SETA and expectancy measures, 
the findings establish an indirect relationship between SETA and PsyCap. Therefore, 
organizations which employ SETA programs to impact the valence, instrumentality and
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expectancies of insiders will have the compounding organizational impact o f insiders’ 
increased PsyCap which has been found to be related to myriad positive organizational 
outcomes (see Table 2.12).
Table 2.12
Summary o f  Key Findings
Key finding Significance to research Significance to practice
SETA’s influence on the 
three expectancy 
dimensions
Provides a diagnostic 
framework for future 
research on SETA 
effectiveness.
Provides support for SETA 
as an effective mechanism 
for developing the 
expectancy facets of 
insiders.
Expectancy dimensions 
influence on insiders’ 
PsyCap
Provides evidence of the 
broadly positive impact of 
SETA through the 
development o f expectancy 
dimensions.
Links security to positive 
psychological resources, 
and provides a framework 
of PsyCap development for 
organizations through 
SETA programs.
Expectancy dimensions 
influence on motivation 
to/withdrawal from 
security behaviors
Provides behavioral 
information security 
research with a framework 
within which to investigate 
insiders’ motivation to and 
withdrawal from security 
behaviors.
Provides a framework for 
SETA in which training for 
the expectancy dimensions 
increases insiders’ 
motivation to protect the 
firm.
Expectancy Theory model 
robust to controls for
( 1 ) demographics
(2 ) managerial support,
(3) social desirability, and
(4) locus o f control
Isolates the results of the 
research model to the 
expectancy dimensions 
which are shown to be 
malleable through SETA.
Provides support for the 
robustness of 
organizational security 
programs which 
incorporate manipulation 
of expectancy dimensions.
The multi-dimensional expectancy-based approach to security is also an effective 
model o f PMBs, accounting for 53% of the variance in PMBs. Further, security valence 
and security expectancy together explained 6 6 % of the variance in insider’s protection 
motivation. This indicates that organizations that are able to successfully affect insiders’
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security expectancy and valence can make a substantial impact in influencing the 
protection motivation of their employees. These relationships are important for the 
development o f future organizational initiatives and SETA programs. The impact of 
SETA was significant and similar on all three measures in the VIE model, indicating that 
to a large extent SETA programs equally influence each facet o f expectancy.
Limitations and Future Research 
There are inherent limitations in self-reported security research, and to a large 
extent this research is no exception. However, due to the absence of observational data of 
actual security behaviors, survey instruments are an accepted medium for ascertaining the 
behavior of insiders. I took recommended precautions to ensure that individual 
anonym ity was preserved and responses were uninhibited. A dditionally, the data 
analyzed in this research was collected at a cross-sectional level with differences 
measured between randomly surveyed organizational insiders. Expectancy theory has 
been employed at both the within and between individual levels in past research. While 
some have argued that expectancy theory is most appropriate for analyzing motivational 
changes within individuals, the robust performance of expectancy between individuals 
supports its use as a framework o f security behavior across individuals. Given the 
significance o f the research model, future research can use this expectancy-based 
framework to examine within individual impacts resulting from manipulations such as 
training sessions.
In the research model, SETA significantly explained 26%, 27%, and 16% of the 
variance in instrumentality, expectancy, and valence, respectively. This underscores the 
remaining antecedents to expectancy measures to be uncovered by future research. A
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significant relationship between the expectancy theory measures of instrumentality and 
expectancy and PsyCap was established in this research. However, PsyCap was not 
significantly related to either protection motivation or to security withdrawal. Future 
research should continue to examine the relationship between insiders’ PsyCap and 
security behaviors. Specifically, the role o f PsyCap as a resource for security behavior, as 
a potential moderator o f important relationships, and as a dependent variable in IS 
research should be explored.
Conclusion
This chapter developed and applied an expectancy theory based research model of 
protective security behaviors. The results of the study indicate that expectancy theory is 
an appropriate framework within which to view the performance o f PMBs. Nine o f the 
thirteen hypothesized relationships were significant and in the hypothesized direction. 
Security expectancies build insiders’ PsyCap and also provide motivation to protect the 
firm. Security valence buffers insider’s from withdrawing from security behaviors and 
simultaneously motivates toward protection of the firm. Security instrumentality also 
works to build insiders’ PsyCap. The positive impact of SETA was also made clear in the 
results o f the structural model, being significantly related to the three facets o f the 
expectancy model (VIE). The indirect effect of SETA on PsyCap is an important finding 
and underscores the broadly positive impact o f security training. Finally, the results were 
robust to a number o f important controls, both demographic related, personality related, 
and security related.
CHAPTER 3
THE ADAPTIVE ROLE OF EMOTION IN 
INFORMATION SECURITY: BROADENING 
THE THEORETICAL REPERTOIRE
Introduction
Humans are broadly influenced by experiences o f emotion. An individual’s 
emotional reaction is often an adaptational intermediary between stimuli and 
corresponding behavior (Lazarus, 1991). In information systems (IS), emotive-behavioral 
models have provided a complementary view of adaptation to the plethora o f cognitive- 
behavioral models (e.g. Venkatesh et al., 2003; Davis, 1989). Behavioral models are of 
increasing interest in IS security as practitioners and researchers recognize that the 
information security o f organizations is at the mercy of organizational insiders (Moore et 
al., 2008; Boss et al., 2009; D'Arcy et al., 2007). Organizational insiders include not only 
technology specialists, but all employees and organizational agents with access to the 
information system and informational resources in the fulfillment o f organizational 
responsibilities (Posey et al., 2013; Shaw et al., 1998). In today’s environment of 
enterprise-wide systems and ubiquitous computing, these insiders have the greatest 
access to their organization’s information and IS (Stanton et al., 2006a). For example, 
over 50% of firms worldwide now allow employees to use mobile devices for tasks such
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as sales force automation, project management, and email (Symantec, 2012). Another 
89% of firms have enabled employees to access organizationally relevant material from 
employee-owned devices, a phenomenon dubbed “bring your own device” (BYOD) 
(Bradley et al., 2012).
Given the influence o f insiders’ behavior on security and the central role of 
emotion in adaptation, the study of emotion in IS security is warranted. Further, all 
organizations are emotionally-laden (Amabile et al., 2005). Emotion in the workplace, 
however, is not merely an artifact o f the organization itself, but rather a manifestation of 
the multitudes o f person-environment relationships which constitute the larger 
organization (Lazarus, 1991). Lazarus (1991 loc. 570) notes, “the basic unit of this 
person-environment relationship is an adaptational encounter.” IS security is rife with 
such adaptational encounters as insiders are assailed with increasingly sophisticated 
threats to their firms’ security (Hamill et al., 2005). IS security has no framework for the 
consideration o f the broad spectrum of emotions, but rather—as in the broader 
organizational literature (Fredrickson, 1998)— has often considered only the role of 
negative emotions, particularly fear (e.g. Johnston et al., 2010). However, emotional 
stimuli often elicit multiple emotions o f varying intensities simultaneously (Lazarus et 
al., 1984; Lazarus, 1991; Beaudry et al., 2010). The broaden-and-build theory 
(Fredrickson, 1998; Fredrickson, 2001) provides a multi-dimensional framework of 
emotions which includes the often neglected positive emotions. The broaden-and-build 
theory posits that positive emotions “broaden the scope of attention and thought-action 
repertoires,” (Fredrickson et al., 2005) while simultaneously building lasting 
psychological resources (Fredrickson, 1998; Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson et al., 2005).
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An individual’s thought-action repertoire is the collection o f the thoughts and behaviors, 
which are cognitively available to the actor (Fredrickson et al., 2005).
The broaden and build theory is an outworking of a new positive direction in the 
larger field of psychology known as the positive psychology movement (Seligman et al., 
2000). Positive psychology is “the study of the conditions and processes that contribute to 
the flourishing or optimal functioning of people, groups, and institutions” (Gable et al., 
2005). Positive psychological resources such as those described in the broaden-and-build 
theory have received increased attention in positive psychology. One such 
conceptualization o f positive psychological resources is psychological capital (PsyCap). 
PsyCap is a construct o f positive “psychological resource capabilities” which are open to 
development (Luthans et al., 2009). PsyCap is a higher order construct composed of 
distinct yet related core tenets of positive psychology o f hope, resilience, optimism, and 
self-efficacy (Luthans et al., 2007b).
PsyCap is uniquely applicable in behavioral information security research because 
the optimal functioning of the “average person” is its subject (Sheldon et al., 2001). 
Similarly, IS security research has taken an interest in the role o f ordinary insiders, 
including their ability to increase their firms’ information security (Posey et al., 2013; 
Albrechtsen et al., 2009; Stanton et al., 2005). Recently, a taxonomy of protection- 
motivated behaviors (PMBs) has explicated the ways in which these ordinary insiders can 
protect their organizations’ information and IS (Posey et al., 2013). PMBs are the 
volitional behaviors organizational insiders can enact to protect ( 1) organizationally 
relevant information within their firms and (2) the computer-based IS in which that
56
information is stored, collected, disseminated, and/or manipulated from information- 
security threats (Posey et al., 2013).
Whether through security policy compliance (Herath et al., 2009) or PMBs (Posey 
et al., 2013), insiders seeking to practice safe computing are faced with an increasingly 
complex environment within which to protect the organization’s IS. Organizations often 
play on the emotions o f employees to elicit security behaviors by employing appeals to 
emotion, such as fear (Johnston et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2010; Herath et al., 2009; 
Lee et al., 2009). However, as the role o f emotion continues to become increasingly 
important in IS, a thorough treatment of the role of emotion requires the spectrum of 
emotions be considered (Beaudry et al., 2010). The broaden-and-build theory provides a 
model for considering the role of emotions, both positive and negative in adaptation. The 
goal o f this paper is to integrate a framework of emotions (Beaudry et al., 2010) with the 
broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 1998, 2001) to thoroughly examine the adaptive 
role o f emotions in information security.
Emotion and Adaptation in IS
It is inconceivable to me that there could be an approach to the mind, or 
to human and animal adaptation, in which the emotions are not a key 
component. Failure to give emotion a central role puts theoretical and 
research psychology out o f  step with human preoccupations from  the 
beginning o f  recorded time (Lazarus, 1991 loc. 125-127).
IS research continues to adapt to the evolving role o f technology in the workplace 
and society at large. Along this pursuit, Abraham et al. (2013) describe the need to add 
adaptive mechanisms to the “theoretical repertoire” o f IS research. A principle tenet of 
adaptation is the belief that the most suited creatures survive (i.e. “survival o f the 
fittest”).The organizational and economic implications of survival o f the fittest are
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widespread from firm survival (Gimeno et al., 1997) to the adoption of technology 
(Hantula et al., 2011; Kock, 2009). From an evolutionary perspective, emotions play the 
adaptive role o f fit enhancement (Nesse et al., 2009). Hence, when fit is challenged, 
negative emotions are positively adaptive and vice versa. It has been the role o f emotions 
to elicit some innate or adaptive response which generally has increased the survival of 
our species (Nesse et al., 2009). Therefore, emotions can be viewed as either an innate 
coping mechanism or an evolved remnant of historically (and presently) adaptive 
responses.
Behavioral research has begun to acknowledge the role o f adaptation in the 
explanation of behavioral responses (Capra et al., 2011; Griskevicius et al., 2011; Hantula 
et al., 2011). However, a general framework for describing phenomena in light of 
adaptive responses has not yet been created (Saad, 2011). The broaden-and-build theory 
o f positive emotions offers an integrated framework of emotions. Application o f the 
broaden-and-build theory provides explanation o f the complex relationship between 
emotional stimuli and adaptation. Additionally, the broaden-and-build theory elucidates 
the role of emotions (both positive and negative) on cognition, behavior, and the 
psychological resources of the emotional being.
Affect and Emotion in IS Security 
Since William James (1884) first asked What is an emotion?, and even long 
before, philosophers, psychologists, and other behaviorists have grappled with the 
meaning and implications of emotions (Solomon, 2008). Even now there remain 
inconsistencies in the conception o f emotions in contrast to other affective states, such as 
sensory pleasure and positive mood (Fredrickson et al., 2008). For many (including the
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author), an acceptable differentiator is that emotions, both negative and positive, have a 
specific referent (Beaudry et al., 2010; Lazarus, 1991; Smith et al., 1990). This is in the 
vein of what Frijda (1988) called “situational meaning.” Therefore, affect can be viewed 
as an “umbrella for a set o f more specific mental processes including emotions, moods, 
and (possibly) attitudes,” and emotion a referent specific “mental state o f readiness” 
(Bagozzi et al., 1999, p. 184).
Positive affect is often concomitant with positive emotion though more stable and 
relatively long lasting (Fredrickson, 2001; Forgas et al., 2001). Further, as opposed to the 
specificity o f emotions, positive affect is often considered a measure of general happiness 
(Culbertson et al., 2010). Both positive emotions and affect, however, facilitate 
motivation or approach behavior (Carver et al., 1990; Cacioppo et al., 1999). The stable 
nature o f general affect over time has caused it to become conceptualized as a trait-like 
characteristic o f individuals (Kaplan et al., 2009). Persistent or trait-like affect is 
associated with categories o f workplace behavior (Bennett et al., 2003). For example, 
positive affect has been linked to organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs), while a 
negative affect has been linked to a decrease in OCBs along with an increase in 
counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs) (Kaplan et al., 2009).
Beaudry and Pinsonneault (2010) developed a framework for classifying specific 
emotions in IS based on the work of Lazarus and his colleagues (Lazarus et al., 1984; 
Folkman et al., 1986). Lazarus and Folkman (1984, p. 26) describe a coping process for 
individuals confronted with “any event in which the person feels his or her adaptive 
resources to be taxed or exceeded.” According to Lazarus, taxing stimuli initiate a two 
stage appraisal process: (1) a primary appraisal and (2) a secondary appraisal (Lazarus et
59
al., 1984). During the primary appraisal, an individual assesses the stimulus as either 
irrelevant, benign-positive, or stressful, while the secondary appraisal is a judgment of 
control. Stressful appraisals are further delineated as harm/loss, threat, or challenge 
(Lazarus et al., 1984). These primary, secondary, and stress appraisals can be seen in the 
emotional framework presented by Beaudry and Pinsonneault (2010) (see Figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.1 Classification o f  Emotions -  Adaptedfrom Beaudry & Pinsonneault (2010)
Beaudry and Pinsonneault’s (2010) framework of emotions is instrumental in the 
depiction of discrete emotions as experiences of emotions are often overlapping and 
varying in intensity (Lazarus et al., 1984). The framework can also be viewed as 
categorizing emotions as either positive (above the x-axis) or negative (below the x-axis). 
The distinction o f positive and negative emotions is warranted as positive and negative
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emotions have been found to be relatively independent and impact behavior and 
cognition differently (Bagozzi et al., 1999; Cenfetelli, 2004; Fredrickson, 2001). When 
stimuli are appraised as fit enhancing (i.e. an opportunity), the emotions elicited have a 
positive valence, whereas stimuli assessed as challenging fit (i.e. a threat) elicit negative 
emotions (Nesse et al., 2009; Beaudry et al., 2010). In this way, Beaudry and 
Pinsonneault’s (2010) emotional framework illustrates the similarities between appraisal 
theories of emotion and adaptive approaches to emotion (Nesse et al., 2009).
The impact of negative emotions has received greater consideration in the 
behavioral literature than positive emotions (Fredrickson, 1998). IS security has more 
often considered the role of negative emotions as well, most frequently through fear 
appeals (Johnston et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2010; Herath et al., 2009; Lee et al., 
2009). Compared to the information technology (IT) usage literature (Beaudry et al., 
2010; Venkatesh, 1999; Davis et al., 1992; Cenfetelli, 2004), the role of positive 
emotions has been examined less often in IS security. Additionally, when emotion has 
been considered it has been in the form of fear which is a single discrete negative 
emotion (Egloff et al., 2003; DeSteno et al., 2004; Nabi, 2002). Discrete emotions “each 
reflect a unique person-environment relationship, and thus are associated with different 
goals and action tendencies designed to achieve those goals” (Nabi, 2002, p. 205). The 
role of emotion across the spectrum of positive and negative discrete emotions is 
examined in this chapter through the integration of Beaudry and Pinsonneault’s (2010) 
framework o f emotion with Fredrickson’s (2001, 1998) broaden-and-build theory.
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The Broaden-and-Build Theory
The broaden-and-build theory posits that positive emotions broaden an 
individual’s thought-action repertoire and increase the ability to process large amounts of 
information through a broadened scope o f attention (Fredrickson, 2001). Positive 
emotions also build lasting psychological resources over time (Fredrickson, 1998; 
Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson et al., 2005). Therefore, implicit in the broaden-and-build 
theory are three distinct roles of emotions: ( 1 ) a broadening role, (2 ) a narrowing role, 
and (3) a building role (Fredrickson et al., 2005).
Broadening Role
The broadening role o f positive emotions impacts individuals in two distinct 
ways. First, positive emotions broaden an individual’s ability to recognize and process 
external cues (e.g. broadens scope of attention and ability to process large amounts of 
information). Second, positive emotions broaden an individual’s thought-action 
repertoire. A broadened scope of attention and cognitive processing is in line with Isen’s 
(1999) assertions that positive affect generally influences “memory, learning, problem 
solving and creativity, and flexibility in thinking.” A broadened scope o f attention also 
increases cognitive variation, and cognitive variation results in an increase in the number 
o f original ideas generated (Amabile et al., 2005). In the same way, as individuals 
broaden their processing of conditions relative to an issue, creativity in problem solving 
arises (Fredrickson, 2004; Amabile et al., 2005). As employees seek to protect the firm 
through their use of and interactions with the firm’s IS (Posey et al., 2013), the increased 
cognitive agility and broadened information processing that result from positive emotions
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(Isen, 1999; Fredrickson, 2004; Fredrickson et al., 2005; Amabile et al., 2005) provide 
insiders with important resources for contributing to IS security.
Positive emotions also lead to the broadening o f an individual’s thought-action 
repertoire. An individual’s thought-action repertoire is the collection o f thoughts and 
actions cognitively available to an individual at a moment in time (Fredrickson et al., 
2005). Therefore, enactment of the PMBs identified by Posey et al (2013) is contingent 
upon the availability of these behaviors to the actor at the time of the behavioral stimulus. 
The broaden-and-build theory implies insiders experiencing positive emotions are more 
likely to have the known behaviors cognitively accessible in the face o f a security threat. 
In this way, the broaden-and-build theory offers a partial remedy for the “knowing- 
doing” gap of security behaviors (Workman et al., 2008) by explaining that security- 
related thought and behavioral diversity is enhanced by positive emotions.
Narrowing Role
In contrast to the broadening role o f positive emotions, there is an implicit 
narrowing role o f negative emotions in the broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson et al., 
2005). That there is a narrowing role to complement the broadening role does not imply 
an inverse relationship between positive and negative emotions, however. Positive and 
negative emotions do not produce opposite behaviors, but rather work in different ways 
on cognition and behavior altogether (Isen, 1999). The narrowing role o f emotions is 
rooted heavily in the aforementioned adaptive role o f emotions. Negative emotions elicit 
specific action tendencies based on adaptive needs (Fredrickson et al., 2005; Cosmides et 
al., 2000). These adaptive tendencies are considered to be innate and often evolved 
mechanisms for increasing fit and therefore survival (Ohman et al., 2001; Cosmides et
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al., 2000; Nesse et al., 2009). For example, when fit is threatened, negative emotions such 
as fear may be stimulated, which produce a state o f readiness for a specific action such as 
“flight” (Nesse et al., 2009; Bagozzi et al., 1999). In this way, as predicted by the 
broaden-and-build theory, the specific tendency brought about by fear narrows the 
thought-action repertoire of the individual experiencing the negative emotion 
(Fredrickson, 1998; Fredrickson, 2001).
Beaudry and Pinsonneault’s (2010) original framework of emotions classified 
negative emotions associated with controllable consequences (e.g. fear, anxiety, worry, 
distress) as “deterrence emotions.” However, these emotions are often associated with an 
action tendency o f avoidance (Lazarus, 1991). Therefore, I have reclassified the bottom 
right quadrant o f the emotional framework as “avoidance emotions.” This is an 
appropriate reclassification as avoidance emotions are those which arise when an 
individual appraises a stimulus as threatening fit, yet perceives control over the outcome 
(i.e. the consequences are avoidable) (Beaudry et al., 2010; Nesse et al., 2009). 
Avoidance is an active adaptation due to the implied perception o f control over the 
outcome (Carver et al., 1982). As IS security research continues to search for the 
conditions o f efficacious emotional appeals (Crossler et al., 2012), the broaden-and-build 
theory is a useful framework for considering the role o f emotions in relation to security 
behaviors. As explained by the theory, negative emotions narrow individual’s thought- 
action repertoire and elicit an innate reaction.
Building Role
Finally, the broaden-and-build theory predicts that positive emotions build 
significant, lasting psychological resources such as resilience, optimism, and creativity
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over time (Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson, 1998). In this way, the broaden-and-build 
theory can be seen as providing a framework for positive emotions in positive 
psychology (Fredrickson, 2001). Positive psychology has been described as “the study of 
the conditions and processes that contribute to the flourishing or optimal functioning of 
people, groups, and institutions” (Gable et al., 2005). In their introduction o f positive 
psychology, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) describe positive psychology as 
focused on “the good life,” outlining positive characteristics such as well-being, 
optimism, hope, and happiness, among others. Fredrickson et al. (2002) note that these 
experiences o f positive emotions provide an “upward spiral” toward lasting psychological 
resources. Core psychological resources associated with positive psychology have 
recently become recognized as an individual’s PsyCap (Luthans et al., 2007a).
Psychological Capital
The broaden-and-build theory postulates that positive emotions build positive 
resources such as resilience and optimism (Fredrickson, 1998; Fredrickson, 2001; 
Fredrickson et al., 2005). As a higher order construct made up of hope, self-efficacy, 
resilience, and optimism (Luthans et al., 2007a), PsyCap is a higher order construct 
composed of positive resource capabilities (Luthans et al., 2009). PsyCap has received 
broad acceptance in business research and beyond (Avey et al., 2009; Walumbwa et al., 
2011; Avey et al., 2010; Peterson et al., 2011). In addition, PsyCap has been linked to a 
number of positive personal and organizational outcomes such as job performance and 
satisfaction (Luthans et al., 2007a), low absenteeism (Avey et al., 2006), and low 
turnover and stress (Avey et al., 2009). PsyCap is also associated with increased 
citizenship and decreased deviance (Avey et al., 2011).
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PsyCap Hope can be defined as a “positive motivational state that is based on an 
interactively derived sense o f successful (a) agency (goal directed energy) and (b) 
pathways (planning to meet goals)” (Snyder et al., 1991, p. 287; Luthans et al., 2007a). 
PsyCap Resilience “is characterized by positive coping and adaptation in the face of 
significant risk or adversity” (Luthans et al., 2007a, p. 546; Masten, 2001; Masten et al., 
2002). Resilience can also be thought o f simply as “the positive psychological capacity to 
rebound, to ‘bounce back’ from adversity, uncertainty, conflict, failure, or even positive 
change, progress and increased responsibility” (Luthans, 2002, p. 702; Luthans et al., 
2007a). PsyCap Optimism is defined as that characteristic that is held by individuals who 
“expect things to go their way, and generally believe that good rather than bad things will 
happen to them.” (Scheier et al., 1985). PsyCap Self-Efficacy is a role-breadth self- 
efficacy and is defined as “the employee’s conviction or confidence about his or her 
abilities to mobilize the motivation, cognitive resources or courses of action needed to 
successfully execute a specific task within a given context” (Stajkovic et al., 1998, p. 6 6 ; 
Luthans et al., 2007a).
An important distinction of PsyCap and perhaps one reason that it has been so 
widely considered is that it has been shown to be composed of characteristics that are 
state-like rather than trait-like. Though research has often relied on context to inform the 
true distinction between state and trait (Allen et al., 1981), there is an important 
distinction to be made between trait-like and state-like characteristics (Zuckerman, 1983; 
Fugate et al., 2012). This distinction is especially critical in a security context because 
PsyCap, a construct composed o f state-like characteristics, has been shown to be 
developable (Luthans et al., 2007a; Luthans et al., 2006a; Peterson et al., 2011). This
6 6
ductile quality of PsyCap distinguishes it from other, more stable, traits like “The Big 
Five” personality traits (Goldberg, 1990) and the higher order “Core Self-Evaluation” 
(Judge et al., 2001; Luthans et al., 2007a). Therefore, any benefits to firm security which 
can be shown to be attributable to PsyCap can be influenced by an organization through 
an investment in employees’ PsyCap.
PsyCap as a Resource 
PsyCap is also composed of positive resource capabilities. Hobfoll (1989; 2002) 
stipulates that individuals require resources for functioning, and they will seek to gain 
available resources and when possible conserve unnecessarily expending resources. 
Therefore, the conservation of resources has two components: building o f resources and 
conservation o f resources. PsyCap as a resource can be built by either micro-intervention 
(Luthans et al., 2007b) or by macro-intervention such as a supportive climate (Luthans et 
al., 2008). In reference to conservation, resources are either “centrally valued in their own 
right” or “as a means to obtain centrally valued ends” (Hobfoll, 2002). PsyCap can be 
viewed as adaptive in that not only does PsyCap embody a positive psychological state, 
as a psychological construct it serves meaningful ends. For instance, PsyCap has been 
shown to provide a necessary psychological resource for psychological well-being 
(Culbertson et al., 2010) ( see Table 3.1).
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Table 3.1
Summary o f  PsyCap Characteristics
PsyCap
Component
Definition Micro-Development
PsyCap
Self-
Efficacy
“[T]he em ployee’s conviction or 
confidence about his or her abilities 
to mobilize the motivation, cognitive 
resources or courses o f  action needed 
to successfully execute a specific 
task within a given context” 
(Stajkovic et al., 1998, p. 66)
1. Mastery experiences
2. Modeling and vicarious learning
3. Social persuasion
4. Physiological and psychological arousal
PsyCap
Hope
“[P]ositive motivational state that is 
based on an interactively derived 
sense o f  successful (a) agency (goal 
directed energy) and (b) pathways 
(planning to meet goals)” (Snyder et 
al., 1991, p. 287).
1. Goal-setting
2. Participation
3. Contingency planning for alternative 
pathways to attain goals
PsyCap
Optimism
Characterizes individuals who 
“expect things to go their way, and 
generally believe that good rather 
than bad things will happen to them.” 
(Scheier et al., 1985).
1. Leniency for the past
2. Appreciation for the present
3. Opportunity-seeking for the future
PsyCap
Resilience
“[T]he positive psychological 
capacity to rebound, to ‘bounce back’ 
from adversity, uncertainty, conflict, 
failure, or even positive change, 
progress and increased 
responsibility” (Luthans, 2002, p. 
702)
1. Asset-focused strategies such as enhancing 
employability
2. Risk-focused strategies such as proactive 
avoidance o f  adversity
3. Process-focused strategies to influence the 
interpretation o f  adverse events
Adapted from descriptions in Psychological capital: Developing the human competitive edge, Luthans, Youssef, et 
al. (2007b).
Protection-Motivated Behaviors
Posey et al. (2013) identified PMBs as in- and extra-role behaviors that an insider 
may undertake which protect the firm’s information and information systems. PMBs are 
the volitional behaviors organizational insiders can enact to protect ( 1 ) organizationally 
relevant information within their firms and (2) the computer-based IS in which that 
information is stored, collected, disseminated, and/or manipulated from information- 
security threats (Posey et al., 2013). These protective behaviors were organized into a 
systematic-based taxonomy of fourteen categories (see Table 3.2 for summary, and Posey
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et al. (2013) for full discussion). As a general class o f behaviors, PMBs are robust to the 
varying security policies that are inevitably found across organizations. For example, 
compliance with an explicit security policy is clearly an in-role behavior, but the specific 
behaviors required for that compliance vary across firms (Bulgurcu et al., 2010).
Table 3.2 
PMB Clusters'
Identified Cluster Number and Name
4. Appropriate data entry and management________________________________________
3. Policy-driven awareness and action____________________________________________
8 . Wireless installation_________________________________________________________
2. Protection against unauthorized exposure_______________________________________
7. Verbal and electronic sensitive-information protection____________________________
9. Widely applicable security etiquette____________________________________________
12. Account protection_________________________________________________________
11. Co-w orker reliance_______________________________________________________________
13. Im m ediate reporting o f  suspicious behavior_______________________________________
1. Legitimate e-mail handling___________________________________________________
6 . Secure softw are, e-m ail, and Internet use___________________________________________
5. Document conversion________________________________________________________
10. Distinctive security etiquette_________________________________________________
14. Equipment location and storage______________________________________________
'Table 3.2 from Posey, Roberts, Lowry, Bennett, & Courtney, 2013_______________________________
Research Model and Hypotheses
This study examines the role of emotion in IS security by empirically testing a 
model which incorporates Beaudry and Pinsonneaulf s (2010) emotional framework into 
Fredrickson’s (2001, 1998) broaden-and-build theory. As described, the broaden-and- 
build theory entails three implicit hypotheses which are tested in this research: (1) a 
broadening hypothesis, (2) a narrowing hypothesis, and (3) a building hypothesis. In 
order to assess the hypotheses, emotions were identified from each quadrant o f Beaudry 
and Pinsonneaulf s (2010) framework o f emotions. These discrete emotions arise out of
69
adaptive encounters and each elicit a distinct cognitive, psychological, or physiological 
response (Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus et al., 1984). Though each emotion has a specific 
stimulus or referent, a single stimulus may elicit multiple discrete emotions of varying 
intensity simultaneously (Lazarus, 1991). In order to assess the adaptive role of discrete 
emotion in performance o f PMBs, the emotional reaction to thinking about protecting the 
organization’s information and information system from security threats was ascertained 
from organizational insiders.
Challenge emotions arise out of an appraisal process which classifies an 
adaptation-related stimulus as an opportunity over which the individual perceives him or 
herself to have control (Beaudry et al., 2010). As such, challenge emotions are positive 
emotions which exhibit an apparent fit enhancement opportunity (Nesse et al., 2009). 
Lazarus (1991) describes one who has appraised a stimulus as a challenge. “A challenge 
makes one feel good, and there is apt to be a considerable expansion of one's functioning, 
with relevant thoughts coming easily and with a subjective impression that one is 
approaching the zenith of one's powers” (1991, loc 373). This broadened thought pattern 
elicited by challenge emotions mirrors the broadening hypothesis of the broaden-and- 
build theory. Further, the perceived control over the stimulus o f challenge emotions 
exacerbates the approach tendency generally associated with positive emotions (Carver et 
al., 1990; Cacioppo et al., 1999). As an example, the challenge emotion excitement has 
been linked with task adaptation (Beaudry et al., 2010). It is hypothesized that the 
elicitation o f challenge emotions will be positively related to PMBs.
HI: Challenge Emotions will be positively related to PMBs.
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Achievement emotions arise out o f an appraisal o f an opportunity for fit 
enhancement with no perceived control over the outcome (Beaudry et al., 2010; Nesse et 
al., 2009). The broaden-and-build theory hypothesizes that certain positive emotions 
work to build lasting psychological resources such as those conceptualized in PsyCap. 
Fredrickson (2001) notes the building role o f positive emotions. “Joy can have the 
incidental effect o f building an individual’s physical, intellectual, and social skills. 
Importantly, these new resources are durable and can be drawn on later, long after the 
instigating experience o f joy has subsided” (p. 305) . Based on the building role of 
positive emotions in the broaden-and-build theory, achievement emotions elicited by the 
thought o f protecting the organization from security threats will be positively related to 
PsyCap.
H2: Achievement emotions will be positively related to PsyCap.
Loss emotions arise out of an appraisal o f a stimulus as being an uncontrollable 
threat to fitness (Beaudry et al., 2010; Nesse et al., 2009). As Lazarus (1991, loc. 108) 
notes: “[l]oss undermines our appreciation o f life and may lead to withdrawal and 
depression.” In that way, loss taxes one’s psychological resources. PsyCap can be viewed 
as positive resources which are taxed by loss emotions. Therefore loss emotions are 
hypothesized to be negatively related to PsyCap.
H3: Loss emotions are negatively related to PsyCap.
Avoidance emotions arise out of a threat appraisal paired with perceived control 
over the outcome (Beaudry et al., 2010; Nesse et al., 2009). Perceptions o f control are 
instrumental in motivating behavior of all kinds (Carver et al., 1982). The elicitation of 
avoidance emotions have been widely found to be effective at inducing threat-avoidance
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behaviors in IS security (Johnston et al., 2010). However, the referent o f the emotion has 
most often been a security threat (Johnston et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2010; Herath et 
al., 2009; Lee et al., 2009). Therefore, by shifting the referent of the emotion from the 
threat itself to the protective behavior, it is expected that avoidance emotions will be 
negatively related to PMBs.
H4: Avoidance emotions will be negatively related to PMBs.
Whether viewing PsyCap as a psychological resource or simply a psychological 
state, the previously established links between PsyCap and organizational outcomes 
provide a basis for the relationship between PsyCap and PMBs. For example, PsyCap has 
been positively linked to an increase in both job performance and satisfaction (Luthans et 
al., 2007a) as well as increased organizational commitment and citizenship (Avey et al., 
2011). As security continues to be adapted into organizational strategy through security 
policy and otherwise, an increase in job performance, which includes security policy 
compliance, will lead to an increase in organizational security (Siponen et al., 2006; 
Herath et al., 2009; Bulgurcu et al., 2010). The positive impact o f job satisfaction, 
commitment, and citizenship are closely linked and are supported by findings that 
individuals who are satisfied with their jobs are better organizational citizens and can be 
expected to perform both in-role and extra-role behaviors to support the organization 
(Bateman et al., 1983; Williams et al., 1991). The performance of protective behaviors is 
the focus o f this research and as such, it is expected that incorporating PsyCap will 
increase PMBs in part by virtue o f the established relationships with increased job 
performance, satisfaction, commitment, and citizenship.
H5: PsyCap will be positively related to PMBs.
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The preceding hypotheses deal with situational or referent-specific discrete 
emotions and their consequences. However, much research indicates that individuals are 
simultaneously impacted by relatively more stable and lingering affective states or even 
traits (Fredrickson, 2001; Forgas et al., 2001; Kaplan et al., 2009). These more persistent 
dispositions are largely independent of one another and are generally referred to as 
positive affect and negative affect (Diener et al., 1984; Cenfetelli, 2004). Positive affect 
is linked to OCBs, and negative affect is related to a decrease in OCBs and to an increase 
in CWBs (Kaplan et al., 2009). Given these findings it is hypothesized that positive affect 
will have a positive relationship with PMBs, while negative affect will be negatively 
related to PMBs (see Figure 3.2).
H6: Positive Affect will be positively related to PMBs.
H7: Negative Affect will be negatively related to PMBs.
Challenge Emotion*
Hope Positive Affect
Interest
H6
Achievement Emotions
Pride H2
PsyCep PMBs
H5
Loss Emotions H3.
Sad
Anger
H7.f  Avoidance Emotions "N ^4
Anxiety
N egative Affect
Fear
Figure 3.2 Research Model
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Research Methodology
The multi-dimensional research model was tested empirically using survey 
research methodology. The instrumentation for the survey was developed based on a 
thorough literature review. Where possible, the items were adapted from prior research. 
All the items included in the final survey were subjected to subject matter expert review 
and were pilot tested before executing the final survey.
Study Measures
The first four hypotheses in the study ask respondents to report their emotional 
reaction to taking action against security threats to their organization. As in Beaudry and 
Pinsonneault (2010), 1 used Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) emotional intensity ratings to 
ascertain the emotional reaction to dealing with threats to the firm’s security. 
Respondents were asked the following: “When you think about protecting your 
organization’s information and information system from security threats, to what extent 
do you feel...” followed by indicators o f discrete emotions from each quadrant o f 
Beaudry and Pinsonneaulf s emotional framework. The indicators were adapted from 
Izard’s (1977) differential emotions scale (DES) and Fredrickson’s (2003) modified 
differential emotions scale (MDES) and measured interest and hope (Challenge), 
happiness and pride (Achievement), anger and sadness (Loss), and fear and anxiety 
(Avoidance). The measures of anxiety were taken from Venkatesh’s (2000) measure of 
computer anxiety, which describes anxiety as making one feel nervous, threatened, 
bothered, uncomfortable, and uneasy.
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PsyCap was measured using items adapted from the questionnaire developed by 
Luthans, Youssef et al. (2007b). The original PsyCap Questionnaire includes twenty-four 
items (six for each o f the four characteristics). The PsyCap items were all developed from 
prior literature and have been executed successfully throughout the business literature. 
(Luthans et al., 2007a; Luthans et al., 2007b).
PsyCap Hope measures state-hope and is “responsive to events in the lives of 
people” (Snyder et al., 1996, p. 321). PsyCap Hope captures both the agency and 
pathway components of hope, and an example o f an item measuring PsyCap Hope is “I 
can think of many ways to reach my current work goals”(Luthans et al., 2007b). PsyCap 
Resilience measures an individual’s ability to bounce back or to take stressful things at 
work in stride (Wagnild et al., 1993). An example of an item measuring resilience is “I 
usually take stressful things at work in stride” (Luthans et al., 2007b). PsyCap Optimism 
measures an individual’s state-belief that “good rather than bad things will happen to 
them” (Scheier et al., 1985, p. 219). An example of an item measuring PsyCap 
Optimism is “I approach this job as if ‘every cloud has a silver lining’”(Luthans et al., 
2007b). Lastly, PsyCap Self-Efficacy measures the state-like role-breadth self-efficacy 
and are based on Parker’s (1998) self-efficacy scale. An example o f an item measuring 
PsyCap Self-Efficacy is “I feel confident analyzing a long-term problem to find a 
solution” (Luthans et al., 2007b).
Positive affect and negative affect were measured in this study using the 
shortened positive affect/negative affect scale (PANAS) (Watson et al., 1988; Mackinnon 
et al., 1999). In order to capture general affectivity, the respondents were asked to 
“indicate to what extent you generally feel this wav, that is how you feel on average.”
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The respondents rated a total o f ten affect-related adjectives on a seven point likert scale, 
five reflecting positive affect and five reflecting negative affect.
A nalysis and R esults
The research model was analyzed in a two-step procedure as recommended by 
methodologists (Gerbing et al., 1988). The analysis utilized the covariance-based 
structural equation modeling (SEM) platform Mplus (Muthen et al., 1998-2010). In the 
first step, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was run in Mplus to establish the validity 
of the measures to be included in the subsequent structural model. Upon confirmation of 
the validity of the research model, the hypothesized research model was assessed using 
Mplus. Prior to the collection of the data for the final analysis, the instrument was pilot 
tested to confirm the validity of the measures.
Instrument Development 
Critical to any study is the validity and reliability of the measures employed 
(Straub, 1989; Gefen et al., 2011). As recommended, whenever possible the scales 
included in this study were employed as previously published (Straub et al., 2004). The 
instrument was assessed by subject matter experts and pilot tested with a convenience 
sample o f ten organizational insiders. Upon completion of the survey instrument, the 
respondents in the pilot were directed to a separate form which allowed for feedback on 
the instrument. Based on these preliminary analyses, the survey instrument was deemed 
clear and appropriate.
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Primary Study
After analyzing the results of the pretest and confirming the clarity o f the 
instrumentation, responses were collected from a sample o f 421 organizational insiders. 
Panels are especially appropriate for gathering security data as they offer full anonymity, 
not simply confidentiality. Given the sensitive nature o f security responses, anonymity is 
required to encourage candid responses, and panels provide increased anonymity in 
multiple ways. First, the researchers never know the identity o f the respondents, and the 
privacy of respondents is guaranteed and governed by the data provider. Second, 
respondents’ real and perceived anonymity is enhanced by having access to the survey 
outside o f their organization’s network and computers. Providing anonymous, off-site 
access to self-report surveys has been shown to be adequate and appropriate for the 
elicitation o f self-reported incidences o f sensitive and even socially undesirable behaviors 
such as protection-motivated behaviors (Posey et al., 2013) and organizational deviance 
(Bennett et al., 2000; Bennett et al., 2003). The descriptive statistics of the primary 
sample are summarized in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3
Descriptive Statistics o f  Primary Sample
Average Age 44.62
Average Organizational Tenure 10.63
Gender Female 53.7%
Male 46.3%
Education Some high school 9.7%
High school diploma 17.6%
Some college 13.5%
Associate’s or two-year degree 38.5%
Undergraduate degree 15.4%
Master’s degree 4.8%
Doctorate/Professional degree 0.5%
IT Position 14.5%
Management 33.0%
Construct Validity
For the reflective measures included in the structural model, the standardized 
factor loadings from a CFA analysis were considered along with the Cronbach’s alphas. 
Also, the convergent and discriminant validity o f measures in the structural model were 
assessed with average variance extracted (AVE) and the Fornell-Larker criterion (i.e., 
comparison of squared correlations with AVEs) as recommended by methodologists 
(Hair et al., 2006; Hair et al., 2014) ( see Table 3.4).
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Table 3.4
Full Measures in Study & Validity Statistics
Items M easures Scale1 Mean STD Load.
Challenge
Emotions
“When you think about protecting your 
organization’s information and 
information system from security 
threats, to what extent do you feel...” Scale1 Mean STD Load.
Interest Alert c 3.86 1.78 0.764
Curious c 2.89 1.72 0.692
Interested c 3.67 1.78 0.872
Hope Hopeful c 3.37 1.83 0.847
Optimistic c 3.62 1.80 0.856
Encouraged c 3.49 1.81 0.911
Achievement
Emotions
“When you think about protecting your 
organization’s information and 
information system from security 
threats, to what extent do you feel...” Scale1 Mean STD Load.
Happiness Glad c 3.54 1.95 0.925
Happy c 3.53 1.93 0.955
Joyful c 3.00 1.86 0.885
Pride Proud c 3.52 1.89 0.88
Confident c 4.10 1.73 0.89
Self-assured c 3.77 1.77 0.887
Loss
Emotions
“When you think about protecting your 
organization’s information and 
information system from security 
threats, to what extent do you feel...” Scale1 Mean STD Load.
A nger Angry c 1.84 1.30 0.958
Mad c 1.81 1.25 0.946
Annoyed c 2.17 1.45 0.825
Sad Sad c 1.86 1.29 0.907
Unhappy c 1.92 1.33 0.904
Discouraged c 2.06 1.34 0.874
Avoidance
Emotions
“When you think about protecting your 
organization’s information and 
information system from security 
threats, to what extent do you feel...” Scale1 Mean STD Load.
Fear Scared c 1.81 1.18 0.935
Fearful c 1.89 1.24 0.921
Afraid c 1.84 1.20 0.933
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Table 3.4 (Continued)
Anxiety Nervous c 2.19 1.42 0.838
Threatened c 2.14 1.38 0.827
Uneasy c 2.16 1.40 0.888
PsyCap Hope 
(PCH)
(Luthans et al., 2007b)
Instructions: "Please indicate your 
level of agreement with the following 
statements.'' Scale Mean STD Load.
PCH-1
If I should find myself in a jam at 
work, I could think o f many ways to 
get out o f it. a 5.40 1.07 0.687
PCH-2
At the present time, I am energetically 
pursuing my work goals. a 5.15 1.30 0.803
PCH-3
There are lots o f ways around any 
problem. a 5.51 1.11 0.643
PCH-4
Right now I see myself as being pretty 
successful at work. a 5.48 1.18 0.798
PCH-5
I can think of many ways to reach my 
current work goals. a 5.38 1.12 0.771
PCH-6
At this time, I am meeting the work 
goals that I set for myself. a 5.53 1.19 0.715
PsyCap
Resilience
(PCR)
(Luthans et al., 2007b)
Instructions: "Please indicate your 
level of agreement with the following 
statements.” Scale Mean STD Load.
PCR-2
I usually manage difficulties one way 
or another at work. a 5.59 0.99 0.79
PCR-3
I can be “on my own,” so to speak, at 
work if I have to. a 5.91 1.09 0.616
PCR-5
I can get through difficult times at 
work because I’ve experienced 
difficulty before. a 5.54 1.05 0.724
PCR-6
I feel I can handle many things at a 
time at this job. a 5.63 1.07 0.734
PsyCap
Optimism
(PCO)
(Luthans et al., 2007b)
Instructions: "Please indicate your 
level of agreement with the following 
statements.” Scale Mean STD Load.
PCO-1
When things are uncertain for me at 
work, I usually expect the best. a 4.57 1.36 0.738
PCO-3
I always look on the bright side of 
things regarding my job. a 4.96 1.31 0.846
PCO-4
I’m optimistic about what will happen 
to me in the future as it pertains to 
work. a 5.10 1.34 0.754
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Table 3.4 (Continued)
PCO-6
I approach this job as if “every cloud 
has a silver lining.” a 4.86 1.27 0.788
PsyCap Self- 
Efficacy 
(PCSE)
(Luthans et al., 2007b)
Instructions: "Please indicate your 
level of agreement with the following 
statements." Scale Mean STD Load.
PCE-1
I feel confident analyzing a long-term 
problem to find a solution. a 5.43 1.18 0.816
PCE-2
I feel confident in representing my 
work area in meetings with 
management. a 5.44 1.31 0.819
PCE-3
I feel confident contributing to 
discussions about the company’s 
strategy. a 5.09 1.42 0.791
PCE-4
I feel confident helping to set 
targets/goals in my work area. a 5.44 1.24 0.811
PCE-5
I feel confident contacting people 
outside the company (e.g., suppliers, 
customers) to discuss problems. a 5.18 1.46 0.736
PCE-6
I feel confident presenting information 
to a group o f colleagues. a 5.46 1.32 0.788
Protection
M otivated
Behaviors
(PMB)
(Posey, 2010)
Instructions: “Given the following 
statements, on what basis did you 
engage in the stated behaviors in the 
last year?” Scale Mean STD Load.
PMB-1
I actively attempted to protect my 
organization’s information and 
computerized information systems b 4.67 1.93 0.942
PMB-2
I tried to safeguard my organization’s 
information and information systems 
from their information security threats b 4.82 1.92 0.934
PMB-3
1 took committed action to prevent 
information security threats to my 
firm’s information and computer 
systems from being successful b 4.44 1.99 0.891
PMB-4
I purposefully defended my 
organization from information security 
threats to its information and 
computerized information systems b 4.42 1.99 0.923
PMB-5
I earnestly attempted to keep my 
organization’s information and 
computer systems from harm produced 
by information security threats b 4.80 1.92 0.92
81
Table 3.4 (Continued)
Positive
Affect/
Negative
Affect
(PANAS)
(Mackinnon et al., 1999)
Please indicate to what extent 
vou generally feel this wav. that 
is. how vou feel on the average. Scale Mean STD Load.
Positive Affect 
(PA)
Enthusiastic c 4.45 1.33 0.888
Excited c 4.03 1.29 0.811
Alert c 4.68 1.27 0.568
Determined c 4.90 1.33 0.684
Inspired c 4.19 1.43 0.848
Negative
Affect
(NA)
Nervous c 2.61 1.28 0.771
Distressed c 2.45 1.25 0.786
Upset c 2.45 1.24 0.791
Scared c 2.06 1.15 0.823
Afraid c 2.07 1.15 0.824
(R) = reverse scored item 
'Scale:
a) Strongly Disagree -  Strongly Agree
b) Never -  Always
c) Not at all -  Completely
The CFA of lower-order constructs included in the study is characterized by 
strong fit with a Chi-Squared o f 1857.50 with 1049 degrees of freedom (goodness o f fit 
index: CFI = 0.944; badness of fit index: RMSEA = 0.043). As shown in Table 3.4, most 
o f the standardized loadings of the reflective items were above a conservative 0.70 cutoff 
criterion. A loading of 0.70 indicates that the associated latent variable accounts for 50% 
of the variance in the indicator (Hair et al., 2006; Hair et al., 2014). The Cronbach’s alpha 
o f each construct was within the recommendations of prior research (Nunnally, 1978) 
(see Table 3.5).
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Each lower-order construct exhibits strong convergence and reliability. However, 
several o f the first-order constructs are highly correlated with one another. High 
correlations among many of the constructs are theoretically supported in the literature 
such as the relationship between the facets o f PsyCap. Further, as suggested by Beaudry 
and Pinsonneaulf s (2010) emotional framework, the emotions within each quadrant (i.e. 
achievement, loss, etc.) are highly correlated with one another as well. The lack of 
discrimination among the facets o f PsyCap is appropriate as it is specified as a higher- 
order reflective construct. Construct specification is a topic o f considerable interest in IS 
research, as the field seeks to employ second generation techniques with both theoretical 
and statistical validity (Bagozzi, 2011; Gefen et al., 2000; Gefen et al., 2011; Straub et 
al., 2004; Jarvis et al., 2003). Constructs defined as first- and second-order reflective 
appear most often in business research (Jarvis et al., 2003), and specify that the indicators 
at each level “reflect” the latent variable (Straub et al., 2004; Jarvis et al., 2012).
For the discrete emotions within each quadrant o f the emotional framework, however, 
it is inappropriate to specify them as second order characteristics as fundamental to the 
very nature o f discrete emotions is their distinction (DeSteno et al., 2004). Further, a 
primary objective o f this study is to examine the impact of discrete emotions from each 
quadrant o f the emotional framework on the protection of organizational resources. 
Therefore, in order to examine the hypotheses in this study, two structural models were 
ultimately examined. As shown in Figure 3.3, each model has a unique discrete emotion 
from the four quadrants o f the emotional framework. All constructs in each model exhibit 
convergence and discriminance as indicated by the ratio o f Fornell-Larker statistic and 
latent variable correlations of < 1 .
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Figure 3.3 Research Model 
Structural Model
Finally, the hypothesized relationships in the research model were tested using
■y
SEM. For model one, the Chi-Squared statistic and degrees o f freedom (X =2015.84 and 
d.f.=1008; X2 to d.f. ratio = 2.0) along with a goodness of fit index (CFI =0.93) and a 
badness o f fit index (RMSEA=.049) all indicate that the structural model has good fit 
overall (Hu et al., 1999; Kline, 2010). Further, four o f seven hypothesized relationships 
are significant and in the predicted direction. ( see Table 3.6.)
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Table 3.6
Structural Model Results -  Model 1
Chi-Squared = 2015.84; d.f = 1008 
CFN0.934; RMSEA=0.049
Hy
P- Hypothesis (direction)
Path
Coefficient
p-value
(one-tailed)
Significance
(one-tailed)
HI Hope PMBs (+) 0.306 <0 . 0 0 1 'k'k'k
H2 Happiness -> PsyCap (+) 0.292 <0 .0 0 1 k k k
H3 Sadness -> PsyCap (-) -0.149 0 . 0 0 2 k k
H4 Anxiety -> PMBs (-) 0.051 0.173 n/s
H5 PsyCap PMBs (+) 0.245 <0 .0 0 1 "k'k'k
H6 Positive Affect -> PMBs (+) 0 .0 2 1 0.376 n/s
H7 Negative Affect -> PMBs (-) -0.045 0.208 n/s
Dependent Variable R Square
R2 PMB 0.203 <0 . 0 0 1 k  k k
Bold = supported; *p=0.05; **p=0.01; ***p=0.001; n/s=not significant
For model two, the Chi-Squared statistic and degrees o f freedom (X2=2052.36 
and d.f.=1008; X2 to d.f. ratio = 2.04) along with a goodness o f fit index (CFI =0.93) and 
a badness of fit index (RMSEA=.05) all indicate that the structural model has good fit 
overall (Hu et al., 1999; Kline, 2010). Additionally, five o f the seven hypothesized 
relationships are significant and in the predicted direction, (see Table 3.7.)
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Table 3.7
Structural Model Results -  Model 2
Chi-Squared = 2052.36; d.f.= 1008 
CFI=0.932; RMSEA=0.05
Hy
P- Hypothesis (direction)
Path
Coefficient
p-value
(one-tailed)
Significance
(one-tailed)
HI Interest PMBs (+) 0.344 <0 .0 0 1 ***
H2 Pride PsyCap (+) 0.402 <0 .0 0 1 ***
H3 Anger PsyCap (-) -0 .1 0 1 0.019 *
H4 Fear -» PMBs (-) -0 . 1 0 0 0.033 *
H5 PsyCap PMBs (+) 0.204 <0 . 0 0 1 ■kick
H6 Positive Affect PMBs (+) 0.049 0.217 n/s
H7 Negative Affect PMBs (-) -0.025 0.325 n/s
Dependent Variable R-Square
R2 PMB 0 . 2 2 0 <0 . 0 0 1 k k k
Bold = supported; *p=0.05; **p=0.01; ***p=0.001; n/s=not significant
Controls and Rival Explanations 
To substantiate the findings o f the structural model, the analyses were performed 
again including several controls. As can be seen in Table 3.8, controls for age, tenure, 
gender, and social desirability had no significant impact on the performance o f PMBs. 
Conversely, whether or not an insider was a manager or an IT staffer did have a 
significantly positive relationship with performance of PMBs. Further, level o f education 
completed as well as frequency o f organizational SETA programs were also significantly 
positively related to the performance of PMBs. Importantly, the significance and 
direction of all substantive variables remained consistent while controlling for these 
plethora of insider characteristics ( see Table 3.8, Figures 3.4, and 3.5).
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Table 3.8
Structural Model Results Including Controls
Model 1 Model 2
Hyp. Hypothesis (direction)
Path
Coefficient
Significance
(one-tailed)
Path
Coefficient
Significance
(one-tailed)
HI Hope ^  PMBs (+) 0.218 1e sfetfc
HI Interest PMBs (+) 0.246 kick
H2 Happiness PsyCap (+) 0.291 ***
H2 Pride PsyCap (+) 0.403 kkk
H3 Sadness PsyCap (-) -0.150 **
H3 Anger PsyCap (-) -0 .1 0 1 *
H4 Anxiety PMBs (-) 0.016 n/s
H4 Fear -» PMBs (-) -0.105 *
H5 PsyCap ■) PMBs (+) 0.194 kick 0.164 **
H6 Positive Affect PMBs (+) 0.045 n/s 0.049 n/s
H7 Negative Affect -> PMBs (-) -0.025 n/s -0.024 n/s
Controls
Age 0 .0 1 2 n/s 0 .0 1 1 n/s
Tenure 0 .0 1 1 n/s 0 .0 1 2 n/s
Manager 0.076 * 0.079 *
IT Position 0.153 *** 0.148 ***
Gender -0.013 n/s -0.007 n/s
Education 0.116 ** 0.126 **
SETA 0.243 *** 0.235 ***
Social Desirability 0.078 n/s 0.075 n/s
Dependent Variable R-Square
RJ PMB 0.262 *** 0.276 ***
Bold = supported; *p=0.05; **p—0.01; ***p=0.001; n/s=not significant
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Discussion
The results of the analyses provide support for the broaden-and-build theory of 
positive emotions. First, in line with the ‘broaden’ hypothesis of broaden-and-build 
model, discrete challenge emotions o f ‘hope’ and ‘interest’ were both significantly and 
positively related to the performance o f PMBs. Second, in support o f the ‘build’ 
hypothesis, discrete achievement emotions o f happiness and pride were positively and 
significantly related to PsyCap in both models.
Implicit in the broaden-and-build theory o f positive emotions is an inverse 
relationship between negative emotions and personal outcomes. That is, there is also both 
an implied ‘narrowing’ and ‘taxing’ hypothesis. The ‘taxing’ hypothesis was supported in 
both models as the loss emotions o f sadness and anger were both negatively related to 
insiders’ PsyCap. The ‘narrowing’ hypothesis received mixed support, with the discrete 
emotion ‘fear’ negatively relating to PMBs, and ‘anxiety’ failing to relate significantly to 
PMBs.
Insiders’ PsyCap was positively related to the performance o f PMBs in both 
models. Additionally, the stable personality characteristics o f positive affect and negative 
affect were not significantly related to PMBs in either model. Finally, the model was 
robust to a plethora of controls. Supporting the stability of the model o f security emotion, 
the significance and magnitude of the controls were consistent across models. In both 
models, controls for management, IT position, level of education, and SETA frequency 
were significantly related to PMBs. Conversely, organizational tenure, age, and gender 
were not significantly related to PMBs.
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Implications and Contributions 
This research makes important contributions to the behavioral information 
security literature. Principally, the results impart the significant and diverse impact that 
emotions play in the performance of protective behaviors. The broaden-and-build model 
provides a framework of the disparate impact o f discrete positive and negative emotions 
on both insiders’ behavioral tendencies and psychological resources. The importance o f 
emotion to security is made manifest in the found direct and indirect influences of 
emotional experience on insiders’ performance of PMBs.
Complementary to the broaden-and-build theory, this research goes further and 
applies Beaudry and Pinsonneault’s (2010) framework o f emotions to the broaden-and- 
build model to ascertain the importance of specific action tendencies of four categories of 
emotions (challenge, achievement, loss, and avoidance). The results largely support the 
classification of emotions according to specific action tendencies (as in Beaudry and 
Pinsonneault’s framework). In addition to similarities shared among the quadrants o f the 
emotional framework, the results also support nuance among the discrete emotions, even 
those which generally share the same specific action tendency (i.e. from the same 
quadrant). Each emotion plays a unique role in the elicitation o f PMBs and the building 
o f insiders’ PsyCap. For instance, interest was more strongly related to PMBs than hope, 
and pride more strongly related to PsyCap than happiness. Interestingly, fear was 
negatively related to PMBs, while anxiety had no significant relationship.
The findings provide research with an alternative view to the often negative 
appeal to emotion (i.e. fear appeals) employed in security research (e.g. Johnston et al., 
2010). The research model elucidates the efficacy o f emotional appeals as relating to the
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specific action tendencies associated with the underlying discrete emotion. While the 
action tendencies related to emotion are often considered to be evolved or innate, the 
elicitation of emotion can be manipulated through conditioning. Further, emotional 
stimuli result from adaptational encounters (Lazarus, 1991). This research ascertained 
insiders' emotional reaction to protecting their firm from security threats, rather than their 
response to the threats themselves. This distinction is important as it appropriately 
measures emotion in response to an encounter rather than an object and explains a 
negative relationship between fear and PMBs.
Organizations and researchers recognize the benefit of emotional reactions; 
however, as shown in the current study the referent o f the emotion is significant. 
Therefore, the security benefit provided by fear appeals may be confounded or 
diminished if the fear is elicited in terms of actually protecting the firm. Further, the 
research exhibits the significant role that positive emotions can play in increasing security 
o f an organization. Insiders who feel hopeful and interested when thinking about 
protecting their firm from security threats were more likely to engage in PMBs.
In addition to the direct impact of challenge and avoidance emotions, achievement 
and loss emotions were found to indirectly impact the performance of PMBs through the 
building (or taxing) of the positive psychological resource o f PsyCap. PsyCap is related 
to myriad positive organizational and personal outcomes and is also linked in this 
research to the performance of PMBs. Both achievement emotions: pride and happiness, 
were shown to relate positively to insiders’ PsyCap, while loss emotions were a tax on 
insiders’ PsyCap.
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Finally, the more stable characteristics of positive and negative affect were not 
related to the performance of PMBs. The insignificant effect of positive affect and 
negative affect (PANA) in this model is important for two reasons. First, the inclusion of 
PANA serves as an important control for the effect o f discrete emotions. Second, general 
affect is not readily manipulated by an organization. Unlike discrete emotions, general 
affect is not the result o f specific stimuli, but rather a measure o f the general experience 
of emotion of an individual. Therefore, the finding that insider mood is not a significant 
predictor of PMBs allows organizations to focus on manipulation of emotional response 
to security-related stimuli rather than the screening employees for general affectivity ( see 
Table 3.9).
Table 3.9
Summary o f  Key Findings
Key finding Significance to research Significance to practice
Support for the broaden- 
and-build model of 
positive emotions in 
behavioral information 
security.
Broadens the theoretical 
repertoire of behavioral 
information security 
research to include a 
positive security paradigm 
incorporating the security 
contribution o f positive 
emotions.
Provides organizations 
with a framework within 
which to manipulate 
insiders’ positive emotional 
reaction to security-related 
stimuli.
Support for the disparate 
impact of discrete 
emotions within Beaudry 
and Pinsonneaulf s 
emotional framework
Establishes the diverse 
impact o f discrete emotions 
on the performance of 
security-related behaviors 
based on specific action 
tendencies o f categories of 
emotions.
Provides organizations 
with an emotional schema 
for eliciting security- 
related behaviors based on 
the experience o f discrete 
emotion in response to 
specific security-related 
stimuli.
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Table 3.9 (Continued)
Negative influence of the 
avoidance emotion fear on 
PMBs.
Provides evidence o f the 
potentially confounding or 
diminishing effect of the 
experience o f fear on the 
performance o f PMBs 
based on the elicitation of 
avoidance emotions in 
response to protection of 
the firm.
Highlights the potential 
shortcoming of fear appeals 
on the elicitation of 
security-related behaviors 
based on the distinction 
between fear response to a 
threat and fear response to 
protecting the firm.
Influence of achievement 
and loss on PsyCap
Establishes the relationship 
between the experience of 
emotion in response to 
security-related stimuli and 
the positive resource 
capabilities of insiders and 
myriad other positive 
organizational outcomes
Provides organizations 
with a link between 
emotion and insider’s 
PsyCap and the many 
positive organizational 
outcomes associated with 
PsyCap.
Influence of PsyCap on 
PMBs
Evidences a direct link 
between PsyCap and 
organizational security for 
future research.
Further establishes the 
positive personal and 
organizational outcomes 
attributable to PsyCap
No significant relationship 
between PANA and 
PMBs.
Acts as an important control 
for the establishment o f the 
role o f discrete emotion in 
behavioral information 
security.
Provides support for 
organizational influence on 
security outcomes from 
stimuli induced discrete 
emotion and removes the 
burden o f screening for 
general affect when 
seeking to elicit PMBs 
from insiders.
Limitations and Future Research 
There are inherent limitations in self-reported security research, and to a large 
extent this research is no exception. However, due to the absence of observational data of 
actual security behaviors, survey instruments are an accepted medium for ascertaining the 
behavior o f insiders. I took recommended precaution to ensure that individual anonymity 
was preserved and responses were uninhibited. The data analyzed in this research was
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collected at a cross-sectional level with differences measured between randomly surveyed 
organizational insiders. The research model ascertained the impact o f discrete emotion 
on security-related behavior. The researcher’s inability to capture emotional responses 
from insiders in an experimental setting creates an additional limitation. Due to the 
difficulty in recalling past emotions, the instrument asked insiders to respond how they 
feel when they think about protecting their organization from security threats, eliminating 
the temporal disparity between the experience and the survey response.
The results highlight several important avenues o f future security research as well. 
First, the results support the expansion o f the theoretical repertoire to include adaptational 
approaches to security-related behavior such as the broaden-and-build theory. Second, the 
results highlight the need for future research into the impact of positive emotions in 
behavioral information security and IS at large. Additionally, the research model exhibits 
an important relationship between security and insiders’ PsyCap. As shown, an insider’s 
emotional reaction to security had a significant impact on insiders’ PsyCap, and PsyCap 
is positively related to PMBs. In the same way, this research links positive security 
outcomes to other positive personal and organizational outcomes previously associated 
with PsyCap. Finally, the research highlights the need for future research into the discrete 
emotions which impact security. As can be seen, the emotional framework provides an 
important categorization of emotion; however, each discrete emotion retains unique 
influence as well.
Conclusion
This chapter developed and applied a research model based on the broaden-and- 
build theory while incorporating the classification o f emotions provided in Beaudry and
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Pinsonneault’s framework of emotions. The results of the study indicate that discrete 
emotions are impactful on the performance of PMBs. The results support the concept 
specific action tendencies espoused in an adaptational view o f emotions while 
simultaneously confirming the nuance between discrete emotions. The elicitation o f 
challenge emotions in the protection of the firm stimulated PMBs in both models, while 
the elicitation of avoidance emotions had mixed results. The experience o f fear when 
protecting the firm was negatively related to PMBs and anxiety had no relationship.
The results o f the research models tested also support the stated and implied 
‘building’ and ‘taxing’ role o f emotions on personal resources. Achievement emotions 
were positively related to PsyCap, while loss emotions were negatively related. These 
emotions are indirectly related to PMBs as PsyCap was significantly related to the 
performance of PMBs. The influence of PsyCap on PMBs adds to the myriad of positive 
personal and organizational outcomes previously attributed to PsyCap in the 
organizational literature. Lastly, positive and negative affect were unrelated to the 
performance o f PMBs. This lack of influence o f PANA provides an important control for 
the influence o f discrete emotion. Additionally, as PANA captures general disposition, its 
lack of significance highlights the importance of investigating the impact of discrete 
emotions elicited by security-related disposition as opposed to general affectivity.
CHAPTER 4
SECURITY BEHAVIORAL COMPLEXITY AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL: AN 
EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION
Introduction
The digital age has ushered in a dynamic environment o f rapid innovation and 
ubiquitous computing. The repercussions are global, as corporate mobile device usage 
has reached the “tipping point” with 50% of organizations worldwide allowing 
employees to use mobile devices for tasks such as sales force automation, project 
management, and email (Symantec, 2012). Recent surveys in the U.K. and Canada 
indicate that employees access email and corporate documents from personal devices at 
an increasing rate— often without oversight from their employer (CDW, 2013; Wilson, 
2013). Additionally, 54% of U.S. based organizations report an inability to determine if 
off-site employees are using technology and informational resources within corporate and 
regulatory requirements (Ponemon, 2013). In this connected environment, many 
practitioners and academicians recognize that the information security o f most firms is 
largely at the mercy o f those with access to the firm’s information and information 
system (IS) (Moore et al., 2008; Boss et al., 2009; D'Arcy et al., 2007). This revelation— 
fueled by frequent reportage o f data breaches— has rightfully led to copious articles 
warning of the threat o f  the insider (e.g. Shaw et al., 1998; Boss et al., 2009; Vroom et 
al., 2004; Willison et al., 2009; Greitzer et al., 2008). Users have even been declared the
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“weakest link” in IS security (Sasse et al., 2001). Fortunately, however, within the 
greatest weakness often lies the greatest opportunity (Albrechtsen et al., 2009; Stanton et 
al., 2005; Posey et al., 2013).
Evidence o f insider’s beneficial security behaviors has been presented in prior 
research, ranging from basic security hygiene (Stanton et al., 2005) to policy compliance 
(Pahnila et al., 2007; Siponen et al., 2006; Herath et al., 2009). Providing a definitive 
framework, Posey et al. (2013) systematically identified security roles— which they call 
protection-motivated behaviors (PMBs)—that can be enacted by employees to transform 
insiders from a security-related liability into an asset. PMBs are the volitional behaviors 
organizational insiders can enact to protect ( 1 ) organizationally relevant information 
within their firms and (2) the computer-based IS in which that information is stored, 
collected, disseminated, and/or manipulated from information-security threats (Posey et 
al., 2013). Organizational insiders are all individuals (e.g., full- and part-time employees, 
temporary workers, consultants, board members) who have access to organizationally 
relevant information while fulfilling their duties (Posey et al., 2013; Shaw et al., 1998). 
Therefore, in order to most effectively secure the organization’s sensitive information and 
IS, insiders should incorporate PMBs into their behavior and actively work toward the 
protection o f informational resources.
PMBs are roles that may be unrelated to or even in direct contrast with an 
insider’s formal job description. PMBs are enacted alongside the various organizational 
roles held by all insiders with access to informational resources, creating behavioral 
complexity for insiders (Posey et al., 2013). Behavioral complexity refers to “the ability 
to act and play multiple roles that call for diverse and even competing behaviors” (Wu et
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al., 2010, p. 818). Hooijberg (1996) established that behavioral complexity is comprised 
of two distinct components: (1) behavioral repertoire and (2) differentiation. Behavioral 
repertoire is the portfolio of roles an individual performs and his or her ability to perform 
multiple roles, and differentiation is the ability to “switch from role to role at appropriate 
times to handle paradoxes and contradictions mandated by one’s job” (Wu et al., 2010, p. 
818).
PMBs are manifest in a security behavioral repertoire, which is distinct to each 
insider (i.e. each user has his or her own unique repertoire o f behaviors to draw upon) and 
are enacted across employees according to his or her ability to switch between roles. This 
phenomenon is security behavioral complexity and is defined as an insider’s security 
behavioral security behavioral repertoire-paired with his or her differentiation (Wu et al., 
2010; Hooijberg, 1996). Security behavioral complexity offers insight into what has 
become known as the “knowing-doing” gap of security behaviors in which employees 
fail to enact known behaviors to protect the organization’s information and IS (Workman 
et al., 2008).
An individual’s security behavioral repertoire can be thought o f as a set of 
behavioral resources from which the individual may draw. In addition to behavioral 
resources, many theorists argue that effective adaptation is also dependent upon the 
psychological resources o f the actor (e.g. Hobfoll, 1989; Hobfoll, 2002). One related 
conceptualization of personal resources comes from recent work in positive psychology: 
psychological capital (PsyCap) (Luthans et al., 2007a; Luthans et al., 2007b). Positive 
psychology can be described as “the study o f the conditions and processes that contribute 
to the flourishing or optimal functioning of people, groups, and institutions” (Gable et al.,
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2005, p. 103), and PsyCap is a construct of positive “psychological resource capabilities” 
which are open to development (Luthans et al., 2009).
Behavioral complexity has recently been espoused as an antecedent to the 
performance of PMBs (Posey et al., 2013), but has yet to be empirically examined. In 
light of this gap, I develop and empirically test a model of behavioral security 
complexity, which considers the impact o f security behavioral complexity and PsyCap 
simultaneously.
Background
Decades ago, Straub and Nance (1990) predicted that the security-related impact 
o f insiders would steadily increase over the years as average employees gain increased 
computing ability through their use o f personal computers (PCs). This prediction has 
proven to be prophetic as widespread computer use has not only come to fruition, but has 
largely been eclipsed by the astounding penetration of the Internet. Pew Research Center 
reports that in the U.S. 78% of all adults are now online, up from just 10% in 1995 
(Zickuhr et al., 2012). Paralleling this rise of access and ability of insiders has been the 
interest in behavioral information security. Behavioral information security is the study 
o f “the human actions that influence the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of 
information systems” (Stanton et al., 2006b, p. 263).
Today, the prevailing market is largely a knowledge economy in which 
intellectual assets are a firm’s most valuable resources (Johnson et al., 2009). Therefore, 
employees most often have the greatest access to their firm’s “crown jewels” (Stanton et 
al., 2006a). The security of a firm’s informational assets requires that firms incorporate a 
holistic approach to security (Lee et al., 2002): incorporating up-to-date technical security
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mechanisms (Zafar et al., 2009), deterring detrimental behavior (e.g. computer abuse - 
Straub et al., 1990; Johnston et al., 2010; D'Arcy et al., 2012), and promoting protective 
behaviors (e.g. PMBs - Posey et al., 2013). The implementation of these diverse 
protections leads to the emergence of behavioral complexity for insiders (Posey et al., 
2013).
Security Behavioral C om plexity
Behavioral complexity implies a confrontation with paradox (Posey et al., 2013; 
Smith et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2010). Behavioral complexity—paired with cognitive 
complexity and psychological resources— has been espoused to provide an individual 
with the ability to “accept paradoxical tensions rather than respond defensively” (Smith et 
al., 2011). Cognitive complexity refers to the ability to process stimuli in order to 
undertake adaptation (Kiesler et al., 1982). Therefore, cognitive complexity can be 
regarded as a necessary condition for handling complexity, while behavioral complexity 
is the sufficient condition (Denison et al., 1995). Wu et al. (2010, p. 818) note “behavioral 
complexity is the manifestation of cognitive complexity that we can observe, evaluate 
and benchmark.” Behavioral complexity is an important characteristic of individuals 
charged with enacting complex and/or paradoxical roles and serves as an appropriate 
proxy for both cognitive and behavioral complexity. Posey et al. (2013) note, the concept 
o f behavioral complexity enables researchers and practitioners to “explain, motivate, and 
manage PMBs properly.” A primary goal o f this study is to introduce a model o f security 
behavioral complexity into behavioral information security that provides a robust 
framework within which to examine the enactment o f PMBs.
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Security Behavioral Repertoire 
An individual’s behavioral repertoire represents the portfolio o f roles which an 
individual is able to enact (Hooijberg, 1996; Wu et al., 2010). Behavioral repertoire may 
also represent a domain specific collection of roles— such as PMBs (Posey et al., 2013). 
Posey et al.’s (2013) taxonomy of PMBs provides a systematic-based classification o f the 
security roles which make up the protective behaviors which an individual may have in 
his or her security behavioral repertoire. Therefore, security behavioral repertoire is 
defined as the collection o f protective security behaviors (i.e. PMBs) which an insider is 
able to perform.
As implied in a model of security behavioral complexity and confirmed in the 
taxonomy o f PMBs, robust protection of the firm’s informational assets and systems 
requires that insiders hold various security roles within their security behavioral 
repertoire. This view is unique to much extant security research which has focused on 
singular behaviors such as anti-malware or anti-spyware software adoption (e.g. Lee et 
al., 2009; Johnston et al., 2010) or compliance with formalized security polices (e.g. 
Bulgurcu et al., 2010; D'Arcy et al., 2009; Herath et al., 2009; Vroom et al., 2004). Policy 
compliance is an important goal o f any organization, but—as a subject o f empirical 
research— investigations o f motivation and/or intention to comply with security policy 
often fail to capture the ability to undertake the protective behaviors themselves. An 
insiders’ security behavioral repertoire includes not only an insiders’ awareness o f policy, 
but views the ability to comply with policy as a part o f a larger behavioral repertoire. 
Additionally, software solutions are most often adopted by the IT department rather than 
the ordinary users of the system. Therefore, implementation of security software best
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reflects an organization’s investment in IT security rather than the motivation of insiders’ 
to protect the organization (Kumar et al., 2008; August et al., 2006).
Security research has also relied on general perceptions o f behavioral self-efficacy 
as opposed to the more specific security behavioral repertoire (Herath et al., 2009; 
Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Johnston et al., 2010; Boss et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2009; Workman 
et al., 2008; Woon ct al., 2005). Many of the identified roles which emerged from the 
newly developed taxonomy of PMBs have been examined in one form or another in past 
research; however, security research has largely lacked the comprehensiveness offered by 
a behavior complexity model (Zafar et al., 2009). For example, the protection of 
organizational resources has been examined in terms of “values of people” (Dhillon et al., 
2006), organizational climate (Chan et al., 2005), and even “social censure” (D'Arcy et 
al., 2 0 1 1 ), yet a research framework for assessing behavioral roles in concert with the 
other implied roles o f information security has yet to be established. Incorporating 
consideration of the breadth and magnitude o f insiders’ security behavioral repertoire into 
the research allows researchers to examine the ability to take on security roles across the 
entire domain o f protective behaviors (e.g. PMBs) simultaneously.
Though prior research has made great strides in ascertaining the conditions of and 
antecedents to information security, the knowing-doing gap persists (Workman et al., 
2008). Behavioral complexity allows for an examination of the impact o f insiders’ 
behavioral repertoire along with the complementary differentiation.
Security Differentiation 
Differentiation is the ability to switch roles as demanded by the situation (Wu et 
al., 2010; Hooijberg, 1996). Differentiation implies an improvisational view of behavior,
103
incorporating behavioral diversity in a dynamic environment. The dynamism and 
interrelatedness of organizational behavior has led to anthropomorphic and metaphorical 
descriptions for explanation. Drucker (2012) introduced a musical metaphor, analogizing 
the role o f manager to that of an orchestral conductor. Yet, according to Drucker, “neither 
business nor government agency has a ‘score’ to play by” (Drucker, 2012 loc.3051- 
3052). Much like a jazz musician’s ability to fluctuate between solos and melodies, 
tempos and time signatures, security differentiation is an insider’s ability to switch 
between the various security behaviors incorporated in one’s security behavioral 
repertoire (Wu et al., 2010; Posey et al., 2013). The jazz metaphor is instructive because 
the players enact their skills not in a vacuum, but rather incorporate their repertoire of 
abilities into a dynamic, spontaneous composition (Barrett, 1998).
Many insiders must safeguard both the sensitive information they have in their 
possession as well as their access to the organization’s information system on an ongoing 
basis (Ayyagari et al., 2011). Each task and environment is characterized by unique 
security requirements, and consequently the effectiveness of the protective response is 
reliant upon the insiders’ security differentiation. Security differentiation is the ability of 
an insider to effectively switch from one security role to another along the course o f his 
or her work and is a core component of the security behavioral complexity model (Posey 
et al., 2013). Abilities such as those conceptualized by security behavioral complexity 
may be necessary but insufficient conditions of behavior, however, as behavior is a 
function o f personal resources as well (Hobfoll, 2002).
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Psychological Capital
Hobfoll (1989) posits that individual’s draw on personal psychological resources 
in order to maintain resilience in the face o f adversity. Similarly, it has been postulated 
that personal characteristics such as equanimity equip one to deal with the tensions of 
divergent demands (Smith et al., 2011). Equanimity is a facet o f resilience which 
characterizes one who maintains a balanced perspective, and resilience “connotes inner 
strength, competence, optimism, flexibility, and the ability to cope effectively when faced 
with adversity” (Wagnild, 2009, p. 105). Positive psychological resources such as 
resilience have received greater consideration as a result o f the growing positive 
psychology movement (Luthans et al., 2006b; Seligman et al., 2000). Positive psychology 
has as its domain “optimal functioning” or what is referred to in positive psychology 
literature as “flourishing” (Seligman et al., 2000). From this focus on optimal 
functioning, PsyCap has emerged as a construct of positive “psychological resource 
capabilities” which are open to development (Luthans et al., 2009).
As a higher order construct, PsyCap is composed of the distinct— yet related— 
core tenets of positive psychology of hope, resilience, optimism, and self-efficacy.
Positive psychology is uniquely able to contribute to the current behavioral security 
research because it has the “average person” as its subject (Sheldon et al., 2001). In 
addition, PsyCap has received broad acceptance in business research and beyond (Avey 
et al., 2009; Walumbwa et al., 2011; Avey et al., 2010; Peterson et al., 2011), and has 
been linked to a number o f positive personal and organizational outcomes such as job 
performance and satisfaction (Luthans et al., 2007a), low absenteeism (Avey et al., 2006),
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low turnover and stress (Avey et al., 2009), as well as increased citizenship and decreased 
deviance (Avey et al., 2011).
PsyCap hope can be defined as a “positive motivational state that is based on an 
interactively derived sense o f successful (a) agency (goal directed energy) and (b) 
pathways (planning to meet goals)” (Snyder et al., 1991, p. 287; Luthans et al., 2007a). 
PsyCap resilience “is characterized by positive coping and adaptation in the face of 
significant risk or adversity” (Luthans et al., 2007a, p. 546; Masten, 2001; Masten et al., 
2002). Resilience can also be thought of simply as “the positive psychological capacity to 
rebound, to ‘bounce back’ from adversity, uncertainty, conflict, failure, or even positive 
change, progress and increased responsibility” (Luthans, 2002, p. 702; Luthans et al., 
2007a). PsyCap optimism is defined as that characteristic that is held by individuals who 
“expect things to go their way, and generally believe that good rather than bad things will 
happen to them.” (Scheier et al., 1985). PsyCap self-efficacy is role-breadth self-efficacy 
and is defined as “the employee’s conviction or confidence about his or her abilities to 
mobilize the motivation, cognitive resources or courses of action needed to successfully 
execute a specific task within a given context” (Stajkovic et al., 1998, p. 6 6 ; Luthans et 
al., 2007a).
PsyCap can be viewed through a resource lens (Luthans et al., 2007b; Hobfoll, 
1989; Hobfoll, 2002). Hobfoll (1989) stipulates that individuals require resources for 
functioning, and they will seek to gain available resources and when possible conserve 
unnecessarily expended resources. Thus, the conservation of resources theory has two 
components: building up of resources and conservation o f resources. PsyCap as a 
resource can be built by either micro-intervention or by macro-intervention such as a
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supportive climate (Luthans et al., 2008). In reference to conservation, resources are 
either “centrally valued in their own right” or “as a means to obtain centrally valued 
ends” (Hobfoll, 2002). PsyCap can be viewed as adaptive in that not only does PsyCap 
embody a positive psychological state, as a psychological construct it serves meaningful 
ends. For instance, PsyCap has been shown to provide a necessary psychological resource 
for psychological well-being (Culbertson et al., 2010).
A distinguishing quality of PsyCap and perhaps one reason that it has been so 
widely considered is that it has been shown to be composed of characteristics that are 
state-like rather than trait-like. Though research has often relied on context to inform the 
true distinction between state and trait (Allen et al., 1981), there is an important 
distinction to be made between trait-like and state-like dispositions (Zuckerman, 1983; 
Fugate et al., 2012). This distinction is important as it differentiates those characteristics 
which are innate and inflexible from those which are malleable and developable. 
Trainable characteristics are especially critical in a security context because they can be 
developed within an organization to enhance organizational security. PsyCap is a 
construct composed of state-like characteristic and has been shown to be developable 
(Luthans et al., 2007a; Luthans et al., 2006a; Peterson et al., 2011). Therefore, any 
benefits to firm security which can be shown to be attributable to PsyCap can be 
influenced by an organization through an “investment” in employees’ PsyCap. This 
ductile quality of PsyCap distinguishes it from other, more stable, traits like “The Big 
Five” personality traits (Goldberg, 1990) and the higher order “Core Self-Evaluation” 
(Judge et al., 2001; Luthans et al., 2007a). Peterson (2012) notes:
“People’s locus of control and self-esteem are things a manager probably 
can’t change significantly within a few weeks. Psychological capital is
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more malleable. We’re not born hopeful, resilient, optimistic, efficacious 
people. We learn these things.”
The facets of PsyCap and established facet-level development strategies 
are summarized in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1
Summary o f  PsyCap Characteristics
PsyCap
Component
Definition Micro-Development
PsyCap
Self-
Efficacy
“[T]he employee’s conviction or confidence 
about his or her abilities to mobilize the 
motivation, cognitive resources or courses of 
action needed to successfully execute a 
specific task within a given context” 
(Stajkovic et al., 1998, p. 66)
• Mastery experiences
• Modeling and vicarious 
learning
• Social persuasion
• Physiological and 
psychological arousal
PsyCap
Hope
“[Pjositive motivational state that is based on 
an interactively derived sense o f successful 
(a) agency (goal directed energy) and (b) 
pathways (planning to meet goals)” (Snyder 
et al., 1991, p. 287).
•  Goal-setting
• Participation
• Contingency planning for 
alternative pathways to 
attain goals
PsyCap
Optimism
Characterizes individuals who “expect things 
to go their way, and generally believe that 
good rather than bad things will happen to 
them.” (Scheier et al., 1985).
• Leniency for the past
• Appreciation for the 
present
• Opportunity-seeking for 
the future
PsyCap
Resilience
“[T]he positive psychological capacity to 
rebound, to ‘bounce back’ from adversity, 
uncertainty, conflict, failure, or even positive 
change, progress and increased 
responsibility” (Luthans, 2002, p. 702)
• Asset-focused strategies 
such as enhancing 
employability
• Risk-focused strategies 
such as proactive 
avoidance o f adversity
• Process-focused strategies 
to influence the 
interpretation of adverse 
events
Adapted from descriptions in Psychological capital: Developing the human competitive edge, Luthans, Youssef, et 
al. (2007b).
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Research Model and Hypotheses
Based on the definition of behavioral complexity, security behavioral complexity 
entails an insider’s security behavioral repertoire and their ability to enact the roles 
appropriately, termed security differentiation (Hooijberg, 1996; Wu et al., 2010). An 
insider’s security behavioral repertoire is reflected by the roles o f protective behaviors 
identified by Posey et al. (2013) and adapted into a formative construct in this research. 
Therefore, as described by behavioral complexity, it is hypothesized that security 
behavioral complexity— composed o f security behavioral repertoire and security 
differentiation— positively impacts an insider’s performance of PMBs.
HI: Security Behavioral Repertoire will be positively related to PMBs.
H2: Security Differentiation will be positively related to PMBs.
Effectually performing PMBs requires behavioral complexity as the roles 
identified in an insider’s security behavioral repertoire are often paradoxical and 
contradictory (Posey et al., 2013). Whether viewing PsyCap as a psychological resource 
or a positive psychological state, the previously established links between PsyCap and 
organizational outcomes provide a basis for the relationship between PsyCap and PMBs. 
For example, PsyCap has been positively linked to an increase in both job performance 
and satisfaction (Luthans et al., 2007a) as well as increased organizational commitment 
and citizenship (Avey et al., 2011). The positive impact o f job satisfaction, commitment, 
and citizenship are closely linked and are supported by findings that individuals who are 
satisfied with their jobs are better organizational citizens and can be expected to perform 
both in-role and extra-role behaviors to support the organization (Bateman et al., 1983; 
Williams et al., 1991). Furthermore, PsyCap— by virtue of its association with resilience
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and equanimity— is a valuable resource for handling divergent demands or enacting 
paradoxical roles (Smith et al., 2011). Therefore, PsyCap is hypothesized to be positively 
related to PMBs (see Figure 4.1).
H3: PsyCap will be positively related to PMBs.
t Security Behavioral 
R epertoire
Protection M otivated 
Behaviors
Security Differentiation
BEHAVIORAL COM PLEXITY
Psychological Capital
F irst-O rder Reflective 
*1 Second-O rder Reflectiveri
: • F irs t-O rder Form ative
Figure 4.1 Security Behavioral Complexity Research Model
Research M ethodology
The multi-dimensional research model was tested empirically using survey 
research. The instrumentation for the survey was developed based on a thorough 
literature review. Where possible, the items were adapted from prior research. All the 
items included in the final survey were subjected to subject matter expert review and pilot 
tested using a representative sample of organizational insiders from a large public 
university in the Southeastern United States. The data for the published analyses was 
collected using an online panel of organizational insiders. Panels are especially 
appropriate for gathering security data as they offer full anonymity, not simply 
confidentiality. Given the sensitive nature o f security responses, anonymity is required to
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encourage candid responses, and panels provide increased anonymity in multiple ways. 
First, the researchers never know the identity o f the respondents, and the privacy of 
respondents is guaranteed and governed by the data provider. Second, respondents’ real 
and perceived anonymity is enhanced by having access to the survey outside o f their 
organization’s network and computers. Providing anonymous, off-site access to self- 
report surveys has been shown to be adequate and appropriate for the elicitation o f self- 
reported incidences o f sensitive and even socially undesirable behaviors such as 
protection-motivated behaviors (Posey et al., 2013) and organizational deviance (Bennett 
et al., 2000; Bennett et al., 2003).
Measurement Models 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the research model utilizes three distinct latent model 
structures: first-order reflective constructs, a first-order formative construct, and a 
second-order reflective construct. Construct specification is a topic o f considerable 
interest in IS research, as the field seeks to employ second generation techniques with 
both theoretical and statistical validity (Bagozzi, 2011; Gefen et al., 2000; Gefen et al., 
2011; Straub et al., 2004; Jarvis et al., 2003). The ultimate goal of all model specification 
is to appropriately model theoretical relationships; therefore, the on-going discussion 
regarding the theoretical justification and statistical validity is an important one (Aguirre- 
Urreta et al., 2012; Jarvis et al., 2012).
The various forms of model specification are “derived from the fact that (a) a 
first-order construct can have either formative or reflective indicators, and (b) those first- 
order constructs can, themselves, be either formative or reflective indicators o f an 
underlying second-order construct” (Jarvis et al., 2003). Constructs defined as first- and
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second-order reflective appear most often in business research (Jarvis et al., 2003), and 
specify that the indicators at each level “reflect” the latent variable (Straub et al., 2004; 
Jarvis et al., 2012). All o f the models specified as reflective in the research model were 
each adapted from prior literature (Luthans et al., 2007b; Wu et al., 2010).
Security behavioral repertoire was developed from the previously developed 
taxonomy of PMBs (Posey et al., 2013). The developed construct is specified as first- 
order formative based on Wu et al.’s (2010) repertoire construct and the 
formative/reflective decision rules provided in prior literature (Jarvis et al., 2003; Petter 
et al., 2007). Specifically, Wu et al. (2010) measured behavioral repertoire as “the 
composite o f the multiplicative effect o f the means o f each of the four roles.” As noted by 
Diamantopoulos (2011), modeling a construct with formative specification in partial least 
squared (PLS) utilizes composites. Therefore, as depicted in Figure 4.1, security 
behavioral repertoire is specified as formative and will be modeled with PLS as a 
composite latent variable. This formative specification is in line with previous model 
specifications in IS (Anderson et al., 2010; Johnston et al., 2010).
Measures in Study
Security behavioral repertoire was measured formatively with items capturing 
each role o f PMBs established in prior research (Posey, 2010). In order to empirically 
assess the impact of an individual’s personal repertoire of security behaviors, I first 
developed an all-inclusive formative measure of security behavioral repertoires from the 
published taxonomy o f PMBs. The items developed to measure the 14 security roles are 
shown in Table 4.2. The final construct used in the analysis was refined according to the 
formative construct specifications in literature.
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Table 4.2
Items Developed to Measure 14 Security Roles
Rol Item
1 I am able to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate email requests.
2
I can protect my organization's sensitive information that I control from 
unauthorized exposure.
3
I have the skills to fulfill the requirements o f my organization's information 
security policy.
4
I know how to dispose o f the organization's unneeded sensitive documents and 
backup important documents.
5
I know how to convert sensitive, corporate documents to other formats to reduce 
potential alterations from their original content by security threats.
6
I am able to use my work-related software (e.g. email clients and Internet 
browsers) securely.
7
I know what information in my organization is sensitive and should not be 
disclosed, whether verbally or electronically.
8 I know whether or not I am allowed to set up my own wireless access point at
9
I know how to perform the general security-related tasks required o f all 
employees at work.
10 I know how to perform security-related tasks specific to my position at work.
11
I have the ability to remind my co-workers of information-security guidelines 
and policies and inform co-workers when thev are violating organizational rules.
12 I am able to protect my work-related accounts by safeguarding my log-in
13
I can identify when my co-workers are using IT suspiciously and report it to 
management.
14
I am able to keep electronic devices (e.g., laptops, tablets, PDAs) issued to me 
by my organization either safely stored under lock and key or with me at all
Security differentiation was adapted from the five-item measure o f behavioral 
differentiation used in Wu et al. (2010). The measures were adapted from a context of 
supply management to reflect security differentiation. An example o f an item measuring 
security differentiation is “I adapt my behavior to effectively secure my firm’s sensitive 
information.”
PsyCap was measured using the questionnaire developed by Luthans, Youssef et 
al. (2007b). The PsyCap Questionnaire includes twenty-four items (six for each o f the 
four characteristics). The PsyCap items were all developed from prior literature and have
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consistently exhibited validity and test/retest reliability throughout the business literature. 
(Luthans et al., 2007a; Luthans et al., 2007b).
PsyCap hope measures state-hope and is “responsive to events in the lives of 
people” (Snyder et al., 1996, p. 321). PsyCap hope captures both the agency and pathway 
components of hope, and an example of an item measuring PsyCap Hope is “I can think 
o f many ways to reach my current work goals”(Luthans et al., 2007b). PsyCap Resilience 
measures an individual’s ability to bounce back or to take stressful things at work in 
stride (Wagnild et al., 1993). An example of an item measuring resilience is “I usually 
take stressful things at work in stride” (Luthans et al., 2007b). PsyCap optimism measures 
an individual’s state-belief that “good rather than bad things will happen to them” 
(Scheier et al., 1985, p. 219). An example of an item measuring PsyCap optimism is “I 
approach this job as if ‘every cloud has a silver lining’”(Luthans et al., 2007b). Lastly, 
PsyCap self-efficacy measures the state-like role-breadth self-efficacy and are based on 
Parker’s (1998) self-efficacy scale. An example of an item measuring PsyCap self- 
efficacy is “I feel confident analyzing a long-term problem to find a solution” (Luthans et 
al., 2007b).
PMBs were measured with a five-item scale developed based on Posey et al.’s 
(2013) taxonomy o f protection-motivated behaviors. An item assessing the performance 
of PMBs is “I tried to safeguard my organization’s information and information systems 
from their information security threats.”
A nalysis and Results
The research model was analyzed in a two-step procedure as recommended by 
methodologists (Gerbing et al., 1988). The analysis utilized partial least squared (PLS)
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based structural equation modeling (SEM) platform, SmartPLS (Ringle et al., 2005). In 
the first step, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was run in order to establish the 
reliability and validity of the reflective measures to be included in the subsequent 
structural model. Upon confirmation of the validity of the research model, the 
hypothesized research model was assessed using SEM. Prior to the collection of the data 
for the primary analysis, the full instrument was pilot tested.
Pilot Study
Critical to any study is the validity and reliability of the measures employed 
(Straub, 1989; Gefen et al., 2011). As recommended, whenever possible the scales 
included in this study were employed as previously published (Straub et al., 2004). The 
instrument was pilot tested with a sample o f 42 MBA students from a large public 
university in the Southeastern United States. All the students used for the pilot were 
either currently employed or had previous work experience. The descriptive statistics of 
the pilot sample are summarized in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3
Descriptive Statistics o f  Pilot Sample
Average Age 24.26
Average Organizational Tenure 1.66
Gender Female 31%
Male 69%
IT Position 4.8%
Management 12.2%
The data from the pilot test was used to examine the validity o f the reflective 
measures to be used in the study. The pilot test construct statistics were ascertained using
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partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) in SmartPLS (Ringle et al., 
2005). Overall, the results of the pilot test provide evidence of the initial validity of the 
measures to be used in the full study—the exception being SBD4 which failed to load on 
the differentiation construct. The construct loadings from the pilot test are summarized in 
Table 4.4.
Table 4.4
Pilot Study Construct Loadings
Security
Behavioral
Differentiation PMBs PsyCap
SBD1 0.700
SBD2 0.851
SBD3 0.756
SBD4 0.040
SBD5 0.746
PMB1 0.949
PMB2 0.926
PMB3 0.946
PMB4 0.874
PMB5 0.941
PCO 0.808
PCSE 0.896
PCH 0.914
PCR 0.925
In addition to viewing the standardized loadings, I also examined the convergent 
and divergent validity of the constructs by calculating the latent variable correlations, the 
Cronbach’s alpha, and the average variance extracted (AVE) for each of the constructs. 
The convergent and divergent statistics for the pilot study measures excluding SBD4 are 
summarized in Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5
Pilot Study Correlations
Security
Behavioral
Differentiation
(SBD) PMB PsyCap
Cronbach’s
a
SBD 0.83* 0.8971
PMB 0.4279 0 . 8 6 0.9593
PsyCap 0.4578 0.3871 0.79 0.9189
*AVE’s bolded along diagonal
Primary Study
After analyzing the results o f the pilot test and confirming the initial validity of 
the instrumentation, responses were collected from a sample o f 414 organizational 
insiders. Panels are especially appropriate for gathering security data as they offer full 
anonymity, not simply confidentiality. Given the sensitive nature o f security responses, 
anonymity is required to encourage candid responses, and panels provide increased 
anonymity in multiple ways. First, the researchers never know the identity of the 
respondents, and the privacy o f respondents is guaranteed and governed by the data 
provider. Second, respondents’ real and perceived anonymity is enhanced by having 
access to the survey outside o f their organization’s network and computers. Providing 
anonymous, off-site access to self-report surveys has been shown to be adequate and 
appropriate for the elicitation o f self-reported incidences o f sensitive and even socially 
undesirable behaviors such as protection-motivated behaviors (Posey et al., 2013) and 
organizational deviance (Bennett et al., 2000; Bennett et al., 2003). The descriptive 
statistics o f the primary sample are summarized in Table 4.6.
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Table 4.6
Descriptive Statistics o f  Primary Sample
Average Age 45.59
Average Organizational Tenure 10.58
Gender Female 53.1%
Male 46.9%
Education Some high school 0.2%
High school diploma 11.4%
Some college 25.6%
Undergraduate degree 41.5%
Master’s degree 16.4%
Doctorate/Professional degree 4.8%
IT Position 15.2%
Management 33.8%
This study employed one formative construct, security behavioral repertoire, 
which was developed based on a previously published taxonomy of PMBs. In order to 
assess the validity of security behavioral repertoire, first, the content validly o f the items 
was examined by subject matter experts. Second, the statistical and practical significance 
o f each formative indicator was assessed through the significance and magnitude o f the 
coefficient. Finally, the collinearity o f the selected formative items was assessed by 
calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF) of each indicator from regression analyses.
The validity of the measure o f security behavioral repertoire was assessed 
according to the recommendations for formatively specified constructs (Hair et al., 2014). 
First, the content validity of the security behavioral repertoire measures was established. 
Formative measures are modeled to include no measurement error (Bagozzi, 2011); 
therefore, the formative items are said to fully explain the latent variable. An error in 
content validity is manifest in the absence o f an item which should be included in order to 
fully represent the construct domain. The formative items measuring security behavioral
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repertoire were developed directly from a taxonomy of PMBs (Posey et al., 2013). The 
taxonomy of PMBs was developed for an identical context (security) and population 
(organizational insiders). Second, the collinearity o f the items was assessed by running 
regressions of each item on the others in order to ascertain the VIF level o f each item. 
Items with a VIF of greater than ten are said to suffer from multicollinearity, while those 
with a VIF of five or less are conservatively assessed to have no multicollinearity 
(D'Arcy et al., 2009; Flair et al., 2014; Hair et al., 2006). The correlations of the 14 roles 
are shown in Table 4.7.
As expected with such a large number of related, yet distinct roles, the items are 
correlated with one another with a range of correlation from 0.329 -  0.705. In order to 
refine the measure of PMB roles, the 14 indicator construct was analyzed using PLS 
SEM in SmartPLS (Ringle et al., 2005). PLS was chosen for the analysis because of 
identification issues arising from the inclusion of a formative measure with many 
indicators.
The initial omnibus security behavioral repertoire construct included 14 security 
roles and failed to converge using covariance-based SEM. PLS does not share the 
identification issues with covariance-based SEM. Therefore, analyzing in PLS allows for 
convergence (Hair et al., 2014). In addition to the PLS analysis, the VIF for each item 
was calculated by running individual regressions with each item as the dependent 
variable. The item weights, average VIF, and significance of each role are shown in 
Table 4.8.
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Table 4.8
PMB Role Statistics
PMB Role Avg. VIF Weight T-Statistic
1 Legitimate e-mail handling 2.43 0.1862 1.3551
2 Protection against unauthorized exposure 2.44 0.3052 2.3111
3 Policy-driven awareness and action 2.36 -0.0756 1.9078
4 Appropriate data entry and management 2.39 0.2218 1.1169
5 Document conversion 2.43 -0.1066 0.1508
6 Secure software, e-mail, and Internet use 2.38 0.3701 0.4151
7 Verbal and electronic sensitive-information 2.39 0.1872 2.6241
8 Wireless installation 2.42 -0.085 0.5355
9 Widely applicable security etiquette 2.42 0.0822 1.5859
1 0 Distinctive security etiquette 2.50 0.247 0.8465
11 Co-worker reliance 2.40 -0.2363 2.6375
1 2 Account protection 2.44 0.1384 1.2446
13 Immediate reporting o f suspicious behavior 2.43 -0.0182 0.6164
14 Equipment location and storage 2.44 0.0497 0.609
Many o f the 14 roles included initially in the construct o f PMB roles failed to 
exhibit statistical and practical significance. Although none of the VIF statistics surpassed 
the rule of thumb of five, the high correlations shown in Table 4.7 along with the counter­
intuitive weights and lack of significance of many items make it clear that the construct 
should be subjected to refinement. Therefore, an iterative process o f isolating the 
significant roles making up an insider’s security behavioral repertoire was undertaken. I 
set as an initial decision-rule one-tailed statistical significance of a = 0 . 1 0  (t-statistic 
1.282). This allowed me to retain only those roles which were significantly influencing 
the construct of security behavioral repertoire while not being overly restrictive in terms 
of nomological and content validity.
As a result, eight o f the 14 roles met the significance criteria for further analyses. 
The collinearity diagnostics were re-run for these eight roles and they were assessed for 
adequate domain breadth. The significance o f the eight roles along with the collinearity
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diagnostics are exhibited in Table 4.8. These roles represent both broad and specific 
security behaviors (i.e. email use and task specific etiquette), as well as technical and 
social aspects o f security (i.e. secure software use and co-worker reliance). They also 
include physical as well as intellectual protections (i.e. unauthorized exposure and verbal 
disclosures) as well as systems protection (i.e. account protection). Therefore, the eight 
roles are said to meet the criteria for a valid measure of an insider’s security behavioral 
repertoire (see Table 4.9).
Table 4.9
Security Behavioral Repertoire Correlations and T-Statistics
Rolel Role2 Role4 Role6 Role7 Role 10 Rolel 1 Role 12 T-Statistic
Legitimate e-mail 
handling 1 1.441
Protection against 
unauthorized exposure .392 1 2.709
Appropriate data entry 
and management .666 .329 1 1.546
Secure software, e- 
mail, and Internet use .606 .440 .615 1 2.768
Verbal and electronic 
sensitive-information 
protection
.588 .507 .565 .703 1 1.468
Distinctive security 
etiquette .477 .401 .496 .430 .494 1 2.337
Co-worker reliance .591 .517 .567 .641 .692 .487 1 1.947
Account protection .473 .594 .504 .602 .637 .441 .606 1 1.367
For the reflective measures included in the structural model, the standardized 
factor loadings from a CFA analysis were considered along with the Cronbach’s alphas. 
Also, the convergent and discriminant validity of measures in the structural model were 
assessed with average variance extracted (AVE) and the Fornell-Larker criterion (i.e., 
comparison of squared correlations with AVEs) as recommended (Hair et al., 2006; Hair
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et al., 2014). The items from the full study and their respective loadings are shown in 
Table 4.10, followed by the statistics of convergence and discriminance.
Table 4.10
Full Measures in Study
Security Behavioral 
Repertoire Measures
Scale' Spec." Mean STD Wt.
Role 1: Legitimate e- 
mail handling
I am able to differentiate between 
legitimate and illegitimate email 
requests. a F 5.58 1.45 0.156
Role2: Protection 
against unauthorized 
exposure
I can protect my organization's 
sensitive information that I control 
from unauthorized exposure. a F 4.11 1.80 0.299
Role4: Appropriate 
data entry and 
management
I know how to dispose of the 
organization's unneeded sensitive 
documents and backup important 
documents. a F 5.70 1.43 0.168
Role6: Secure 
software, e-mail, and 
Internet use
I am able to use my work-related 
software (e.g. email clients and 
Internet browsers) securely. a F 5.22 1.62 0.348
Role7: Verbal and 
electronic sensitive- 
information 
protection
I know what information in my 
organization is sensitive and should 
not be disclosed, whether verbally 
or electronically. a F 5.18 1.62 0.168
Role 10: Distinctive 
security etiquette
I know how to perform security- 
related tasks specific to my position 
at work. a F 5.21 1.72 0.225
Rolel 1: Co-worker 
reliance
I have the ability to remind my co­
workers o f information-security 
guidelines and policies and inform 
co-workers when they are violating 
organizational rules. a F 5.13 1.68 0.219
Role 12: Account 
protection
I am able to protect my work- 
related accounts by safeguarding 
my log-in information. a F 4.78 1.72 0.142
Security
Differentiation
(SBD)
Adapted from (Wu et al., 2010);
Scale Spec. Mean STD Load.
SBD-1
I adapt my behavior to effectively 
secure my firm’s sensitive 
information. a R 5.13 1.486 0.798
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Table 4.10 (Continued)
SBD-2
I adjust my approach to my work in 
order to handle various security 
threats. a R 4.67 1.615 0.862
SBD-3
I take on different security roles at 
work such as complying with 
security policy and policing co­
workers. a R 3.97 1.863 0.864
SBD-4
At work, I may go from screening 
an illegitimate email request to 
appropriately discussing my firm's 
sensitive information with a trusted 
party. a R 3.94 1.870 0.770
SBD-5 When doing different work tasks, 1 often play different security roles. a R 4.01 1.861 0.850
PsyCap Hope 
(PCH) From  (Luthans et al., 2007b) Scale Spec. Mean STD Load.
PCH-1
If I should find myself in a jam at 
work, I could think o f many ways to 
get out of it. a R 5.34 1.057 0.757
PCH-2
At the present time, I am 
energetically pursuing my work 
goals. a R 5.14 1.334 0.768
PCH-4 Right now I see myself as being pretty successful at work. b R 5.41 1.054 0.815
PCH-5 I can think o f many ways to reach my current work goals. b R 5.29 1.246 0.830
PCH-6 At this time, I am meeting the work goals that I set for myself. b R 5.45 1.118 0.833
PsyCap Resilience 
(PCR) From  (Luthans et al., 2007b) Scale Spec. Mean STD Load.
PCR-2 I usually manage difficulties one way or another at work. a R 5.64 .989 0.852
PCR-3 1 can be “on my own,” so to speak, at work if I have to. a R 6.01 1.069 0.780
PCR-4 I usually take stressful things at work in stride. a R 5.18 1.202 0.738
PCR-5
I can get through difficult times at 
work because I’ve experienced 
difficulty before. a R 5.61 1.069 0.872
PCR-6 I feel I can handle many things at a time at this job. a R 5.65 1.111 0.831
PsyCap Optimism 
(PCO) From  (Luthans et al., 2007b) Scale Spec. Mean STD Load.
PCO-1 When things are uncertain for me at work, I usually expect the best. a R 4.81 1.263 0.834
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Table 4.10 (Continued)
PCO-3 I always look on the bright side of things regarding my job. a R 5.03 1.521 0.887
PCO-4
I’m optimistic about what will 
happen to me in the future as it 
pertains to work. a R 5.09 1.277 0.825
PCO-6 I approach this job as if  “every cloud has a silver lining.” a R 4.96 1.421 0.818
PsyCap Self- 
Efficacy (PCSE) From (Luthans et al., 2007b) Scale Spec. Mean STD Load.
PCSE-1 I feel confident analyzing a long­term problem to find a solution. a R 5.43 1.143 0.822
PCSE-2
I feel confident in representing my 
work area in meetings with 
management. a R 5.45 1.274 0.824
PCSE-3
I feel confident contributing to 
discussions about the company’s 
strategy. a R 5.05 1.375 0.805
PCSE-4 I feel confident helping to set targets/goals in my work area. a R 5.543 1.250 0.772
PCSE-5
I feel confident contacting people 
outside the company (e.g., 
suppliers, customers) to discuss 
problems. a R 5.17 1.482 0.700
PCSE-6
I feel confident presenting 
information to a group of 
colleagues. a R 5.32 1.347 0.808
Protection 
Motivated 
Behaviors (PMB)
Adapted from (Posey, 2010)
Scale Spec. Mean STD Load.
PMB-1
I actively attempted to protect my 
organization’s information and 
computerized information systems b R 4.87 1.900 0.948
PMB-2
I tried to safeguard my 
organization’s information and 
information systems from their 
information security threats b R 4.94 1.877 0.922
PMB-3
1 took committed action to prevent 
information security threats to my 
firm’s information and computer 
systems from being successful b R 4.52 1.983 0.916
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Table 4.10 (Continued)
PMB-4
1 purposefully defended my 
organization from information 
security threats to its information 
and computerized information 
systems b R 4.36 1.994 0.880
PMB-5
I earnestly attempted to keep my 
organization’s information and 
computer systems from harm 
produced by information security 
threats b R 4.90 1 . 8 8 6 0.938
'Scale: a) Strongly Disagree -  Strongly Agree 
b) Never -  Always
"Specification: R) reflective 
F) formative
As shown in Table 4.10, a few items were eliminated from the analysis for failing 
to load significantly on their respective constructs. However, all reflective constructs 
retained at least four items of which the standardized loadings o f the retained reflective 
items were above a conservative 0.70 cutoff criterion. A loading of 0.70± indicates that 
the associated latent variable accounts for 50% of the variance in the indicator (Hair et 
al., 2006; Hair et al., 2014). Supporting the validity o f the items, the Cronbach’s alpha of 
each construct was within the recommendations of prior research (Nunnally, 1978), and 
the constructs exhibited convergence and discriminance as indicated by the AVE and 
latent variable correlations.
Structural Model
Finally, the hypothesized relationships in the research model were tested using 
PLS SEM. Unlike covariance-based SEM, PLS analyses do not provide goodness o f fit 
statistics, but rather are assessed by the construct validity and the significance o f the
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resultant paths (H air et al., 2014). As can be seen in Tables 4.11 and 4.12, all three o f  the 
hypothesized relationships were significant and in the predicted direction.
Table 4.11
Primary Study Correlations
Security
D ifferentiation
(SD) PMB PsyCap
Cronbach’s
a
SD 0.69* 0.89
PM B 0.4279 0.85 0.96
PsyCap 0.4578 0.3871 0.51 0.95
*AVE’s bolded along diagonal
Table 4.12
Structural Model Results
Hyp.
Hypothesis
(direction)
Path
Coefficient T-value
Significance
(one-tailed)
H I Security Behavioral Repertoire PMBs (+) 0.33 4.914 ***
H2 Security differentiation-^ PM Bs (+) 0.18 2.911 **
H3 PsyC ap-^  PM Bs (+) 0.14 2.931 **
Controls
Age 0.09 2.038 *
Tenure -0.04 1.211 n/s
Gender 0.01 0.052 n/s
Management 0.03 0.982 n/s
IT Staff 0.03 1.180 n/s
Bold = supported; *p=0.05; **p=0.01; ***p=0.001; n/s=not significant
In an effort to establish the robustness o f  the m odel o f  security behavioral 
com plexity, the structural m odel was also run while controlling for the age, gender, 
organizational tenure and w hether the insider was a m em ber o f  either m anagem ent or the
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'S
organization’s IT staff. In addition, the model was also re-run three additional times 
including distinct potential rival explanations each time. The security behavioral 
complexity model was robust to controls for age, gender, and tenure simultaneously, as 
well as managerial support for security, security locus of control, and social desirability, 
separately (see Figure 4.2).
Account Protection
Co worker Reliance
Verbal & Electronic Sensitive 
Info Protection
Legitimate Email Handling
Protection Against 
Lnautborized Exposure
Security Behavioral 
Repertoire
Distinct Security' Etiquette
Appropriate 
Data entrv and Management
Security DifferentiationSecure Software. Email, and 
Internet I se
BEHAV IORAL C OMPLEXITY
Hope
Resilience
Optimism
Self-Efficacy
Psychological Capital
Controls:
Included  Sim ultaneously:
A ge 
Sex 
T enure 
M anager 
IT  P osition  
Included  Separately:
S ocia l D esirability 
M anagerial S u p p o rt fo r S' 
S ecurity  L o c u s  o f  C 'ontro
R- = 34%
Protection Motivated 
Behaviors
First Order Re 
First Order Fo
i Second Order
Figure 4.2 Security Behavioral Complexity Results
2 The reduced model including demographic controls is no longer under-identified and was assessed in 
covariance-based SEM to confirm the results. PsyCap, 0.21, ***; Repertoire, 0.35,***; security 
differentiation, 0.22,** (construct, path coefficient, significance)
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Common Method Variance 
All o f the indicators in the study were measured by self-report survey items. 
Although IS research has been shown to be less susceptible to common method variance 
(CMV) than other disciplines (Malhotra et al., 2006), as a further assessment o f the 
validity of the findings an analysis o f CMV was performed. Study design is an important 
step in avoiding CMV in empirical research (Podsakoff et al., 2003). In order to 
minimize the effect o f CMV in the reported results, several steps were taken in the study 
design. (1) Respondents were assured of their anonymity by having access to the survey 
off-site and with a survey organization with which they have a trusted relationship. (2 ) 
Within each question set the items were randomly ordered for each respondent, 
eliminating any systematic bias in the ordering of the items. (3) The question order was 
counterbalanced with antecedent variables, consequence variables, and control variables 
dispersed throughout the instrument so as to minimize the likelihood that the responses to 
independent variables would impact the response to potential dependent variables. The 
instrument was pilot tested to ensure that the question order did not introduce cognitive
labor. (4) The instrument used reverse-order questions as well as “please respond ”
questions in order to identify those respondents who were answering carelessly. (5) Each 
item was carefully worded to eliminate any biasing effect of item ambiguity.
Given that the analysis was performed using PLS SEM, the methods o f detecting 
and potentially correcting for CMV are more limited than those in covariance-based SEM 
(Ronkko et al., 2011). Recently, a marker variable technique has been espoused which 
can be used to detect methodological bias in PLS (Ronkko et al., 2011). Despite the 
efforts to reduce common method bias in the single source data, such a marker variable
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was included in the study to allow a post-hoc analyses o f CMV. The marker variable 
included was a construct measuring an individual’s feelings about the color blue. An 
example o f an item measuring blue affinity is “I prefer blue to other colors.” The 
responses are a seven point likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree to strongly 
agree.” The use o f this variable is more rigorous than using, for example, a demographic 
response because it is o f the same type (i.e. seven-point Likert scale) as the substantive 
variables in the study (Ronkko et al., 2011; Williams et al., 2010). The correlation matrix 
of the substantive, controls, and marker variable are shown in Table 4.13.
The minimum total correlation in the study is 0.00 between differentiation and 
organizational tenure. However, the minimum correlation between every substantive 
variable and the marker variable is 0.13. To assess whether or not the relationship 
between the substantive variables are impacted by a methodological bias, the marker 
variable was included in the structural model as an antecedent to the single endogenous 
variable, PMBs. In this way, any variance explained by the theoretically unrelated 
variable should be associated with methodological bias rather than a true relationship. 
The marker variable acts as a control of method bias.
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As recommended, the impact to significance and magnitude resulting from the 
inclusion of the marker variable should be assessed. The changes observed between the 
baseline model and the marker variable model are shown in Table 4.14. The marker 
variable failed to significantly explain variance in the endogenous variable (R2 of both 
models was 34%). Further, the significance and magnitude o f all three substantive 
variables were unchanged when the marker variable was included in the analysis. These 
results indicate that method bias is not responsible for the explanation o f the dependent 
variable. Additionally, as discussed, the substantive variables remained significant in the 
presence of a control for social desirability as well, which further supports a lack of bias 
in the results.
Table 4.14
Results o f Common Method Variance Analysis
Hyp. Hypothesis
(direction)
Path
Coefficient
Coefficient
A
T-value T-value
A
Significance
A
H I Security behavioral reperto ire-^  
PM Bs (+)
0.33 - 4.896 0.018 -
H2 Security differentiation-^ PMBs 
(+)
0.18 - 2.882 0.089
-
H3 PsyC ap-^  PM Bs (+) 0.14 - 2.881 0.050 -
Controls
Age 0.10 .01 2.083 - -
Tenure -0.05 .01 1.215 0.004 -
Gender 0.00 .01 0.033 0.019 -
Management 0.03 - 1.027 0.045 -
IT Staff 0.03 - 1.162 0.018 -
Mar <er Variable
Blue 0.012 n/a 0.499 n/a -
*p=0.05; **p=0.0l; ***p=0.001; n/a=not applicable
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Discussion
The results o f the analysis indicate that the security behavioral security 
complexity model provides a robust, multidimensional framework o f PMB motivation. 
The three core hypotheses o f security behavioral complexity were supported in the 
analysis and were robust to the inclusion of controls, rival explanations, and a common- 
method marker construct. As predicted, an individual’s security behavioral repertoire is 
positively related to the performance of PMBs. Security differentiation, or the ability of 
an insider to differentiate his or her protective behavior according to the situation, was 
also positively related to the performance of PMBs. Further, as predicted, insiders’ 
PsyCap was positively related to PMBs as well, indicating that PsyCap does provide a 
necessary resource for taking on the paradoxical roles required by modem information 
security. Additionally, the varying means and standard deviations of the roles within 
security behavioral repertoire support the supposition that insider repertoires vary in both 
breadth and magnitude.
Implications and Contributions 
This research makes several important contributions to the behavioral information 
security literature. First, the study establishes the influence of insiders’ security 
behavioral repertoire on the performance of PMBs. The results underscore the diverse 
nature o f the roles within each insider’s security behavioral repertoire as well, with 
varying means and standard deviations across the roles. The positive relationship between 
insiders’ security behavioral repertoire and PMBs reveals that the broader an insider’s 
repertoire, the greater likelihood that the insider will enact security roles through the 
performance of PMBs. By capturing security roles through Likert scales, the measures
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also capture the magnitude o f each role within the insider. Therefore, the results also 
indicate that the more deeply held the conviction that he or she can enact the roles, the 
greater the performance of PMBs. Additionally, the formative measure o f security 
behavioral repertoire provides a relative measure o f importance of each role in leading to 
the enactment o f the broad category o f PMBs.
The influence of security behavioral repertoire provides organizations with 
evidence o f the importance o f training the protective security roles individually. 
Reviewing the formative measurement indicates that certain roles are more strongly 
related to the performance of PMBs. This realization leads to two conclusions (1) the 
return to security is unequal across all roles and (2) certain roles do not lead to behavior 
either because the role is not required or the insider fails to employ a known protection. 
Therefore, this research provides a measure of effectiveness of the protective roles 
identified in prior research. Organizations seeking to incite protective behaviors from 
employees must ensure that the insiders hold the appropriate behaviors within their 
security behavioral repertoire.
In order to effectively enact the security roles within one’s security behavioral 
repertoire, employees must also be able to switch from one of the roles to another along 
the course o f work. This research provides initial empirical support for this phenomenon 
which is termed security differentiation. The significance o f security differentiation is 
important for both research and practice. First, insiders who are able to multi-task or 
change security roles according the dynamic threats encountered in the workplace are 
more likely to engage in PMBs. This establishes the significance of an important 
security-related personal characteristic. Organizations seeking to increase security may
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seek to train employees to differentiate their behavior or may use this characteristic for 
screening employees for organizational roles which encounter the most diverse security 
threats. This significance is summarized in Table 4.15.
Table 4.15
Summary o f  Key Findings
Finding Significance to research Significance to practice
Varying significance, 
coefficients, means, and 
standard deviations of 
roles included in security 
behavioral repertoire.
Establishes the uniqueness 
of each insider’s security 
behavioral repertoire and 
the relative influence of 
each role on the 
performance of PMBs.
Informs organizations as to 
the uniqueness of each 
insider’s repertoire of 
security roles and the 
relative influence of each 
role on PMBs.
Security behavioral 
repertoire’s positive 
relationship with PMBs.
Provides evidence that 
insiders propensity to enact 
behaviors to protect the 
firm is directly related to 
the roles which they hold in 
their security behavioral 
repertoire.
Provides support for 
organizational training of 
individual security roles in 
order to increase security by 
eliciting PMBs from 
insiders.
Security differentiation’s 
positive relationship with 
PMBs
Establishes the role of 
multi-tasking or behavioral 
diversity on the 
performance o f PMBs and 
identifies an important 
security-related 
characteristic for inclusion 
into behavioral information 
security.
Provides organizations with 
an important characteristic 
for security-related 
screening and/or training.
PsyCap’s positive 
relationship with PMBs.
Provides support for the 
significant role of 
psychological resources in 
the enactment of divergent 
security roles such as 
PMBs.
Links PsyCap to security, 
further establishing the 
positive personal and 
organizational outcomes 
attributable to employees’ 
PsyCap.
Finally, beyond the behavioral complexity (repertoire and differentiation), the 
PsyCap o f the insider was a significant antecedent to the performance of PMBs. As
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defined previously in the chapter, PsyCap is a set o f positive resource capabilities. When 
dealing with the diverse roles required by modern information security, insiders require 
psychological resources in order to handle the resulting behavioral tensions. PsyCap 
provides a measure o f these resources and is a significant contributor to the security 
behavioral complexity research model tested here.
Limitations and Future Research 
There are inherent limitations in self-reported security research, and to a large 
extent this research is no exception. However, due to the absence of observational data of 
actual security behaviors, survey instruments are an accepted medium for ascertaining the 
behavior of insiders. I took recommended precaution to ensure that individual anonymity 
was preserved and responses were uninhibited. Additionally, the data for this research 
was collected at a cross-sectional level with differences measured between randomly 
surveyed organizational insiders. As such, this research is an appropriate and important 
initial validation of the security behavioral complexity model, but research remains to be 
completed within individuals and at an organizational level.
Eight o f the fourteen roles identified as the full taxonomy of PMBs were 
significantly related to the performance of PMBs. As measured by the security behavioral 
complexity model, this research examines the relative importance of the roles in insiders’ 
performance of PMBs. Future research remains to examine PMBs at the organizational 
level in order to ascertain the absolute importance of PMBs in protecting organizations 
from security threats. Additionally, future research should examine the potential 
effectiveness of each role in protecting the organization. In that way, organizations will
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have a measure o f the possible, absolute impact of each role as well as the actual, relative 
impact o f each role.
The impact of differentiation is also an important area for future research. 
Research remains to establish the ability o f organizations to manipulate employee’s 
differentiation. To the extent that differentiation is a malleable characteristic, 
organizations can increase security by training the diverse enactment o f security roles. 
Additionally, the research supports the notion that employees have varying abilities to 
differentiate their security behaviors. Future research remains to examine the 
characteristics o f individuals which make them more likely to differentiate their security 
behaviors. Finally, future research should examine the ability o f insiders to differentiate 
across organizational roles. For example, it may be shown that some departments are 
more secure due to the self-selection of high differentiators.
Finally, future research should continue to examine the role o f positive 
psychology and positive psychological facets such as those conceptualized in PsyCap in 
information security. This research adds to the myriad positive outcomes attributable to 
PsyCap and supports the notion that protective behaviors are impacted positively by 
positive psychological factors. The security behavioral complexity model is a trainable 
model, as insiders can have their repertoire expanded and their PsyCap built. Future 
research should seek to establish effective security programs that capitalize on the 
malleable qualities o f these antecedents to security behaviors in order to maximize the 
protection o f firms’ information and information systems.
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Conclusion
This dissertation chapter introduced and empirically examined a novel model of 
security behavioral complexity. The model of security behavioral complexity empirically 
examines the impact o f an insider’s security behavioral repertoire, differentiation, and 
PsyCap on the ultimate performance of PMBs. The results support the model as an 
appropriate and effective framework of insiders’ performance o f PMBs. Eight of the 
fourteen PMB roles were retained in the measure of an insider’s security behavioral 
repertoire and they exhibit the diverse nature of security behaviors in today’s connected, 
techno-centric business and social environments. The retained roles parallel the complex 
nature o f insider’s protection o f information and IS. The roles are both broad and specific 
(i.e. email use and task specific etiquette), as well as technical and social (i.e. secure 
software use and co-worker reliance). They also include physical as well as intellectual 
protections (i.e. unauthorized exposure and verbal disclosures), as well as systems 
protection (i.e. account protection).
In addition to merely holding each role within one’s behavioral repertoire, the 
research highlights the inherent role of behavioral diversity in order to enact the various 
behaviors. This ability is referred to as security differentiation in the chapter and together 
with security behavioral repertoire makes up behavioral complexity as defined in prior 
literature. Drawing from the field o f positive psychology, this research improves the base 
model o f behavioral complexity by including the psychological resource capabilities of 
the actor as a significant antecedent to PMBs. The security behavioral complexity model 
significantly explains over a third of the total variance in the performance o f PMBs and is 
robust to controls and rival explanations.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUDING CHAPTER
This dissertation and the three studies contained herein empirically examine novel 
research models in behavioral information security. Central to the research is the 
relationship between insiders’ PsyCap and information security. The findings exhibit the 
fundamental relationship between information security and PsyCap with support for 
PsyCap as both an antecedent to security behavior and a consequence of security 
expectancies. Additionally, the studies incorporate the same dependent variable, 
performance o f protection motivated behaviors (PMBs). The consistency o f both PsyCap 
and PMBs across research models provides a central theme for the investigation o f the 
impact o f PsyCap in behavioral information security. PMBs as a dependent variable are 
o f particular importance as they represent behaviors across the domain of protection 
motivated behaviors which an insider can undertake. The specific results o f the three 
studies are summarized in the remainder o f this chapter followed by a recounting of the 
conclusions drawn from the studies. In addition to summarizing the dissertation findings, 
the limitations in the dissertation research and opportunities for future research are 
articulated.
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Summary of Dissertation Findings
This concluding chapter next includes a summary of the dissertation findings. The 
findings of the studies are recapitulated along with a discussion of study-specific 
limitations and conclusions. Following the specific findings, general conclusions of the 
dissertation as a whole are detailed.
Study I: A Multi-Dimensional Assessment o f  Organizational 
Insiders ’ Performance o f  Protection-Motivated Behaviors:
An Expectancy Theory Approach
The first study examined an expectancy-theory based model o f insiders’ security 
behavior. Expectancy theory espouses a relationship between valence, instrumentality, 
and expectancy (VIE) and behavioral motivation. Beyond the relationship between the 
VIE model and behavioral motivation, the research also examined organizational 
influence on these dimensions through security education training and awareness 
(SETA). Finally, the relationship between expectancy dimensions and psychological 
resources (PsyCap) were also investigated. The motivation to perform protection 
motivated behaviors (PMBs) was conceptualized as motivation to perform and 
withdrawal from performance of protective behaviors.
Nine o f the thirteen hypothesized relationships were supported in the analysis. 
The findings support the significant impact o f the expectancy dimensions (VIE) on the 
motivation to and withdrawal from PMBs. As hypothesized, security expectancy and 
security valence were positively related to protection motivation. Conversely, security 
valence was negatively related to security withdrawal. In addition the impact of SETA on 
expectancy dimensions was uniformly supported across the VIE model. Therefore, the 
security expectancy research model provides a framework for security training for
140
organizations. Though expectancy theory has been employed at both the within and 
between individual level in past research, some have argued that expectancy theory is 
most appropriate for analyzing motivational changes within individuals. However, the 
robust performance of expectancy between individuals supports its use as a framework of 
security behavior across individuals. Given the significance o f the research model, future 
research can use this expectancy-based framework to examine within individual impacts 
resulting from manipulations such as training sessions ( see Figure 5.1).
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0.40 PMBaPeyC apSETA
Security
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Security
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C o n t r o l s :
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* Second  Order Reflective
Figure 5.1 Study One Research Model Summary
Finally, a significant relationship between the expectancy theory measures of 
instrumentality and expectancy and PsyCap was established in this research. However, 
PsyCap was not significantly related to either protection motivation or security 
withdrawal. Future research should continue to examine the relationship between 
insiders’ PsyCap and security behaviors. Specifically, the role of PsyCap as a resource 
for security behavior, as a potential moderator of important relationships, and as a 
dependent variable in IS research should be explored.
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Study 2: The Adaptive Role o f  Emotion in Information Security:
Broadening the Theoretical Repertoire
The second study developed and examined a novel model of emotion in 
behavioral information security. The study offers a complementary emotive-behavioral 
model to the cognitive-behavioral models which are employed often in IS research. The 
results o f the analysis support the broad influence o f emotion in behavioral information 
security. The research integrates a newly developed framework o f emotion with the 
broaden-and-build theory. Through this integration, the research examines the influence 
of discrete emotions taking into account the specific action tendencies o f each quadrant 
of the emotional framework ( see Figures 5.2 and Figure 5.3).
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Figure 5.2 Study Two Research Model I Summary
142
Challenge Emotion
Interest
tO Achievement Emotion
0.25
Lote Emotion
O ) Avoidance Emotion o . U
Anger
Pride
F ear
N egative Affect
Positive Affect
PsyCap PMBs
Controls:
Significant
Significant Path
 ►
Insignificant Path
Manager (+}
IT Position (+) 
Education Level (+) 
SETA Frequency (+) 
Insignificant______________
Age
Tenure
Sex
Figure 5.3 Study Two Research Model 2 Summary
The discrete emotions were analyzed in two separate models, each with a separate 
discrete emotion from each quadrant of the emotional framework. The results elucidate 
the impact of discrete emotions and support the tenants of the broaden-and-build theory. 
Challenge emotions with their specific action tendency of behavior were positively 
related to PMBs. Achievement emotions, which are associated with psychological 
resources, were positively related to PsyCap. On the negative side of the framework, loss 
emotions were negatively related to PsyCap, and avoidance emotions had mixed results. 
Anxiety had no relationship with PMBs, while fear was negatively related to PMBs. 
Lastly, the impact o f lingering positive and negative affect were examined in the model 
and were found to have no impact on PMBs.
Emotional research is not without inherent limitation. The researcher’s inability to 
capture emotional responses from insiders in an experimental setting creates a limitation
143
in measurement. Due to the difficulty in recalling past emotions, the survey instrument 
employed in this research asked insiders to respond how they feel when they think about 
protecting their organization from security threats. Though not experimental, this 
technique eliminates the temporal disparity between the experience and the survey 
response.
The emotion-based research model supports the expansion of the theoretical 
repertoire to include adaptational approaches to security-related behavior such as the 
broaden-and-build theory, and highlights the need for future research into the impact of 
positive emotions in behavioral information security and IS at large. Additionally, the 
research exhibits the importance o f research into discrete emotions in behavior 
information security. As shown in this study, Beaudry and Pinsonneault’s (2010) 
emotional framework provides an important categorization of emotion; however, each 
discrete emotion retains unique influence as well.
Study 3: Security Behavioral Complexity and Psychological 
Capital: An Empirical Examination
The third and final study in the dissertation developed and examined a model of 
security behavioral complexity. Behavioral complexity is comprised o f behavioral 
repertoire and differentiation. The model of security behavioral complexity includes the 
core components of behavioral complexity, security behavioral repertoire and security 
differentiation, along with the positive psychological resource o f PsyCap.
The findings support the influence o f security behavioral complexity on the 
performance o f PMBs by organizational insiders. All three core hypotheses in the model 
were supported and robust to controls. The results contribute to both research and
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practice in several important ways. First the research establishes the influence of 
behavioral complexity in information security. The impact o f security behavioral 
repertoire on PMBs supports the notion that insiders’ performance of PMBs is related to 
the security behavioral repertoire of insiders. The relationship between security 
behavioral repertoire and PMBs provides organizations with a framework for developing 
training programs (SETA). The positive influence o f differentiation evidences the 
importance of behavioral diversity in modern information security. Finally, the influence 
of PsyCap indicates that in light o f behavioral complexity, psychological resources are 
influential in behavior as well ( see Figure 5.4).
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The results o f the security behavioral complexity research present opportunities 
for future research. For example, future research remains to establish the potential 
effectiveness o f each role which an insider may hold in his or her security behavioral 
repertoire. The influence of security differentiation also presents an area for future 
research. Researcher into the malleability o f security differentiation would establish the 
most appropriate mechanism by which to increase security in light of the impact of 
differentiation, whether through training differentiation or screening for levels of 
differentiation.
Dissertation Lim itations
There are inherent limitations in self-reported security research, and to a large 
extent this research is no exception. However, due to the absence of observational data of 
actual security behaviors, survey instruments are an accepted medium for ascertaining the 
behavior o f insiders. I took recommended precaution to ensure that individual anonymity 
was preserved and responses were uninhibited. Additionally, the data for this research 
was collected at a cross-sectional level using an online panel with differences measured 
between randomly surveyed organizational insiders.
Panels are especially appropriate for gathering security data as they offer full 
anonymity, not simply confidentiality. Given the sensitive nature o f security responses, 
anonymity is required to encourage candid responses, and panels provide increased 
anonymity in multiple ways. First, the researchers never know the identity of the 
respondents, and the privacy of respondents is guaranteed and governed by the data 
provider. Second, respondents’ real and perceived anonymity is enhanced by having 
access to the survey outside of their organization’s network and computers. Providing
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anonymous, off-site access to self-report surveys has been shown to be adequate and 
appropriate for the elicitation of self-reported incidences of sensitive and even socially 
undesirable behaviors such as protection-motivated behaviors (Posey et al., 2013) and 
organizational deviance (Bennett et ah, 2000; Bennett et ah, 2003). Finally, all 
instruments were pilot tested before execution. As such, the dissertation results were 
based on the surveying of four unique samples—two pilot study samples and two large 
online panels.
Final C onclusions and Future R esearch
The dissertation examined the role of PsyCap in behavioral security. The role of 
PsyCap as an important consequence o f and antecedent to security-related constructs was 
established in the work. The dissertation sets the stage for significant future research in 
behavioral information security. First, future research into the relationship between 
PsyCap and information security should be researched further. The studies reveal PsyCap 
to be a significant antecedent and consequence of security-related constructs. The role of 
PsyCap in information security highlights the importance of psychological resources in 
the protection of the firm’s informational assets. In this hyper-connected organizational 
environment, the psychological resources o f all those with access to proprietary 
information is likely to be an important future consideration. Additionally, the almost 
daily reportage of insider misbehavior support future research into the role that positive 
psychological resources may play in the commission o f deviant behaviors as well.
The dissertation also provides support for the investigation into PMBs. All three 
dissertation studies explore theoretical frameworks for the explanation o f performance of 
PMBs. As a construct reflecting a general class of protective behaviors, research into
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PMBs allows for consideration across the full domain o f protective behaviors 
simultaneously. Future research remains to be conducted into the performance o f PMBs. 
PMBs are an important future dependent variable as they represent the full domain of 
protective behaviors which an insider can hold in his or her security behavioral repertoire. 
Therefore, they allow for the investigation into a class o f behaviors rather than relegation 
to specific behaviors.
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